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 Abstract 
 
The following work develops a critical approach to women’s experience by engaging 
with phenomenology and modernist poetics of place. It critiques the androcentricity 
of phenomenology and philosophical abstractions of gender and space, arguing that a 
feminist phenomenology with its focus on alternative modes of being in a diverse but 
socially and gender-stratified world can more aptly articulate experiential specificities 
that neither fortify nor fit into conventional paradigms of experience. This thesis 
discusses the imaginative and aesthetic rendering of women’s experiences of rooms in 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway, Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood, Jean Rhys’s Good 
Morning, Midnight, and Elizabeth Bowen’s “The Demon Lover,” “Pink May,” and 
“Hand in Glove.”   
 
Chapter 1 addresses the affinities between phenomenology and feminism, and trace 
the trajectory of the narrative of place in modernist women’s writing. Chapters 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 discuss the power of place, examining how women experience the environing 
world and come to perceive it in its givenness. The chapters show how naturalised 
understandings of identity and gender manifest in the experience of place, and argue 
that a “shaking” of place and the discovery of a room of one’s own can expand the 
realm of experiential possibilities to configure a feminine kind of experience that may 
transform the normative world into something more hospitable and livable for those 
who fall short of the hegemonic ideal.  
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Introduction 
If we escape a little from the common sitting-room and see human beings not as 
always in their relation to each other but in relation to reality; and the sky, too, and the 
trees and whatever it may be in themselves…  
—Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (1929) 
 
Virginia Woolf closes A Room of One’s Own by inviting fellow women to experience 
the world and in doing so live for the dead poets of our sex. If “our relation is to the 
world of reality and not to the world of men and women,” then the women who came 
before our time “shall find it possible to live and write” (132). To have a room of her 
own, woman must first turn to her relation to the lived world, that brick and mortar 
world.  
 And it is the city of London to which Clarissa in Mrs Dalloway turns her 
attention. The hubbub of modern life is a stimulus for her interior space: as she 
“plunges” into the heart of the city, the spatial boundary between inner and outer 
spaces collapses, and she is in the midst of “what she loved” (MD 4). Sasha Jenson in 
Jean Rhys’s Good Morning, Midnight, too, fixates on the city; her wanderings and 
relentless search for a hotel room of her own are spatial manifestations of her lack of 
fixity and socio-geographical ambivalence. Contrary to Clarissa, Sasha is where she 
does not feel belonged. Still in both novels is an emphasis on women’s active 
engagement with the exterior world.  
Beyond the city, the accent on space opens up narratives of inconspicuous, 
modest rooms wherein identities, subjectivities, the past and the present, action and 
thought are interrogated. In Elizabeth Bowen’s “The Demon Lover,” the room 
upstairs is where Kathleen Drover escapes the haunting of her former lover and re-
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sees the past in light of the woman she has become. In Mrs Dalloway, the attic room 
in London somewhat merges with the room on the top of the house in Bourton where 
Clarissa was once with Sally Seton; the room expands just as Clarissa’s aloneness 
gives way to female solidarity. In Bowen’s “Hand in Glove,” the attic room is also a 
threshold space, between reality and unreality where the oppressive culture takes the 
form of a murderous glove. The tight room allows for confrontations of rigid rules 
and boundaries, fixed norms and conventions, ironically making space for a deeper 
contemplation of the significance and representation of place in the study of women’s 
experience.1  
The experiential turn to places—be they streets or rooms—is a modern 
phenomenon. One explanation for this were the technological advances that emerged 
from about the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century which created new 
ways of experiencing space.2 The motor car, for example, altered conceptions of 
speed and mobility: time taken to get from one place to another was shortened and 
distance was a lesser obstacle.3 Such changes affected everyday experience, including 
that of the modern writer. Woolf wrote in her diary in July 1927: “All images are now 
tinged with driving a motor” (149). Modern experiences were influenced by new 
forms of mobility which inspired the freedom of imagination.4  
                                                
1 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of rooms in general; Chapters 4 and 5 for a detailed discussion of small 
rooms in Good Morning, Midnight and “Hand in Glove.” 
2 These include mainly innovations which changed the way distance and time was perceived: the safety 
bicycles in the 1880s, mass production and sale of the motor car in the 1900s, and the Wright brothers’ 
flyers in 1900s which allowed cross-country flights over a sustained period of time.  
3 Concepts of time and space shifted in tandem with scientific discoveries of the time: Einstein’s 
relativity theory destabilised the uniform space of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry. For a 
more detailed discussion of the changing conception of space in the early 1900s, see the chapter 
“Space” in Stephen Kern’s The Modernist Novel. 
4 Wendy Parkins elaborates on the life of the modern writer and the relationship between writing and 
driving: “the ephemerality, spontaneity and unpredictability of car travel” challenged modern writers to 
“capture a moment in time” (152). For a detailed discussion of how the modern writer was influenced 
by transportation options like the motor car, see Parkins’s Mobility and Modernity in Women’s Novels 
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The rapidly modernising world and varying perceptions of space figure into 
the narrative of place in modern fiction. The experiential turn to one’s relation with 
the world as suggested in A Room of One’s Own is not only a material one but 
modernist as well.5 The authors discussed in this thesis: Virginia Woolf, Jean Rhys, 
Djuna Barnes, and Elizabeth Bowen, are a coterie of modernists in the early twentieth 
century who “write of events in meaningful rooms and evocative exterior settings” 
(Kern, The Modernist Novel 77). More specifically, they write about women’s 
experiences of places. Whilst the modern writer is conscious of new possibilities of 
freedom, she is also aware that heightened mobility accentuates the predicaments of 
women who are not afforded the luxury of movement or place of their own. 
In the denouement of “The Demon Lover,” Kathleen is driven away by the 
ghost from her past into the hinterlands; the speed of the taxi contrasts with the 
passenger’s inertia. The woman is unable to escape the expectations and roles thrusted 
upon her. In Nightwood, Robin Vote shuffles from lover to lover, shelter to shelter. 
Key chapters set in the confidante’s abode—Nora Flood’s parlour, Jenny 
Petherbridge’s inherited house, Matthew O’Connor’s apartment—locate the narrative 
of the elusive protagonist. The seed of Robin’s wanderlust is sexual ambivalence—
the inability to be fixed and refusal to be pinned down. Not only are interior states of 
mind and inexpressive feelings mapped onto spaces, the invisible and marginal are 
also fleshed out in rooms. The works studied in this thesis pave the way for renewed 
explorations of quotidian and liminal spaces and present the experience of being a 
woman whose course of life is neither dominant nor neutral.6  
                                                
5 See Chapter 1, “Place in Modernist Women’s Writing.”  
6 Sara Ahmed in Queer Phenomenology writes about dominant “lifelines” that we inherit and 
reproduce. She calls attention to “the social pressure to follow a certain course, to live a certain kind of 
life, and even to reproduce that life” (17). The female characters in the works studied in this thesis 
deviate from this dominant course of life, albeit in varying degrees. For example, the lesbian women in 
Nightwood and the lone wandering Sasha in Good Morning, Midnight.   
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The focus on women’s experiences that runs through the selected works—Mrs 
Dalloway, Nightwood, Good Morning, Midnight, “The Demon Lover,” “Pink May,” 
and “Hand in Glove”—along with the insistence on exploring that which is outside 
the common sitting-room and one’s relation to the environing world put focus on 
material geography and inquire into what it means for women to be in the lived world. 
This very idée fixe anticipates a critical study of modernist women’s writing through 
a feminist phenomenological lens.  
Phenomenology and feminism form the framework for thinking about the 
narrative of place in this thesis. Phenomenology, according to Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, “offers an account of space, time and the world as we ‘live’ them” and tries to 
give a “direct description” of the world which is “already there” (Phenomenology of 
Perception vii). In this regard, it echoes Woolf’s entreaty to women to experience 
phenomena as they appear in the material world. Whilst phenomenology 
complements the analysis of modernist works given its commitment to the material 
world, it alone is inadequate to elucidate the narrative of place in the select literary 
texts. There are two reasons for this: first, its androcentricity neglects the peculiarities 
of women’s experiences; second, it lacks the polemic force to urge women to escape 
from their sitting-rooms.  
To begin with, the phenomenologist sees the world as a “universal horizon… 
of existing objects, each ‘I-the-man’ and all of us together” (Husserl, The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy 5). Historically, she who is 
“present in cities as temptress, as whore, as fallen woman, as lesbian,” whose public 
presence is “a general moral and political threat,” sees the paternal world differently 
from her male counterpart (Wilson, The Sphinx in the City 6). The world is not as 
“universal” as the phenomenologist conceives. This bleeds into the second reason, for 
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the focus on a universal experience of an androcentric subject does not require 
phenomenology to dig deeper into the politics of gender and identity. 
The initiative to draw together phenomenological perspectives on the lived 
body in a material world and feminism, which tends to the particularity of experience 
and subjective being in the world, tackles the generality of experience in the world as 
well as illuminate the specifics of women’s experiences. The feminist perspective 
serves a critical and corrective lens to the androcentric phenomenological framework 
used to read the fictions of Woolf, Barnes, Rhys, and Bowen. When Woolf said that 
Jane Austen and Emily Brontë “wrote as women write,” she was asserting the need to 
attend to “the values of women” which differ from men (A Room of One’s Own 85-
87). This call is aligned with feminism which Patricia Waugh defines “seeks a 
subjective identity, a sense of effective agency and history for women which has 
hitherto been denied them by the dominant culture,” (Feminine Fictions (9). Only 
when the focus is on women’s experience and expression can there be the hope of 
relieving “the weight of the masculine canon,” as Rachel Bowlby writes, of 
“recovering a female tradition,” and of “establishing [women’s writing] as a tradition 
with its own line of development” (Feminist Destinations 22-23).  
Feminism with its emancipatory force and specific focus on women’s 
experience, and phenomenology’s interest in the general modality of experience in the 
lived world work together to expound on what it means for women to inhabit a world 
that is sedimented with patriarchal beliefs and gender-stratified. This interdisciplinary 
approach is necessary for the select women writers who are not only interested in the 
body, positionality, and emplacement which phenomenology too delves into; they are 
committed to presenting how women are physically and socially positioned and 
directed to see the world in a certain way.  
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This thesis sits at the intersection of its principal critical contexts: 
phenomenology, feminism, and modernist women’s writing, which share a 
commitment to describe lived experience, to forge a narrative of the world that 
includes alternative modalities of experience and identity. With place at the core of its 
discussion, it brings together phenomenology’s emphasis on bodily perception, 
feminism’s focus on women’s lives, and modern fiction’s imaginative reification of 
interiority in an effort to answer the following question: what constitutes feminine 
experience and how does it relate to women’s being in the material and masculine 
world? It is concerned with how women’s naturalised understanding of their existence 
and womanhood manifests in their experiences of places, and how a “shaking” of 
those places and the discovery of a room of one’s own can expand the realm of 
experiential possibilities to configure a kind of experience that can transform the 
normative world into something more hospitable and livable for those who are 
different and displaced.   
The first chapter lays out the framework of feminist phenomenology by 
extrapolating from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and existing feminist revisions. 
It then shows how a feminist phenomenology may elucidate the representations of 
space in modern fiction: from the city in Mrs Dalloway which is an external 
projection of Clarissa’s psychic life, the almost identical rooms in Good Morning, 
Midnight wherein Sasha habitually replays her trauma, to the world at night in 
Nightwood in which the emphasis falls on the sense of place and the paralysis when 
the view of the world becomes vague. The chapter will also situate the thesis within 
current debates of modernist studies and show how a phenomenological framework 
can better articulate feminine experience in relation to textured and dynamic spaces. 
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The second chapter aims to show how the phenomenological idea of situation 
can run parallel to the narrative of place in Mrs Dalloway. It argues that situations 
have a materiality which additionally binds women to socio-cultural milieus by 
examining the narrative of feminine places (the kitchen, for example) and showing 
how the experience of place is a kind of spatial practice that has developed from 
domesticity and the stratification of places. This chapter also posits a gendered 
reading of experience which moves away from the generic modality of experience.  
The study of place extends to the sens of place in the third chapter.7 For the 
women in Nightwood living in the world at night, to experience is to sense. This 
chapter discusses the notion of sense experience in relation to the experiences of those 
who are unable to see rightly and clearly because of certain disadvantages. It argues 
that having a disadvantage is not so much a disability as it is a different vantage point 
of the social and sexual deviant who chooses to see at a slant and remain bent. Here 
phenomenological ideas of the body and its position in the environing world are re-
envisioned for the queer, lived body.  
Having established that the experience of place is a spatial practice and a sens-
ing one at that, the chapter on Good Morning, Midnight ventures to posit a spatial 
consciousness, which is described as the proclivity for structuring thought around 
spatiality. It heightens sensitivity towards place and creates experience that is 
reflecting and exploratory. The chapter details the workings of spatial 
consciousness—how it precipitates a new kind of seeing that is essential to 
comprehending women’s situation, one that is always “already there” and so must be 
constantly seen anew.   
                                                
7 The French sens translates to “sense,” but it also means direction.  
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The last chapter collates ideas of emplaced subjectivity, sense experience, and 
spatial consciousness in the study of the haunted house. It argues that the experience 
of haunted space is a dramatisation of being in the world, that the haunted house is a 
spatial embodiment of women’s beliefs in longstanding domestic ideologies. This 
chapter shows how Bowen’s stories unearth the pernicious effects of beliefs, relating 
perceptual beliefs to ingrained socio-cultural beliefs that domesticate and disempower 
women. It concludes with the return to the home and re-builds it with the feminist 
phenomenological perspective that has developed through the thesis.  
This thesis, then, discusses the relations between place, modernist women’s 
writing, and phenomenology. It ultimately wants to return to the originary experience 
of the world through material places, and in doing so uncover the structure of 
perception that underpins women’s experiences and show how freedom and mobility 
are possible via a re-imagination and creation of perspectives of scenes in modernist 
narratives of space.  
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1. Phenomenology, Feminism, and Place in Modernist Women’s Writing 
The integration of feminist thought into phenomenology is an effort to develop a more 
specialised framework for articulating feminine experience rendered in the select 
women’s writings. First, this chapter will develop the framework for a feminist 
phenomenology by drawing out the intersections between phenomenology and 
feminism. It focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on lived experience: situation, 
positionality, the body and movements, and experiential perception. It will then 
discuss existing feminist perspectives on phenomenology and address the issues of 
androcentricity and universalism that need to be worked out before a project on 
phenomenology and feminism can happen.  
As it lays the rubrics of feminist phenomenology, the chapter will also discuss 
the choice of primary texts and how the rendering of places in Mrs Dalloway, 
Nightwood, Good Morning, Midnight, and Bowen’s short stories adds to or modifies 
certain phenomenological ideas that are abstract and androcentric. The later section 
will address how these literary texts are suited for a phenomenology of place—how 
they are in their own right modernist representations of female subjectivities in the 
twentieth century fin-de-siècle world, whether overtly so in Mrs Dalloway or 
implicitly in Nightwood.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology and the Material World 
Phenomenology (or the logos of phainomenon) is a style of thought on experience and 
consciousness that became prominent in the early twentieth century. It is the study of 
occurrences, of things that appear: the Greek logos meaning word, to speak; 
phainomenon denoting any observable appearance. It offers up a lived world where 
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things are perceived as they appear, as opposed to the Cartesian thought world.8 
Phenomenology was founded by Edmund Husserl who advocated for “[an] originary 
experience of concrete physical things in external perception” that suspends natural 
beliefs in the objectivity of experience (Ideas 6). Husserl’s ontology disavows the 
claims of objective Truths as unquestionable pre-givens constituting the foundation of 
experience and puts focus on the originary contact with the world. Other thinkers like 
Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger have developed their own phenomenologies by 
inquiring into what it means to be in the material world.  
For Scheler, the impulse (Gefühlsdrang) is key to understanding the 
primordial state of experience. “[Devoid] of consciousness, sensation and 
representation,” the impulse only involves motor reflexes (Man’s Place in Nature 9). 
Considering movement, Scheler presents “[a] primitive movement-space,” which 
affords us a “consciousness-of-being-around-and/or-surrounded” (45). The 
mindfulness of how the body moves and is positioned figures a spatial dimension to 
experience—one which Martin Heidegger too picked up on. Positing that phenomena 
must be approached at a participative level, Heidegger developed the concept of 
Dasein (the that-it-is-of a being), where to know an object is to encounter it as it 
“show[s] itself to itself on its own terms,” as an object of “average everydayness” 
(Being and Time 15). His is a “hands-on” phenomenology where one actively engages 
with the everyday world. Such practical involvement with the environment 
emphasises the working world.  
  Phenomenology has always been about lived experience. Philosophers like 
Scheler and Heidegger have illuminated important aspects of the material world, but 
                                                
8 Linda Alcoff describes the Cartesian thought world: “Man organizes and shapes his world, conferring 
on it meaning and intelligibility, and thus man is constitutive for all knowledge” (“Phenomenology, 
Post-structuralism, and Feminist Theory” 40). 
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none so relevant to spatial experience as the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908-1961) whose ideas on the lived body precipitated my inquiry of what it 
means for women to inhabit—and one could say inherit—a world that is already 
there. His phenomenology enables discussions on orientation and position and helps 
us to think about how the female body may negotiate space. Amongst the 
phenomenologies that emerged in the late eighteenth and early twentieth century, 
Merleau-Ponty’s work on perception and spatial dimension of experience is invoked 
as a primary reference to bridge ideas of the body, experience, perception, and place, 
for it emphasises the material (the body and world) and sheds light on the lived 
experience. 
In his landmark treatise, Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty 
writes that “experience is nothing or it must be total” (301). The study of experience 
is “gives us access to being”; to experience a structure, or to be, is “to live it, to take it 
up, assume it and discover its immanent significance” (300).  According to Merleau-
Ponty, experience is more accurately termed, “an experience of my-body-in-the-
world” (164). Here is the idea of the body-world: the body is not only “a system of 
present positions” but also “an open system of an infinite number of equivalent 
positions directed to other ends” (164).9 The body is situated in a world of other 
embodied beings and socio-cultural sediments and habits, interactions and activities, 
which altogether make up the lived bodily experience. Thus what (the spectacle) and 
how (the lens) one perceives are contingent on the situation itself.  
By situation, Merleau-Ponty means “the object in its concrete context”: that is, 
the spatial and social dimensions of situation (POP 284).  This takes into account how 
                                                
9 “End” here refers to other existences who are also positions and systems in themselves. Existence is 
therefore always situated in a network of lived bodies experiencing the material world from multiple 
positions: “It follows that it is not only an experience of my body, but an experience of my body-in-
the-world” (163-164).  
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one’s view of the world is shaped by her social and physical milieus, its patterns of 
perception and habits.10 The idea of situation is important when reading works like 
Good Morning, Midnight in which the narrative of place is less of a spectacle in that 
the rooms are alike. To briefly illustrate, the opening passage in the novella marks the 
layout of the hotel room and segues into a description of the streets. The smooth 
transition from inside to outside is trivial at first; but after several repetitions of 
similar descriptions, it is apparent that the impulse to blur boundaries is part of 
Sasha’s situation, one derived from her habit of returning to the first room and 
subsuming all other rooms into that one room. The hotel room is the concrete space; 
the view of the room is influenced by context.   
Situation also entails positionality. To be situated is to be positioned 
somewhere in a given locality. Emplacement involves direction: words like “left” and 
“right” are used to locate position; empirical designations decide what is here and 
there. In order to situate experience, phenomenology has to concede that the 
“constituting mind is eminently able to trace out all directions in space” (POP 288). 
In response, Merleau-Ponty states that the knowledge of position is not a mindful act 
as it is the body functioning as “a system of possible actions” (291). This is especially 
clear in circumstances where the scene is hard to make out. In an obscure space, 
where directions do not make sense, one would have to “live in it” in order to 
“identify” position (293). Thus, any given position is a result of the body’s 
inhabitation of space; a bodily understanding of space rather than the mind’s. 
This would make sense when we consider the scene in “The Demon Lover” 
where young Kathleen tries to communicate with the soldier in the dark by putting out 
                                                
10 For Merleau-Ponty, habit is the “formula” of “previously acquired movements” (165). The body acts 
because of prior experiences. Merleau-Ponty gives the example of dancing which is modelled on the 
“ideal outline” formed from walking and running (165).  
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her hand, as if to say “I am here.” By doing so, she has positioned herself in relation 
to him, establishing distance in the attempt to “verif[y] his presence” (“TDL” 83). The 
underlying assumption is that her idea of where she is assimilated into his idea of 
where she is, as proven when he takes her hand and presses it to his breast buttons. 
Because neither can see each other, cues like “left” and “right” do not make sense. 
Yet the reciprocated action implies that there is some unanimous agreement of 
direction. Even though directions are pre-learned, concepts of here and there are 
embodied. The location of one’s position in place is a bodily effort. 
Also evident in the above example is the importance of experiential 
perception: Kathleen is able to perceive the soldier because she held out her hand. She 
has a sense of the soldier’s presence. This perception is not altogether attributed to 
visual sight, for she “[has] not ever completely seen his face” (“TDL” 83). Yet, his 
presence is fully verified. To perceive, in this case, is not only to see but also to touch 
and feel. Such perception is in line with Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the lived world that 
demands an understanding of a spatial, if not experiential perception. To perceive, he 
makes clear, is not to “think,” but to “live” (POP xviii). By extension, to perceive is 
to experience. Implied here is the active participation in the lived world, as opposed to 
active thinking.  
Experiential perception encompasses spatiality and positionality—both of 
which requires inhabitation. One has to live in the given space, be situated, in order to 
get a sense of one’s position and place. The word “sense,” or sens in French, is 
spatial. Sens, which captures the English definition of sense (“perceive,” “feel,” 
“know”), also means “direction.” To have a sens of something is to be aware that 
experience involves relations because in the words of Merleau-Ponty, “two points are 
enough to establish a direction” (POP 287). Sens experience embodies the intuitive 
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experience and feeling towards something; it also ascribes direction that anticipates 
movements between points and interactions between the emplaced phenomena. To 
have a phenomenological sense of something is thus to have an experiential 
perception as well as relational understanding of the thing or person in question. 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology situates bodily experience in the material 
world. His ideas on spatiality, positionality, the body and its movements, perception 
as experience are central to developing a feminist phenomenology in this thesis. They 
overlap with feminist ideas of corporeality, identity politics, gender, performance, and 
so on. These commonalities encourage collaborations between phenomenology and 
feminism, which already existed before the term feminist phenomenology came into 
prominence in the twenty-first century.   
 
Feminist Revision and Phenomenology 
At first glance, the ontological stance of phenomenology that revises and challenges 
localised truths is attractive to feminism in which gender is studied as a kind of fiction 
stemming from naturalistic and biological differences. Phenomenology, in its bid to 
unearth the sediments of acquired and imparted ideologies, incidentally echoes de 
Beauvoir’s claim that “one is not born, but, rather, becomes a woman” (The Second 
Sex 295). In this regard, the female body is lived because it practices and performs 
naturalised ideas of identity and gender. On practice, Edith Stein, one of the first 
feminist phenomenologist writing in the early 1900s, notes that women must venture 
outside their comfort zones of “receiving” pre-formed practices and begin to activate 
their “practical abilities” and start “acting” (“Women’s Intrinsic Value in National 
Life” 111). Stein makes clear that vocation is the means to actual living and originary 
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experience. Vocation, as she meant it, entails practical and active engagement with 
the working world—a relation that recalls Scheler and Heidegger’s works. 
 Even as Stein’s phenomenology is specific to women’s experience, the female 
lived body itself is not the main focus in phenomenology—which, is preoccupied with 
bodily interactions with phenomena, with emphasis on experience as bodily (used as 
an adjective), rather than the lived body. Phenomenology approaches the 
transcendence of the self with the assumption of a body that is gender and sex neutral. 
And, de Beauvoir explains, “man represents both the positive and the neutral, as is 
indicated by the common use of man to designate human beings; whereas women 
represents only the negative” (15). Assuming an un-gendered body, phenomenology 
conflates women’s experiences with men, and so into the general study of experience. 
It may have freed the subject from the self-sufficient Ego, but the woman remains the 
unvoiced and invisible half of the universal body. 
If phenomenology is about the subjective lived experience, then it must 
address the different bodily make-up of men and women.11 Feminist critics concerned 
with specificities of the body criticise phenomenology for precisely its neglect of 
existing gender relations and careless presumption of a generic body. As Linda Fisher 
notes, feminists have argued that phenomenology hinges on a universality that 
“erase[s] the unique specificities of women’s experience” (“Phenomenology and 
Feminism” 26). Phenomenology’s neglect of sexual and bodily differences can come 
across as a deliberate move to exclude women.12 Such feminist interpretations come 
with a bias that precludes the appreciation of the phenomenological framework that 
can help articulate women’s experiences in a lived world.  
                                                
11 As de Beauvoir tells us, “Women, like man, is her body; but her body is something other than 
herself” (61). 
12 Fisher notes that phenomenology is sometimes read as an “instance of ‘male’ philosophizing” (23). 
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Feminist scepticism may appear self-aggrandising and and essentialist in its 
claim of feminine experience. The impulse to bifurcate experience into masculine and 
feminine plays into dualist traps. It is difficult, I think, for feminists, to criticise 
phenomenology for its universalism and argue for feminine existence without 
seeming essentialist. To discuss women’s experiences is to posit that there is 
something feminine about our experiences. The challenge is to find a framework that 
addresses the specificities of women’s experiences without excluding other modes of 
existence. Feminist thinkers have tried to resolve this tension: De Beauvoir discusses 
women’s experiences via the processes of becoming; Iris Marion Young and Sandra 
Bartky draw on personal life experiences; feminist philosophers like Fisher re-
envision the phenomenological study of experience for feminine existence.    
Drawing on phenomenology and de Beauvoir’s take on situation, Young 
attempts to read women’s experience with the lens of phenomenology and mitigates 
essentialist charges with a re-definition of feminine experience: 
[Femininity] is a set of situations and conditions which delimit the 
typical situation of being a woman in a particular society, as well as 
the typical way in which this situation is lived by the women 
themselves…. This understanding of “feminine” existence makes it 
possible to say that some women escape or transcend the typical 
situation and definition of women in various degrees and respects. 
(“Throwing Like a Girl” 140-141) 
This interpretation of femininity is a phenomenological one. It is a situation rather 
than something of essence. And, since it is a situation, it is not limited to a particular 
sex, although such circumstances more easily befall women than men.  
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Like Merleau-Ponty, Young believes “human existence is defined by its 
situation” (138). But, whereas Merleau-Ponty locates subjectivity in the body, where 
transcendence “moves out from the body in its immanence in an open and unbroken 
directedness upon the world in action,” she asserts that “feminine bodily existence” 
does not share this “liberatory transcendence” (145). Women remain confined to their 
situations, limited by their bodies. Compared to men, their movement is “circuitous” 
because of a “feminine hesitancy” and “tentativeness” (147), which stem from “a fear 
of getting hurt, which is greater in women than in men” (144). This fear has to do 
with how women regard their biological makeup.  
The association between the female biological makeup and woman’s situation 
is evident in Mrs Dalloway when Clarissa retreats to the attic room. The main fixture 
is the narrow bed with “clean” sheets “tight stretched in a broad white band from side 
to side” (23). The neatness and cleanliness of the space reinforce Clarissa’s chastity as 
she thinks about girlhood. But the virginal purity evoked in the scene is not quite 
girlish; the image is tinted by the introductory clause, “Like a nun withdrawing” (23). 
Whilst “nun” connotes purity, it also conjures images of elderly women and the idea 
of sterility. The attic room is a space of escape, where Clarissa may hide from the 
busyness of life and reminisce about the purity of girlhood, but it is also a reminder of 
her sterility that comes with age. In contrast to Peter Walsh who at fifty-three is 
excited over a young woman in the park, as though full of sexual potential, Clarissa 
can be said to have experienced her body as “a fragile encumbrance,” to use Young’s 
words (144).13   
                                                
13 Young uses this phrase when she compares women who are naturally smaller in stature and frame 
(thus often experiencing the female body as “a fragile encumbrance”) to the male muscular form, 
(144). 
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This example illustrates the complexities of the perception of place that 
accompanies woman’s consciousness of her body. It also exemplifies why a 
phenomenological discussion of women’s experiences deviates from Merleau-
Ponty’s, for it takes into account details the female situation which differs vastly from 
the positive, neutral experience of the universal body. Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology focuses on the body as subject, a feminist phenomenological study of 
experience contends that “the woman lives her body as object as well as subject” 
(Young 153).  
Young elaborates on women as subject and also the objectified: 
An essential part of the situation of being a woman is that of living the 
ever present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a mere body, as 
shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another 
subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living 
manifestation of action and intention. (154) 
For women, there lies the task of not only exposing the seemingly subjective self as 
an object and then reclaiming subjectivity in the movement of the body, but also 
having to cope with the body being both subject and object. A complex relationship 
between object and subject, perceived and perceiver, the present situation and a series 
of past situations emerges. Her experience involves all of these, which has to do with 
being both subject and object.   
By locating differences in propagated cultural rubrics of society, Young makes 
a point that states of existence are not determined by sex but are situational. Yet, as 
she remembers a certain hiking party, her argument on femininity seems to be specific 
to female existence. She confesses that she did not believe hiking was going to be 
easy for her, noting that the men “crossed with ease” (144). The experience of feeling 
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physically inadequate and mentally challenged is presented as typical of feminine 
existence. By separating herself, the slow hiker, and her feelings from the men, 
Young unintentionally slips into a heteronormative assessment of experience. Her 
subjective experience, thoughts, and emotions, come to stand for those of the female 
population: from “I” to “We.”14   
 Nevertheless, Young’s account of feminine experience as situation highlights 
the potential commonalities between phenomenology and feminism which Fisher 
goes on to develop in what she terms “the project of a feminist phenomenology” 
(37).15 According to Fisher, phenomenology “frames” and “validates experiential 
claims”; its “subjective objectivity” serves as “a mode of expression” for feminism 
(34). The resultant feminist phenomenology integrates the specificities of feminism 
into the generality of phenomenology. Because feminism locates experience in a 
particularised setting of the female experience and phenomenology explores the 
generic lived body’s experience, the project of feminist phenomenology supports 
subjectivistic accounts of the female bodily experience.  
To show how a feminist phenomenological framework might support the 
study of women’s experience, let us return to the attic room scene. Focusing on 
perception, Merleau-Ponty would pick up on the colour white and the sensations it 
evokes which reveals the relations between space and her feelings which are 
synthesised by Clarissa’s consciousness. Whilst this observation paves way for the 
politics of gender, the phenomenologist would attribute the associations to former 
                                                
14 In her account of the hiking trip, Young shifts from talking about a general femininity, not limited to 
women, to her own experience as a female, then switches to using the collective pronoun, “we,” the 
last of which designates a shared bond amongst women: “We often experience our bodies as a fragile 
encumbrance, rather than the media for the enactment of our aims. We feel as though we must have our 
attention directed upon our body to make sure it is doing what we wish it to do, rather than paying 
attention to what we want to do through our bodies” (144). 
15 Unlike Young, Fisher formulates a framework for women’s experiences, i.e., feminist 
phenomenology, on how the failings of universalism are made up for by particularities, and vice versa. 
Her approach is methodical, whereas Young’s is anecdotal. 
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experiences and presuppositions of memory: Clarissa’s memory of the “cold contact” 
between men and women and ensuing “cold spirit” is projected onto the ascetic room 
(23-24). The phenomenological impulse is to exfoliate the inhibitions to originary 
experience because “[to] perceive is not to experience a host of impressions 
accompanied by memories capable of clinching them” (POP 26). In context, Clarissa 
is said to be remembering rather than perceiving. Phenomenology’s focus on the 
mechanics and sediments of perception does not work for a study of women’s 
experience because gender whilst obstructive to originary experience is also 
constitutive of the female subject.  
On the other hand, a phenomenological framework sympathetic to female 
existence would for instance consider how the memory of cold contact among women 
takes Clarissa out of the present room to the river at Clieveden; this is then supplanted 
by her memory of Sally which brings her back to the confines of a similar room. The 
analysis has focus on the spatial maneuverings which reflect Clarissa’s relations with 
women. It does not attribute the experience of the attic room to memory, though it 
acknowledges the importance of the past. What is more important is the return to the 
room which can be read as an attempt to re-inscribe the “virgin” room and warm the 
“cold spirit” with female solidarity. Here Clarissa’s personal experience is an 
opportunity to consider what it means to have a room of one’s own if the requisite is 
the sense of female co-existence.  
Feminist phenomenology is a coalescence of the general and specific. The 
eventual consummation of feminism and phenomenology is, according to Fisher, 
“The unique subject—generalized” (29). That which is “generalized,” however, is not 
“equivalent to the absolutist sense of generic” which suppresses differences; rather its 
purpose is to “articulate the tension of generic and specific” (29). What this means is 
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the generality in fact sets up a common ground for the generic and specific to be 
examined in relation to one another, accommodating variants within dualisms that 
may have qualities from the opposing category, enabling the generic and specific to 
be explored beyond their restrictive boundaries and “articulated in broader categorical 
terms” (29). The generality, Fisher explains, is “a generalized account of the 
structures of subjectivity from the perspective of individual subjectivity and ownness” 
(29). The project of feminist phenomenology an open one, in which the generality 
does not universalise and the particularised is situated in larger contexts. 
“The unique subject—generalized” is an ideal that balances out the general 
and particular. Yet, experience can be subjectivistic and biased, capricious and 
defying, too diverse and particularised to fit into the clear-cut intersection of the 
generic and specific. For this reason, the framework of feminist phenomenology—if 
its goal is to study women’s bodily experience—has to factor in emotional and 
personal accounts of experience. Sandra Bartky avers the need to address subjectivity: 
I do not believe that we can have a feminist politics without some 
conception of what is good for women and what is not, and this, in turn 
implies a larger conception of what is good for persons generally and 
what is not. (“Sympathy and Solidarity” and Other Essays 1-2) 
Even though the question of “what is good for women” can only be answered with 
certain subjectivity and varies from woman to woman, the answer cannot be one of 
universal objectivity. For people belonging to a particular group are more sensitive to 
the complexities and circumstances of the group than they who are outside.  
Feminists like Young and Bartky are not so much interested in developing a 
framework for experience as they are with the female working body’s actual 
involvement in the lived world. Their works are expressions of women’s experience, 
 Foo 23 
a prelude to a feminine mode of being in the world. On the other hand, there are 
feminists like Fisher who work towards developing a theoretical structure. Both 
approaches in feminist phenomenology give voice and bring attention to women’s 
experiences. In this thesis I hope to incorporate both means of expression: anecdotal 
and theoretical, into a feminist phenomenological framework that can help to better 
articulate feminine experience. 
Feminist phenomenology enquires into what makes women’s experiences 
different from the generic, a difference which requires a framework specific to 
feminine experience. There is something about how women engage with places 
designed to keep and limit them that connects their experiences. These places may not 
be overtly constraining as the attic room; they could be like the mountain Young 
hikes that reminds her of her inaptitude. Big space or small space, when women 
actively participate and interact with their environments, they perceive with certain 
limitations that can be traced to their situations which in one way or another have to 
do with their being in the world as the non-positive subject. 
With this I posit that feminine experience has to do with women’s 
emplacement and limitation. Specifically, feminine experience emerges from 
delimited and disadvantageous situations and socio-political conditionings that 
compromise one’s ability to experience the world in its givenness.16 It can be 
described as an interpretation of the universal world which returns to one’s physical 
encounter with places and is shaped by women being in gendered and socially 
stratified situations.17 Feminine experience enables a more empathic perception of not 
only women but also others who occupy similar limited positions in society. 
                                                
16 Givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) means the appearance of things as they are to the beholder; it is the 
way of the object in which one becomes conscious of it. Phenomenology examines how bodies are 
placed and positioned that in turn affects how objects of vision appear in their givenness. 
17 This is a working definition of feminine experience which will be further addressed in Chapter 2, the 
section “Towards Feminine Experience.” 
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Described as such, it is not exclusive to female existence but is one that forms from a 
disadvantaged subject’s interaction with the lived world.  
The key to formulating feminine experience, I argue, lies in the study of place. 
Space experienced by the female protagonists is always open in that a room connects 
to other rooms, a memory of place connects with the present. The narratives of space 
reflect the women’s ease of movement or the apparent lack thereof, describing their 
inhabitations and rehabilitations of a sense of belonging and identity in places outside 
the traditional, domestic home.   
 
The Phenomenon of Place in Modernist Women’s Writing 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction, the modernist period saw the destabilisation 
of existing concepts of space which anticipated a myriad of ways in which space can 
be read in modern fiction.18 Andrew Thacker in Moving Through Modernity, for 
instance, surveys social space, metaphorical space, psychic space, and the boundaries 
between these spaces (5). For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus primarily on 
material space. Attention to women’s engagement with rooms and places where 
movements are limited allows for the analysis of the material conditions of 
experience. Such spatialisation of experience reflects women’s shifting and even 
conflicting perceptions of places (between interior and exterior landscapes, past and 
present ideas of space) that are especially prevalent in the early twentieth century.  
This section will trace the trajectory of writing about place from Mrs 
Dalloway (1925), which centres on women’s movements about the city, to Nightwood 
(1936), which focuses on stasis and marginalised existence, to the role of the room in 
relation to the emplaced past in Good Morning, Midnight (1939) and hauntings in 
                                                
18 I understand that “modernist period” is not a term used by the writers of the early twentieth century; 
here it is used retrospectively and as it is traditionally conceived.  
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“The Demon Lover” (1941), “Pink May” (1942), and “Hand in Glove” (1952). There 
are other prominent modernist women writers who articulate the importance of 
spatiality such as Dorothy Richardson, Katherine Mansfield, and Gertrude Stein. 
Whilst Mansfield’s stories are referenced in the discussion on Good Morning, 
Midnight, this thesis does not employ the works of Richardson and Stein. Although 
Stein’s use of syntax and poetic voids is useful in the development of the spatiality of 
the novel, this thesis is concerned with material spaces rather than textual.  
As for Richardson, the devotion to material and lived spaces in Pilgrimage, 
especially of lodging rooms and cafés, seems to deem it a suitable text for the thesis. 
The rationale for analysing Good Morning, Midnight as opposed to Pilgrimage is 
personal and pragmatic.19 Firstly, the length of the thesis does not allow a thorough 
discussion of the voluminous work,20 and an analysis of one volume (such as Pointed 
Roofs) on its own would adequately document the trajectory of Richardson’s writing 
of space. Also, given the intent of Chapter 4, Good Morning, Midnight is packed with 
ambivalence and ideas that are more than sufficient for the discussion of the habit of 
rooms and spatial consciousness. Secondly—and this is also a matter of personal 
interest—the thesis is drawn to the predicament of the unemployed and wandering 
woman who has a tendency towards melancholic attachments. Rhys’s treatment of the 
lone woman and her situation is more suitable for a discussion of alternative 
modalities of experience. 
In short, the texts chosen for this thesis reflect the changes in the cityscape, 
women’s movements about the city, and perception of the exterior world from the 
                                                
19 For the chapter on liminal spaces and the small rooms, the choice of texts was between Good 
Morning, Midnight and Pilgrimage for they make similar points on the inhabitation of tight spaces that 
figuratively represent the claustrophobia and “impasse” state of characters. 
20 For a discussion of the narrative of space in Pilgrimage, see Elizabeth Bronfen’s Dorothy 
Richardson’s Art of Memory which has painstakingly detailed Richardson’s use of material, 
metaphorical, and textual spaces, and spatial oscillations in the different volumes.  
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1920s to early 1950s. In the span of two decades, we will see how the woman leaves 
the home and explores the city, venturing into liminal rooms and plunging into the 
world at night, before returning again to the house. This section will highlight some 
ways in which a phenomenological framework can articulate in these texts what it is 
to experience the world as women, as disadvantageous subjects. This will also help to 
situate the thesis within existing scholarship on geographies of modernism, showing 
how a phenomenological study of experience with the idea of spatial consciousness as 
integral to feminine experience can offer another way of negotiating the hegemonic 
and gendered divide between interior and exterior worlds.  
The discussion of space in modernism primarily revolves around 
“metropolitan cities and the cultural experiments and upheavals they generated” 
(Huyssen, “Geographies of Modernism in a Globalizing World” 6).21 Such upheavals 
and changes have different effects on men and women. Feminist scholarship on the 
representation of the city in modern writing often attribute women’s differing 
experience of the metropolis to “their different embodiment and social positioning” 
(Squier, “Virginia Woolf’s London and the Feminist Revision of Modernism” 101). 
The metropolitan culture is a gendered one, and whilst both men and women 
participate in it, Bonnie Kime Scott states that “women write about it more, perhaps 
because gender is more imposed upon them, more disqualifying, or more intriguing 
and stimulating to their creativity” (The Gender of Modernism 3). The illumination of 
gender differences and women’s experiences is not an attempt to replace the dominant 
                                                
21 For Huyssen, this focus poses a problem for it ignores the translation and mimicry of metropolitan 
cultures in other non-European countries and postcolonial cities. For a discussion of alternative and 
trans-national/cultural modernities, see “Geographies of Modernism in a Globalizing World.” 
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narrative but draws attention to how we may rethink and re-create representations of 
place.22  
A study of how women experience and relate to places will consequently 
expose what Thacker describes elsewhere as “a complex intertwining of material 
spaces with a thematics of power” (“Woolf and Geography” 411-412). Places are 
geographical delineations of power that cause a subject to assume positions of 
superiority or subordination depending on where she visits. In other words, there is a 
spatial hierarchy among places that corresponds to the social hierarchy. It thus 
behooves this thesis to begin a phenomenological study of place with a literary work 
that encompasses a variety of places that reflects the power (im)balance in society. 
Such work, given its sensitivity to the politics of place, would help to illustrate the 
phenomenological idea of situation which has a spatial as well as socio-historical 
dimension. For these two reasons, the first text that will be studied is Mrs Dalloway.  
When Woolf said that she wants to “criticise the social system, and show it at 
work, at its most intense” (A Writer’s Diary 56), one can interpret her approach in 
geographical terms in which London is parsed into sites mirroring the class and 
interior states of characters. In Mrs Dalloway is a range of places, from domestic 
rooms to social rooms, parks to high streets, which allows for the examination of 
situations wherein individuals are put in their “concrete contexts” which consist of 
both the social and spatial. Whilst Clarissa, wife of a member of Parliament, explores 
the Mayfair area, Rezia, a foreigner and wife of the shell-shock Septimus, hides in the 
park. One lives in Westminster, the other in Victoria Street.23 Clarissa’s privileged 
                                                
22 Susan M. Squier asserts that the focus on women’s writing “problematizes the very categories with 
which we have approached modern writers” and pushes for a “reassessment of the critical construction 
of the modern condition” (100). 
23 Thacker notes that the lodging of the Smiths though located in the Bloomsbury area was “at the start 
of the twentieth century… far from the affluent area it is now” (412). For more details about Septimus 
and Peter’s associated geographies with regards to power and empire, see “Woolf and Geography.” 
 Foo 28 
standing and Rezia’s marginality are reflected in the places they occupy. Yet, even as 
Clarissa has more spatial power, she is nonetheless limited to areas “associated with 
traditional forms of aristocratic prestige” (Moving Through Modernity 155). Privilege 
impedes her perception of the world—one compensated by Septimus: “the world [is] 
seen by the sane and the insane side by side” (A Writer’s Diary 51). By focusing on 
how women dwell in places, Woolf stresses on the power of place as a physical as 
well as social force imposed upon the individual such that she perceives the world in 
ways that reinforce existing power relations and entrap her within the patriarchal 
system.  
Just as the socio-political bleeds into the spatial, there is also a blurring of 
boundaries between exterior and interior lives. Critics like Gillian Beer and Alex 
Zwerdling have written about the relations between the mapping of the city and 
characters’ interiority: “Woolf is deeply engaged by the question of how the 
individual is shaped (or deformed) by his social environment” (“Mrs Dalloway and 
the Social System” 69); “[the] accounts of walks and of districts register the 
characters’ social space as well as their separations” (Virginia Woolf: The Common 
Ground 53). The discussion on how the social environment shapes individual 
consciousness can be extended to the sense of the environment. Take, for example, 
how urban life, also the chaotic external world, impinges on interiority. Woolf 
addresses the blurring of interior and exterior spaces in “Chateau and Country Life” 
(1908): 
But surely it is time that someone should sing the praises of express 
trains. Their comfort, to begin with, sets the mind free, and their speed 
is the speed of lyric poetry, inarticulate as yet, sweeping rhythm 
through the brain, regularly, like the wash of great waves. (222) 
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Like “Evening Over Sussex: Reflections in a Motor Car,” where she equates driving 
to writing, Woolf describes the correspondence between the fast paced urban life and 
the rhythm of the mind. Such relations between interiority and exteriority are 
reiterated in Mrs Dalloway often read as a quintessential modernist representation of a 
spectrum of female experiences of the metropolis: the privileged Elizabeth Dalloway 
rides the omnibus and thinks about career choices which are not available to her 
mother, whereas the age battered woman is singing an ancient song, confined 
temporally and physically to the park.  
 The focus on movement as the bind between the exterior and interior spaces in 
Mrs Dalloway also draws out the workings of positionality outside the realm of 
phenomenology. Shifts between supposedly disparate spaces challenge the notion of a 
fixed perspective or position. To cite briefly the scene in Regent’s park where Rezia, 
Septimus, Maisie Johnson, and Mrs Dempster each narrate their stories, the varying 
positions they occupy entitle them to a singular perspective of the park and of the 
passing crowd.24 Yet these individual threads of narratives interact with one another, 
even enlightening the obscurity of the other, collectively building the scene of the 
park. This is the multi-perspectival situation of the park formed from a myriad of 
contexts, all of which are concrete and social at the same time. Here is also a glimpse 
of how situations as put forth in phenomenology can figure into the novel as a kind of 
narrative situation: the social and spatial character of place shapes the way the 
situation is envisioned and narrated.    
 Whilst Mrs Dalloway published in 1925 presents new mobilities and 
possibilities for women, the novels of the 1930s read in this thesis have accents on 
stasis and circumscribed spaces. Nightwood stands in stark contrast to the 
                                                
24 See Chapter 2, “Situations in Mrs Dalloway.” 
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representations of space and movement in Mrs Dalloway, allowing for a different 
understanding of how experiences of place are rendered in modernist writing. For 
one, characters are often stuck in temporary lodgings and forced to perceive the world 
from still and awkward positions. Whilst the novel is “obsessed with feeling and 
movement,” the body which Barnes envisions is a “corpse” that does “nothing” 
(Taylor, Djuna Barnes and Affective Modernism 113). The presentation of movement 
differs from Woolf, for movement comes not from the subject’s bodily actions, but 
from the author who “circle[s] around [the corpse] like the murderess” (113). 
Nightwood relies heavily on the manipulation of narrative perspectives so as to 
“move” scenes. Consider the episode where Nora sees Robin before she leaves with 
Jenny: she has to look away from her lover and unto her lover’s lover in order to see 
Robin in the world at night.    
Such skewed perspective is translated to the reader via the novel’s formal 
techniques, including the use of abstract and poetic language, limited points of view, 
incompatible and surprising pairings of imageries, which offer an alternative way of 
interpreting space and the interactions within. The narrative situation offered in Mrs 
Dalloway, its multi and shifting perspectives, continues in Nightwood’s spatial form. 
By cloaking its world in darkness and ambiguity, Nightwood encourages a 
defamiliarisation of the world, compelling a re-seeing of things and events. The 
impulse to re-present and re-interpret the world is a modernist one to the extent that 
literary modernism is “a set of new ways of seeing and interpreting the world” (Kern 
2). Nightwood demonstrates the “rehierarchization” of space that Kerns discusses in 
The Modernist Novel where the novel moves from writing about “privileged 
locations” that are “concrete” and arguably familiar to contemplating “the nature of 
space itself” (77). The focus on the sens of space causes dissonance which is 
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particularly interesting when read in light of phenomenology’s notion of the “queer 
effect” wherein the body reorientates itself and adjusts to the anomaly and 
discontinuities as its reality, perceiving the world at night as the one by day. If Mrs 
Dalloway offers a myriad of modalities of existence, Nightwood goes one step further 
in unravelling the underbelly of society, presenting literally the world of darkness 
where characters are by default queers and pariahs.   
 In “Laughing at Leviticus: Nightwood as Woman’s Circus Epic,” Jane Marcus 
famously claims that “Nightwood makes a modernism of marginality” (147). Indeed, 
Barnesian characters are queer and their worlds shrouded. As Julie Abraham puts it, 
Nightwood presents the “circumscribed” social positions and “disqualification of her 
lesbian and gay characters” (“‘Women, Remember You’: Djuna Barnes and History” 
256). The limitation in social position manifests in the characters’ physical 
immobility and stilted perspectives as noted earlier. Significantly, as they are “bent” 
as homosexuals,25 they also bow down and perceive the world from bent positions.26 
In this regard, Nightwood opens up the possibility of a queer phenomenological 
reading of spatial experience, where the “inverted” and “bent” reality is the right of 
way in the novel, where shifts in perspectives signal the return to the primitive 
experience, where perception is reorientated and hence untainted by preexisting 
structures of knowledge.  
 The polemics and revisionist impulse of Nightwood evident in how it turns 
away from what is normative and deals with homosexual identity and how it re-
envisions the world at night dissipate as the third decade of the century comes to a 
close with Good Morning, Midnight written in 1939. The reorientation of space and 
                                                
25 For a full account of the term “bent,” see Chapter 3, section “Bent On the Dark.”   
26 Julie Taylor draws the connection between the act of bowing down and the characters’ burden of 
shame that comes from their homosexuality. For more on shame and modernism, see Djuna Barnes 
and Affective Modernism. 
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compelling of the eye to see aslant are missing in Rhys’s work. Rather what we have 
are repeated visits to similar rooms and Sasha Jenson recalling memories of rooms, 
reliving her experiences in them. In “‘A Savage from the Cannibal islands’: Jean 
Rhys and London,” Anna Snaith notes Rhys’s use of “repeated images of 
metropolitan uniformity” (76). Indeed, as Sasha admits, rooms are “all different, all 
exactly alike” (GMM 23). The room of one’s own advocated by Woolf takes on a 
different meaning in Rhys’s work. It neither provides stability nor empowers its 
inhabitant; in fact, the repetition attests to Sasha’s entrapment within the room of her 
past. Her search for rooms seems to be aimless rather than exploratory, escapist rather 
than activist in nature.  
Read through the lens of colonial identity, critics like Chris GoGwilt attribute 
the “doubling and repetition of interior space and interior monologues” to the Creole 
experience which is “an impossibility of recognized ‘white’ female racial identity” 
(“The Interior” 73).  Such readings posit that it is the inability to fulfil the fantasy of a 
white racial identity that leaves Rhys’s protagonist trapped in the search for a mythic 
stability. But if we adopt a phenomenological framework, the repetition of the room 
experience can be read as a way of producing material resemblances where rooms do 
not replace one another but collectively create a mise en abyme effect such that the 
narrative of experience is framed by a structure of rooms.27 Good Morning, Midnight 
allows for the discussion of spatial consciousness wherein subjectivity is emplaced in 
rooms, recalibrating the phenomenological idea of the body in a lived world, for focus 
is now on the living world, on rooms that speak. Consequently, the emphasis on 
emplaced rather than embodied consciousness illuminates feminine experience, for 
                                                
27 See Chapter 4, section “Feminine Re-Vision,” for more discussion of this room-within-room effect.   
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what is feminine about experience seems to be the openness and ability to connect 
present and past engagements with places.  
The “lived” quality of space that is dramatised in rooms that literally 
welcomes Sasha into the room also appears in Woolf’s essays, albeit more implicit. 
The rooms in the Chateau have “corners” that “sink into darkness,” as though 
imbibing the loneliness of its lady owner (“Chateau and Country Life” 223); whilst 
Sussex is “no longer young,” likened to an elderly woman whose beautiful face is 
veiled (“Evening over Sussex” 7). They are glimpses of spatial embodiment of 
subjectivity in which places are enlivened. Such inscriptions of subjectivity though 
not very evident in Mrs Dalloway are important to developing the idea of spatial 
consciousness which can be described as a heightened sensitivity to the material 
environment to the extent that the past, memories, events, things, and etc., are 
conceived in terms of a structure of spatiality.  
Such re-envisioning of the room can be interpreted as an attempt to rediscover 
the significance of space in relation to women’s existence. The 1930s saw 
architectural changes that transformed modern cities: “Many of the familiar 
landmarks in London… were being pulled down… everything had to be pared down 
to a minimum” (Smart, Modernism and After 35).28 In France, Le Corbusier called for 
“functional interiors” that abolished “the stuffy knickknacks of the bourgeois home” 
(Wilson 96). Minimalism and mechanical functions of space emphasised the 
practicalities of space rather than ideals.29 This reevaluated the meaning and function 
of spaces, and by extension the social and gender stratifications. Space became 
                                                
28 Smart also notes the rise of skyscrapers in major European cities, following their first appearance in 
America.  
29 Elizabeth Wilson lays out the Swiss-French architect’s Le Corbusier’s modern city plans which 
included communal restaurants that sent food to homes and nurseries for childcare. Whilst these places 
were designed for practical reasons, such plans nonetheless “would diminish the level of domestic 
drudgery” (96).  
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“evacuable,” according to Andrzej Gasiorek in “Le Corbusier and Wyndham Lewis”: 
it could be “reconstructed,” enabling new visions of places (143). (This can be read in 
light of how Sasha keeps revisiting hotel rooms and trying to create a stable meaning 
out of them.) Yet the shift in the perspectives of space did not immediately freed 
women from the burdens of the domestic home. Just as the political and social 
improvements with regards to women’s rights in the 1920s did not really liberate the 
majority of women by the 1930s.30 Women like Sasha find themselves dislocated, 
caught between the possibilities of freedom and entrenched patriarchal beliefs. She is 
itinerant and seems to be looking for a room of her own, i.e., a supposed 
independence, but what Sasha really wants is to be given a roof over her head.31  
The woman is in transition. Her predicament is that of being caught between 
past memories and new experiences, traditions and new freedoms. This liminality is 
spatially mapped onto the hotel and temporary lodging rooms in Good Morning, 
Midnight which are both public and private spaces: “an intermediate amoral zone”; “a 
pseudo home” (Wilson 59). The “living” room is where Sasha is literally confronted 
by the ghost of her past and presented the opportunity to relive it with her present 
consciousness. Such enlivening of space is a result of the woman reflecting and 
exploring at the same time—which presents a new formula for experience, one that 
makes room for the past and memories and beliefs, rehabilitating them for the present, 
in the material form of the room. 
The dramatisation of space in Good Morning Midnight is taken to the extreme 
in the final texts chosen for a phenomenological study of space in this thesis. In 
Bowen’s short stories, “Pink May,” “The Demon Lover,” and “Hand in Glove,” we 
                                                
30 Key revisions in Britain’s law include the Matrimonial Causes Act (1923) and Equal Franchise Act 
(1928). Such improvements only lead to a slight increase in the number of women participating in the 
workforce by the late 1930s. 
31 See Molly Hite’s The Other Side of the Story for a discussion of the Rhysian women’s “defining” 
and “inherently unrespectable” dependency on man (23). 
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return to the domestic home. But the home is now a perverse inhabitation haunted by 
the past and the women’s faith in traditions and beliefs. Spectrality around the house 
is a manifestation of the women’s fragmented psyche. As Maud Ellmann puts it, 
Bowen’s narrative of the house brings us “deep into the haunted chambers of the 
mind” (“Shadowing Elizabeth Bowen” 147). For Bowen, place comes first. Unlike 
Woolf who in “Literary Geography” (1905) states, “A writer’s country is a territory 
within his own brain” (35), Bowen works the other way round, personifying places as 
if they are extensions of their inhabitants. In the selected stories, the place in question 
is the haunted house, which stands between reality and spectrality, present and past, 
pragmatism and possibility. It is a site of threshold in which the fantastic is housed in 
living space, embodying the ambivalence of women’s experience towards the end of 
the mid-twentieth century.  
Written in the inter and post war years, the short stories reflect an awareness 
that Stefania Porcelli describes as “simultaneously heightened and anesthetized” 
(“City of Ghosts” 15). This is also what allows for Bowen’s “versatile ghost imagery” 
(15). Such ghastly spatial imageries are also what make these haunted house stories 
ideal for a phenomenological study which investigates how reason can be refigured as 
perception is challenged and queered. The haunted house is beyond reason; it 
comprises a fantasy world where ideas of place and women’s perception of places do 
not confirm preexisting formulas of experience. In this regard, the ambivalence of 
haunted space mythologises the normative, eventually exposing the socio-political 
structure of perception which is often missed by the trained and rational eye. 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology which became prominent in the 1940s, 
coinciding with the publication of the selected stories, is especially helpful when 
reading alternative renderings of spaces, for it is interested in experiential perception, 
 Foo 36 
taking into consideration the conditions that shape the various ways in which 
individuals of different vantage points and positions see. In Nightwood, for example, 
we see the workings of a sens-ing type of perception, whereas Good Morning, 
Midnight evokes a habitual perception. Exemplified in Bowen’s short stories is a 
perception linked to beliefs. And the haunted house, a perverse version of the ideal 
feminine space, reflects the dangers and shaking of the female protagonists’ beliefs 
which are deep-seated and patriarchal. Kathleen seems to believe that the demon 
lover’s return is retribution for her unfaithfulness; the unnamed protagonist of “Pink 
May” is haunted by her guilt; Ethel Trevor in “Hand in Glove” is obsessed with 
winning Lord Fred. They have believed in and internalised social norms that reinforce 
the status quo, which would otherwise not be shaken if not for the haunted house.  
The notion of believing as a kind of seeing posed in Bowen’s short stories 
helps us to rethink about how we view spaces and reevaluate perceptual beliefs about 
places that hark back to stock images and traditions. Perception is seeing; it is also a 
practice of inherited and ingrained values. There is conflation between what we see 
and think, what shapes experiences and the experience that has been shaped. This 
returns to the question of situatedness (women’s positions and milieus) and the 
archetype of feminine space, i.e., the home. But this time around space is not 
bifurcated and stratified, but can be open and connecting. The haunted house, or 
mythical space, allows for this mise en abyme effect, as does the room in Good 
Morning, Midnight. Mrs Dalloway too does this by connecting the places of 
Clarissa’s memory to the present, whilst Nightwood presents the potential of space by 
negating the very fixity of space. The texts selected for this thesis present women’s 
experiences in varying ways but share the accent on the material world.  
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Having traced out the phenomenon of place in these modernist works, this 
thesis will in the ensuing chapters develop the idea of feminine experience through 
the examination of the female protagonists’ experiences of the city and rooms, and 
how geographical renderings in the texts queer perception in a different way from the 
one considered in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, one that has to do with 
perceptual disabilities. With narrative situations, formal and poetic strategies to slant 
and shift perspectives, the texts experiment with how scenes can be re-presented and 
seen anew in times of spatial and social crises. 
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2. In Situ: Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway 
Feminist phenomenology is an initiative by female philosophers and finds root in 
philosophy—it is still developing within the philosophical realm. From Stein to de 
Beauvoir, phenomenology with feminist insights has been tangentially applied to 
socio-cultural studies in the works of contemporary feminist theorists like Sandra 
Bartky, Iris Marion Young, and Sara Ahmed. Each feminist critic, in her respective 
way, worked women’s experience into the phenomenological framework by weaving 
accounts, sometimes even personal stories, of women’s situations in the lived world. 
The narrative of women’s experiences that I will be focusing on is a literary one. 
The fiction works selected for this thesis present women’s experiences in and 
of the lived world. Modernist literature privileges ordinary experience. It speaks of 
life as it is, as “the mind receives a myriad of impressions—trivial, fantastic, 
evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel” (Woolf, “Modern Fiction” 160). 
Modern works, Woolf tells us, “express character,” even if it is banal and seems 
unreal (“Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown” 31). Writers like Woolf are, according to Scott, 
“movers of modernism to its forgotten, gender-inflected territories,” for their works 
breathe life to the littlest things and neglected moments (The Gender of Modernism 
3). They are committed to “describe beautifully, truthfully” character, which is really 
“the spirit we live by, life itself” (“Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown” 39). Mrs Dalloway, 
in this regard, is about life and the situations it deals.   
 By analysing Mrs Dalloway and Woolf’s stories of places, this chapter shows 
how literary texts bring the abstractions in phenomenology to a material and 
experiential level whilst elucidating hidden aspects of situations that cannot be 
properly described in the real world. Literature, interweaving the real and imagined, 
seated nicely between the two enclaves of experience, accounts for experiences 
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without being reductive or metaphysical. The narratives of places such as the park and 
kitchen in Mrs Dalloway are, I argue, descriptive situations of lived experiences of 
feminised places. They draw up a microcosm of the material world according to 
different subjective perspectives of the same place. Multi-perspectivism in Mrs 
Dalloway is key to understanding how experience is not one and unified but dispersed 
and dimensional. In trying to articulate subjectivity and sub-/consciousness, Woolf 
uses free indirect discourse and other narrative strategies to emulate multi-
dimensional experience. This experience, I think, is the closest we can get to an 
originary, albeit fractured and sometimes incoherent, experience.  
This chapter is about how narratives of places articulate the complexities and 
depth of phenomenological situation. It shows how the novel can be a means of re-
envisioning phenomenological ideas and exercising them in more experiential ways. 
The chapter addresses how multi-perspectivism affords different perceptual accounts 
of places, wherein each account reflects a particular position and orientation towards 
the world, one person’s subjectivity and socio-cultural standing. It is the richness of 
Woolf’s narratives of places that gives texture and experiential plurality to the 
philosophical conception of situation. By examining phenomenological ideas through 
literary renderings of women’s experiences of the lived world, this chapter lays out 
the groundwork for a nascent literary feminist phenomenology that will be continued 
in later chapters.  
 
Situations in Phenomenology and Literature 
Understanding how situations occur in literary texts and how they are imaginatively 
enacted in narratives helps to reveal the ways in which human beings experience 
places and the things and appearances within them. Particularly, the modes of 
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representing experience tell and describe experiences. Phenomenology is 
fundamentally about how phenomena are experienced in their givenness, where the 
process of perception and of givenness is the only way phenomena appear to the 
beholder.32 The novel, in general, with its narrative of experience that represents some 
form of reality, offers a unique approach to the conveyance of phenomena as they 
appear to the perceiver. Dan Zahavi, a proponent of what some scholars call neo-
phenomenology that studies Husserlian philosophy in light of cognitive sciences, 
comments on how experiences are represented: 
Rather than saying that we experience representations, it would be 
better to say that our experiences are presentational, and that they 
present the world as having certain features. (“Intentionality and 
Phenomenality” 75) 
In this regard, the literary text, in trying to communicate subjective and imaginative 
ways of experiencing the world, “presents” narratives of experiences where each 
description “presents” a feature of the world.  
Understanding that narratives of experiences are presentational is useful for a 
literary phenomenology because the bifold quality of being presented and presenting 
illuminates how experiences are told and described. With the mastery of figurative 
language and diction, interior monologues, stream-of-consciousness, interweaving 
narratives, and a virtuoso flair for expressing subjective experience, Mrs Dalloway 
wonderfully presents a world that in spite of convolution and chaos connects its 
inhabitants. It proffers another kind of situatedness of place: that is, an artistic and 
literary milieu that interweaves distinct perceptual accounts of the same lived world.  
                                                
32 Givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) is a term in phenomenology that means the appearing of things as 
they are to the beholder. 
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The situation of a place encompasses people and things that come together in a 
certain locality, and the happenings and interactions between them. Situations are not 
physical loci per se, phenomenologically speaking, but are possible through the places 
in which bodies (characters) appear and move, engaging with surrounding phenomena 
in a given place (setting). To be in a situation, in situ, is to undertake a position and be 
situated. From this position one experiences the things and events of the given 
situation. The exact location or “level” in place in which one takes up is, as Merleau-
Ponty calls it, “a spatially particularized” setting that facilitates the perception of 
place according to where one is positioned and oriented towards (POP 295). Every 
spatial point comes with a unique view of place. In Mrs Dalloway, for example, each 
place Clarissa wanders into presents a particular scene of London viewed through her 
eyes. She carries with her biases, memories, and preconceptions that give her a certain 
visual clarity, or un-clarity. The sights of different sides of London such as the parks 
and streets from various vantage points piece together a situation of place. They 
illustrate the importance of processes, intricacies, social and personal biases that 
constitute the narrative of place. This approach to narrating place threads narratives: 
we move from one object to another, scene to scene, as opposed to a bird’s eye view 
narrative. It opens up the main narrative to several others. Characters occupy 
positions and their perspectives are communicated in different ways which still 
collectively contribute to a multi-layered sense of situated place.  
Novels like Mrs Dalloway are made up of perspectives and sub-narratives, 
each told from different positions, directing the flow of the story in a particular 
course. The omniscient narrator is usually charged with delivering the outline of the 
story, whilst characters are directly central to the unfolding of the narrative, if not 
secondary to plot development. The positions characters occupy and their backstories 
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affect and form situations. As they walk into place, they, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
“inhabit” and “actively assume” place (POP 117). From inhabitation and activities 
emerge “a spatiality of situation” where the body meets place (115). Experiences that 
occur from this meeting describe not only “spatial sensations” that the individual 
feels, but also the place with which one comes into contact (115). The accounts of 
such experiences encapsulate both the interior and exterior, where one’s sensuous 
experience is manifested kinesthetically, where thought-processes are mapped onto 
places and the routes on which one embarks. Still more significant is the manner in 
which this is enacted and expressed in the text. Places are described and presented as 
characters’ experiences are narrated. This is not to say that presentations of places are 
wholly subjective. Rather, in order to comprehend the extent to which place 
influences experience, we must consider how its facticity—that is, the facts of the 
situation, of reality—are undertaken or thrown upon its inhabitants whose subjectivity 
and biases affect their perceptions.  
A literary phenomenology faces the challenges of mediated experiences, 
particularly because of the modes of presentation that intervene with the perception of 
places. Yet again, the objective-subjective polarity resurges. Erich Auerbach, in his 
wide-ranging study of representation, Mimesis, expounds on the relation between 
subjectivity and objectivity in the novel: although “inner processes” (“movements 
within the consciousness of individual personages”) appear to be of primary 
significance in narrative prose, “exterior occurrences” are constantly “interspersed 
with [them]” (529).33 Auerbach’s insight helps us rethink insipid details and 
ephemeral descriptions of places as extensions of insignificant occurrences that, 
despite arising from external circumstances, are just as important as inner workings. 
                                                
33 The exterior occurrences mentioned in his analysis of To the Lighthouse are the trivialities of the 
scene that, on initial inspection, do not quite contribute to the workings of the mind. 
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From this perspective, characters’ complaints and musings on inane details of their 
environment actually provide perceptive accounts of scenes of the same place. Not 
only are these “made to serve as the frame for what goes on,” they are “worked in” 
(Auerbach 529). More importantly, because external occurrences are part of the 
narrative construction, even the supposedly objective world in which the narrative is 
situated bears marks of fiction. The situation of place breaks down the objective-
subjective polarity and holds both in its givenness. For Merleau-Ponty, this translates 
to the idea of embodied subjectivity. For our discussion of a phenomenological 
perspective on place, subjectivity is not only embodied by the lived body, but also 
emplaced in the lived world.  
The idea of an embodied and emplaced subjectivity in literary texts is not so 
much constrained by challenges posed by subjectivity and objectivity, interiority and 
exteriority, as it is concerned with presenting how they correlate in experience, where 
narratives of mental wonderings and physical wanderings are interwoven. This echoes 
Auerbach’s claim that the body’s actions in and about external occurrences reveal 
inner processes. Malcolm Bradbury and John Fletcher build on this, describing the 
novel to be an art that “hangs on the border between the mimetic and the autotelic 
species of literature” (“The Introverted Novel” 401). Accordingly, the novel sits 
comfortably between representing reality and allowing the described reality to speak 
for itself. It explores the powers of “perspective and form which lie in the spaces 
between the data and the creative object” (409). Here, data is inferred as the facticity 
of the situation into which the individual is thrown and has to take up. Although 
Bradbury and Fletcher underline the intrinsic relation between interiority and 
exteriority, stressing the tension that holds the modern novel, they see the novel as a 
work of “fine consciousness” (401), preferring an introversion that “desubstantiates 
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the material world and puts it in its place” (409). There is an underplaying of the 
significance of the external lived world in the study of experience.  
Addressing the subscription to dualist models of reading that either favours the 
inward turn or simply represents the external world simpliciter, David Herman offers 
a way to interfuse polarities: 
I seek to replace the internal-external scale with a continuum stretching 
between, at one pole, a tight coupling between an intelligent agent and 
that agent’s surrounding environment, and at the other pole, a looser 
coupling between agent and environment…. [Representing] 
consciousness can be seen as an attempt to highlight how minds are at 
once shape and are shaped by larger experiential environments, via the 
particular affordance or opportunities for action that those 
environments provide. (“Re-minding Modernism” 249-250) 
Herman does not think about interiority and exteriority as opposites. He draws out 
two ends of a spectrum, where on both sides exist the agent (internal) and the 
environment (external). The difference between the poles is how tight the coupling is. 
Both are contingent on a mixing of the external and internal, hence diluting the 
distinction between them. So it is not about polarising or privileging any one, but 
rather understanding the relation between the two.    
By highlighting the “modernist accent” that falls on “fictional-worlds-as-
experienced,” Herman reconciles the environment with the agent (243). The curious 
phrase-word is made of words connected and separated by hyphens, their meanings 
conjoined but nonetheless distinct. This tension extends to and describes the 
paradoxical relation of poles: they are irresolutely separate yet intrinsically bounded 
together. It is the glue that coheres warring elements such as thought and action; 
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subjective construals and objective reality; the narrator and dramatis personae. The 
tension does not need resolving; it holds and connects seemingly irreconcilable 
opposites. Interiority, for example, does not have to be separated from exteriority. To 
quote Herman on this, “The mind does not reside within; instead, it emerges through 
humans’ dynamic interdependencies with the social and material environments they 
seek to navigate” (254). Whilst Herman’s intention is to explain the widespread 
workings of the mind (how it is embodied and emplaced to some extent), the subject 
in question is the “intelligent” agent. As with Fletcher and Bradbury’s “creative” 
object, the “intelligent” agent raises questions as to what constitutes intelligence or 
creativity. Although Herman’s ideas on fictional worlds have helped develop a 
literary phenomenological framework for looking at situations, the discussions in this 
thesis are not about the intelligent subject. Unlike Herman, I am more interested in 
how consciousness is embedded in the material, working world, not in the thinking 
mind per se.  
 
Situations in Mrs Dalloway 
To invoke again Woolf’s last words in A Room of One’s Own, women must “have the 
habit of freedom and the courage to write exactly what we think” (131). We have to see 
and experience for ourselves the landscapes, the sky, the horizon, the city and its streets. 
Woolf avows commitment to narrating experiences of a material world in her novels and 
essays, but none so as reifying as the much lauded Mrs Dalloway. Places like Regent’s 
Park, Piccadilly, the kitchen, and the attic are mirrors of characters’ situations, where 
attitudes and differences are sustained.  
Squier, in Virginia Woolf and London, notes that Woolf chooses a “spatial rather 
than a conceptual form” to record her memories (8). She elaborates that Woolf adopts an 
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“angle” that helps create scenes in her writings: “Taking ‘angle’ not as a mental 
perspective on a subject but as an actual physical relationship between objects or places 
in space” (8). Again there is emphasis on the synergy between individuals, objects, and 
place in order to complete the scene. On this, Leena Schröder suggests, “there is an 
interactive relation between us and the world,” i.e., both place and the body are active 
agents (“Virginia Woolf’s Phenomenological Relations of Time and Space” 133). She 
states that the body and place are one: place should be seen as “an extension of the body 
itself that incorporates space and time into a self that every moment is created anew” 
(139). Woolfian scholarship on place often ruminates on the unity of body and place. 
Whilst the overlapping of body and place does haunt Woolf’s writing, the discussion here 
focuses on how interactions between bodies and places create situations.     
In the novel situation is most effectively grasped in the setting. The place of 
choice in Mrs Dalloway is London. It is the mecca of interactions and activities where 
characters crisscross ordinary and landmark places. In presenting a myriad of 
interacting narratives of experiences of London, the novel captures a lively sense of 
space. Though different in approach, Woolf’s novel like Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology explicates the lived world. Louise Westling too catches on to the 
similarity: “Woolf's dynamic, participatory vision of the real is very close to 
[Merleau-Ponty’s] thinking” (“Virginia Woolf and The Flesh of the World” 859). She 
is correct to point out that both Woolf and Merleau-Ponty write about a “lifeworld” 
which “captures human embeddedness within the flesh of the world” (858). This 
“lifeworld” and the “vision of the real” mean more than lifelike mimicries of reality. 
Whilst Mrs Dalloway has been called an “encyclopedia of the city’s streets and 
landmarks,” it is not a compendium of places in post-war England (Snaith and 
Whitworth, “Introduction: Approaches to Space and Place in Woolf” 1). The novel is 
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a narrative of experiences of the material world. It does not try to represent but draws 
an alternative lived world through the subjective perception of characters.  
Mrs Dalloway is about ordinary lived experiences of places. It follows 
Clarissa Dalloway as she physically wanders about more affluent parts of London, 
exploring the topography of a decadent polis during the post-war period. The opening 
pages draw us into a visual and auditory moment experienced by Clarissa in early 
twentieth century London:  
In people’s eyes, in the swing, tramp, and trudge; in the bellow and the 
uproar; the carriages, motor cars, omnibuses, vans, sandwich men 
shuffling and swinging; brass bands; barrel organs; in the triumph and 
the jingle and the strange high singing of some aeroplane overhead was 
what she loved; life; London; this moment of June. (4) 
Place is conceived in relation to phenomena contained within its parameters. London 
is lived and materialised in the sights and sounds, hustle and bustle of the scene. This 
presentation of place contrasts with Ford Madox Ford’s description: 
London, in fact, is so essentially a background, a matter so much more 
of masses than of individuals…. A human aggregation, it leaves 
discernible so very little of the human that it is almost as essentially a 
natural product as any great stretch of alluvial soil. (The Soul of 
London 6) 
Ford’s vision of London is generic. He downplays the materiality of place, describing 
the society of London, not its place. This broad view of place focuses on the masses, 
homogenising society and bypassing the material world. It fails to consider atomic 
details and scattered phenomena that exist within place. Ford may not have intended 
to commodify place, but his reference to place as a background, accommodating the 
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masses, elucidates the general attitude towards place in discourses on space. That is, 
place preexists because things and people that exist have to occupy some place. This 
precept of place is troubling. Like Newtonian and Euclidian precepts of space, this 
misconception has in mind a particular modality of place before an experience of 
place even begins.  
Woolf’s vision of place in Mrs Dalloway is not centripetal. Place is painted 
from the ground up, gradually formed from piecing together bits and pieces of 
phenomena in place. Rather than teleologically building a narrative of place, there is 
emphasis on the many spatial vocabularies and perspectives that eventually coalesce 
into several focal points. In the well-known scene where a motor car driving an 
unknown member of the royal family parks on Bond Street, for example, everyone 
stops and looks at the motor car: Clarissa, Miss Pym, Edgar J. Watkiss, Septimus and 
Rezia Smith, and passers-by from many walks of life are “inclined the same way” 
(MD 13). Attention is first drawn to the pavement, Atkinson’s scent shop, Mulberry’s 
shop, then seamlessly digresses to the sounds of the motor engines, slowly piecing 
together an entourage of Londoners. The “gradual drawing together of everything to 
one centre” begins from ground level, from interacting with phenomena of place and 
subsequently moving towards describing a more all-rounded, though not necessarily 
unified, place (MD 12). As the narrative of place follows Clarissa’s experience and 
perception, one assumes her directedness towards various sights and sounds. Place is 
not amorphous and mere background, but is detailed and personalised. Clarissa’s 
participation in the lived world shared with others creates personal but also multi-
perspectival places.   
The pattern of space opening other spaces adds perspectives to otherwise 
absolute spaces. It also contributes to a structure of spatiality that maps out how 
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characters connect events of the past and present. This is exemplified when Clarissa 
asks Peter if he remembers “how the blinds used to flap at Bourton” (MD 31). She 
associates Bourton with objects. Her impression of place is tied to a piece of furniture 
whilst Peter slithers into a memory of having breakfast with her father. Peter thinks of 
the scene of having breakfast which then brings to mind a dining area. They envision 
place differently: Clarissa’s fancy for the physicality of place and the minute details 
of scenes reflects how place is conceived by its phenomena, whereas Peter’s grudge 
against Clarissa leads him to associate Bourton with unpleasant memories of 
rejection. She wants to walk through the grass; he does not care for it. To Clarissa, the 
blinds are an extension of Bourton; to Peter, the encounter with old Parry is a large 
part of Bourton. Her association of place is a physical one whereas his is symbolic. 
Or, to draw from the vocabulary of David Lodge, her relation to place is metaphoric 
and his metonymic.  
In “The Language of Modernist Fiction,” Lodge posits that all fiction contains 
metonymic and metaphoric elements; some are more inclined towards one of the two, 
and others are suffused with both. Modern fiction, he writes, “belongs to the 
metaphoric mode” (492), and is also “perfectly compatible with the retention and 
exploitation of metonymic writing” (493). Clarissa’s view of the blinds as Bourton is, 
in his terms, synecdochic: the blinds are a “part standing for whole” (483). This 
means that her thoughts “proceed by associating items that are contiguous” (485). 
Peter, on the other hand, selects a particular memory instead. Each perception shows 
an idiosyncratic way of viewing place, also revealing the subjective lenses through 
which place is viewed. 
On Clarissa’s perception, Vicki Tromanhauser notes how she makes sure to 
address the people and things in the places she walks. Clarissa personalises the 
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metropolis by greeting her neighbours, old friends, and shopkeepers as she walks the 
streets: “Clarissa’s pedestrian course marks out a particularized, personal London 
within the greater metropolis” (“Virginia Woolf’s London and the Archaeology of 
Character” 39). This is also apparent as Clarissa magnifies her presence by attaching a 
sense of herself to the places she visits. A description of St James’s Park is really a 
recollection of Clarissa’s time in Bourton; a description of Mulberry’s is Clarissa’s 
self-aggrandising account of her importance to Miss Pym. Every place she enters is 
suffused with her presence and bears her mark as she communicates her perspective 
in and of place. She possesses places by stamping part of herself onto them. Place, in 
this sense, becomes part of her. She is not only situated in place but is engulfed in a 
spatiality that admits and sustains intricacies, impressions and scenes, celebrating the 
diversity materialised in place.  
Situations in the novel arise from points of view from which characters 
experience. Multi-perspectivism is at work as characters—gendered, biased, broken, 
idealistic, flawed, and essentially human—gather to experience places. We see this in 
the scene where Rezia, Septimus, Maisie Johnson, and Mrs Dempster congregate in 
Regent’s Park. The episode is framed by three main accounts of place, each told from 
a point of view reflecting the character’s state of mind and place in life. Merleau-
Ponty explains how positions can reveal the depth of place: 
I should see [depth] if I were in the position of a spectator looking on 
from the side, who can take in at a glance the series of objects spread 
out in front of me, whereas for me they conceal each other…. What 
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makes depth invisible for me is precisely what makes it visible for the 
spectator as breadth. (POP 297)34  
The depth that “I” fails to see is equivalent to the breadth that the spectator perceives. 
The perception of depth is taken to be that of breadth when the two are actually 
completely different experiences. Remarkably, Mrs Dalloway interweaves the 
positions in a manner that forbids one from subsuming the other.  
In the Regent’s Park episode, positions enabling the experience of depth and 
breadth are embodied by different characters but embedded in the same locus. They 
are separate but one at the same time. Later in the scene when Septimus’s distorted 
vision makes it difficult to identify place, the park melts into blotches of random 
colours of “white things,” “green stuff,” “blue and pink smoke,” and “dun-coloured 
animals” (MD 18-19). His experience seems purely imaginative and senseless. Yet, 
this perverse account suddenly becomes sensible if read alongside Maisie Johnson’s 
viewpoint. Maisie observes that there are “dogs busy with the railings, busy with 
themselves” (20), which reminds of Septimus’s “dun-coloured animals” that peered 
“over the Zoo palings, barking, howling” (19). What is imperceptible to Septimus is 
perceivable for Maisie. They are both spectators and participants at the same time. As 
characters assume various positions in place and their narratives intermingle, “the 
juxtaposition of points,” as Merleau-Ponty calls it, occurs and the depth of place 
manifests itself (POP 297). Multi-perspectivism makes it possible to trace the 
originary contact of place which is consistent and connects disparate perspectives. It 
is the perceptual interpretations of the park from the characters’ respective positions, 
and not the object of the park as a static monument per se, that make depth visible.  
                                                
34 The point on depth develops from traditional ideas of perception and is one that Merleau-Ponty 
challenges. Here, the brief discussion of depth enables the consideration of positionality, which is the 
main focus of this section. Depth—whether conceived traditionally or phenomenologically—is 
indubitably created by points and positions. For a detailed analysis of depth, refer to chapter 4.  
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We have seen how Septimus’s delirium affects perception. Characters take up 
positions according to their circumstances and experience the world. To Rezia, the 
park is “everything terrible” (MD 17). Her perception is affected by her predicament: 
“Her wedding ring slipped—she had grown so thin. It was she who suffered” (17). 
She compares her experience of park to the Milan gardens, the cheerful Italian crowd 
with the “half alive” Londoners (18). Whilst Rezia’s thoughts hinge on her subjective 
expectations of the park which she has internalised from her previous experiences, 
they are nonetheless intrinsic to her being. Analysing the same scene, Werner Deiman 
identifies Rezia as the embodiment of historical continuity, connecting her with 
“Roman forbears” and “their response to new terrain and geography” (“History, 
Pattern, and Continuity in Virginia Woolf” 53). The same can be said of Septimus 
who carries the trauma of war with him. Deiman claims that “Woolf's deeply rooted 
historical consciousness became the springboard for belief and her orientation to the 
future” (66). With a historicist lens, he identifies in Woolf’s works “a pattern of 
history,” which “offered redemption from time and affirmed finally a continuum into 
the future” (66). Deiman’s approach is not phenomenological; he shows how human 
beings are entrenched in forms of intentionality (directedness is synchronously 
backward and forward). A literary feminist phenomenology, however, is not as keen 
on one’s rootedness in the past or how it impinges on present perception. Rather it 
works with how narratives of experience sustain the tension between past and present, 
and what this says about the workings of underlying categorical ideologies that 
structure perception and experience.  
The situatedness of place gathers together multiple descriptions of place and 
allows different positions from which place is experienced. Rezia’s perspective, 
although shares the “darkness” of her Roman ancestors, adds to and confirms the 
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facticity of the park, which is the state of the park that precedes the characters’ 
entrances (MD 18). As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the facticity of the world is “always 
‘already there’ before reflection begins—an inalienable presence” (POP vii). This 
“already there” quality is not the same as Deiman’s idea of a preexistent historical 
consciousness. It is not a predetermined fact wanting to explain itself, but a feature of 
the world waiting to be undertaken and described. For instance, Rezia’s complaint of 
the park as a “terrible” place of “sky and tree, children playing, dragging carts, 
blowing whistles, falling down” unveils snippets of the quotidian occurrences in 
Regent’s Park (17): “people here, huddled up in Bath chairs, looking at a few ugly 
flowers stuck in pots” (18). The descriptions, though brimmed with displeasure, rather 
effectively illustrate the park. Rezia may apprehend the darkness as her forefathers 
saw but the park which is already there does not present itself as preexistent, impacted 
by factors apart from the way it appears to her. In fact it gradually forms only as she 
describes it. Thinking of greener pastures in Italy, along with the references to history, 
Rezia’s sense of place is brimming with nostalgia, yet her biased and subjective 
experience of the park is still very much rooted in its spatial objects. This is 
juxtaposed with her recollection of the Milan gardens where she uses plurals and 
general descriptions that are not as specific as the biting but concrete words she uses 
to criticise the park.  
The intertwining of Rezia’s past and present, her experiences in Milan and in 
Regent’s, shows how boundaries are blurred in place. Other places can coalesce in a 
single locality; stories of places come together to form a grand narrative of place. 
There is plurality when she fully inhabits place and gets carried away in place, so to 
speak. The blurring of memories and experience, history and present, subjective 
feelings and objective sensing, is achieved through free indirect discourse where 
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Rezia’s perspective and the narrator’s supposedly more objective commentary 
interweave, purveying a layered perspectivism for the narrative. Free indirect 
discourse is a narrative interplay of interior/exterior, public/private, past/present, and 
the list goes on, that presents reality as perceived and as presented for the perceiver. 
Anna Snaith gives an account of what she calls “indirect interior monologue”: 
[It] occurs when a character's thoughts are presented in the third person 
by the narrator. The narrator enters the mind of the character and 
reports his or her thoughts verbatim, but the first- and second- person 
pronouns of direct interior monologue are absent…. Indirect interior 
monologue can be signalled by the narrator with, for example, the 
usage ‘she thought,’ or the move into the character's mind can be left 
to the reader to locate…. Often the line between reporting and showing 
what a character is thinking is difficult to discern. (“Virginia Woolf's 
Narrative Strategies” 134) 
This narrative maneuvre shifts between “public and private voices,” and characters’ 
voices are “internal” whilst “the narrator’s is external” (134). Snaith elaborates that 
the narrators in Woolf’s writings have “the omniscience to move the narrative while 
their own private realm remains untouched” (134). Likewise, characters often disclose 
their private thoughts without any means of controlling the narrative beyond their 
own. Snaith opines, rather than “relinquishing either authority or subjectivity, indirect 
interior monologue allows Woolf to combine and move between the two” (134). 
There is a tight coupling between the internal and external that presents place from a 
distance, as well as intimately. 
Free indirect discourse is at work when Rezia first reminisces about Italy: 
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Far was Italy and the white houses and the room where her sisters sat 
making hats, and the streets crowded every evening with people 
walking, laughing out loud, not half alive like people here, huddled up 
in Bath chairs, looking at a few ugly flowers stuck in pots! (MD 17-18) 
The omniscient narrator conveys the short section, but it is Rezia’s sentiments that are 
expressed. The narrative slips in and out of her thoughts of missing Italy and resenting 
London. The phrases, “half-alive like people here” and “ugly flowers,” bear Rezia’s 
prejudices against London and her dissatisfaction (18). “Here” refers to her proximity 
to the crowd and blurs the distinction between her consciousness and the external 
narrative. Even punctuating the sentence with an exclamation mark suggests a 
personal emotion that traces back to Rezia’s previous laments about her predicament. 
This culminates when she bursts out, “For you should see the Milan gardens,” 
ascertaining that the previous section is an extension of Rezia’s thought-processes 
(18). This method of narrative telling, instead of having Rezia personally lament her 
unhappiness or a third-person narrator communicating an observation outside 
subjective opinions, is disinclined to offer an absolute perspective. It continues when 
Maisie Johnson enters the park, further showing how character and narrator’s 
perceptions and voices are intertwined.  
Compared to the crestfallen and resigned Rezia, Maisie, a nineteen year old 
exploring London for the first time, occupies another position in the situation of the 
park. Maisie provides a mundane picture of the general crowd in Regent’s Park, 
expressing her little interest for the people and their activities. Her impression of the 
park forms when she is greeted by Rezia and Septimus in a far from hospitable 
manner. Maisie is immediately uncomfortable and feels out of place. The narrative is 
peppered with the words, “odd” and “queer,” pronouncing her displacement. In 
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addition, the adjectives, “stone” and “prim,” add to the hostile atmosphere. With a 
third-person narrator reporting her actions and feelings, free indirect discourse 
expresses Maisie’s state of mind without having her directly voicing her experience. 
Unlike Rezia’s section, Maisie’s account lacks quotation marks and uses bracketed 
commentaries to direct the narrative and explain Maisie’s actions. They function as 
brief interjectory backstories that insert back the presence of a third-person narrator 
who has been seemingly ousted from the narrative. Although Maisie does not directly 
speak—she is somehow distant from the narrative—the extent of her alienation is 
fully expressed. It is as though the narrator and Maisie are one in the same narratorial 
voice and yet remain distinct. Free indirect narrative enables different perspectives to 
simultaneously manifest. The narrator gains more access to the characters’ thoughts; 
characters dwell on their feelings whilst still keeping an aesthetic distance.  
In this instance free indirect discourse distances the characters from self-
aggrandising monologues and draws the external narrator closer to the happenings of 
the novel. It is freed from the conventional third person and from the syntax of direct 
speech. On free indirect discourse, Roy Pascal writes, “the value of the term ‘indirect’ 
is that it indicates that both a narrator and character are involved” (The Dual Voice 
32). He also points out that this “does not suggest the mingling, even fusion, of two 
voices in a dual voice, neither simple narrator nor character” (32). Duality enables the 
co-existence of interiority and exteriority; they are distinct correlates conjoined as a 
couple. The duality is not a fusion of two positions but a position from which two 
perspectives are working alongside one another towards presenting a more knowable 
world. Duality is apparent as place is experienced from a dual position: Regent’s Park 
is seemingly experienced at a distance through the voice of the omniscient narrator, 
and also intimately through Rezia and Maisie’s thoughts and emotions. The park is 
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represented by the narrator’s reporting voice and also by their consciousnesses. Here, 
both accounts are tightly linked, demonstrating a multi-layered perspectivism that 
preserves both direct descriptions and mediated explanations of experiences.   
As more perceptual experiences of the park are admitted into the narrative, a 
multi-perspectival narrative of place emerges. In the same example of Regent’s Park, 
as Septimus desires to run away from people, the paragraph is narrated in free indirect 
discourse where the narrator speaks with the characteristics of the involved character. 
The third-person narrator likens the slope of the park to “a length of green stuff with a 
ceiling cloth of blue and pink smoke” and describes the “dun-coloured animals” with 
elongated necks (19). The scene is dramatised by “howling” and “barking” noises, 
made more chaotic by jarring images of “irregular houses… hazed in smoke” (19). 
The cacophonous scene parallels the disturbed state of mind of Septimus; it follows 
that, because of his illness, he sees the park distorted. It is not a sound representation 
of reality, as compared to that of Rezia or Maisie’s. Yet, in his brief description of the 
park, the chairs are referred to twice—the first occurs when Septimus wants to run 
away “where there were chairs beneath a tree,” and the second is when the narrator 
concludes, “There they sat down under a tree” (19). In the first instance, the narrator 
is speaking for Septimus and the narrative is locked in free indirect discourse. In the 
second, however, the dramatic description of the scene has ended, and the previous 
lengthy and convoluted sentence is succeeded by a simple observation of the couple 
sitting under a tree. It seems, for that concluding remark, the narrative has slipped out 
of Septimus’s consciousness and returned to the narrator, who ascertains that the 
chairs are indeed under the tree. Either way, in or out of Septimus’s consciousness, or 
between that and the narrator’s commentary, the facticity of the park remains 
constant. The chairs are banal but they are the meeting point where subjectivities 
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intersect. One character’s narrative of the park, mentioning the chairs, immediately 
brings into the scene another character’s narrative. In this way, the chairs constitute 
the facticity of the park that connects the disparate experiences of characters.  
In Solid Objects, Douglas Mao interrogates Septimus’s perception of trees in 
the same scene and makes a claim about objects as the facticity necessary for 
“intersubjective mediations” (54).35 Adopting philosophical readings of production 
and commodification in modernism, he writes about banal objects, or “natural 
phenomena,” as “referents” that lead back and point towards signifiers (46).36 Mao 
elucidates how they tug at the crisis between “appearance and contingency” (43). He 
compares Septimus’s and Rezia’s perceptions of the trees in the park:  
Rezia addresses the pattern [of the trees] as the limited signifier of 
something specific, her manner of reading conspicuously literalized by 
the fact that in this case the signified lurks physically right behind. But 
for Septimus, the pattern suggests something about “everything.” (47)  
Perceptions of the same object inspire different responses: Rezia sees the image but 
Septimus “transforms signification into sensuousness” (47). Plagued by the “horror of 
the possible meaninglessness of everything,” Septimus does not see what idealism or 
reality exhibits but “make[s] something out of the possibility that meaning might 
proceed from the object without reference to some ordered system” (48). Septimus 
and Rezia show two ways of seeing objects but neither is privileged. The disparity 
appears to inhibit communication between them but a closer analysis conveys that 
both ways are equally crucial to expand on experience. 
Rezia does not know what Septimus is seeing but keeps imploring him to look 
away, as if sensing his wayward vision. The directive, “Look,” is repeated six times; 
                                                
35 For Mao, the tree stands between the “nonlinguistic” and “nonsentient,” and is a “product of nature 
rather than humanity” (48). 
36 Mao uses the terms “object” and “phenomenon” interchangeably.  
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the seventh is a wave for his attention. The dogged attempts to get her husband to turn 
away from what he sees hint of Rezia’s awareness of something awry about his 
vision. Septimus, at the receiving end, does not hear her but hears another: “Look the 
unseen bade him, the voice which now communicated with him” (19). The narrative 
depersonalises Rezia, reinforcing Septimus’s inability to make sense of her. Mired in 
their positions, they are incognisant of the other’s vision and fail to get through to 
each other. Still, they are somehow connected. Rezia persists to distract her husband 
whilst Septimus mistakes his wife’s voice for the Lord’s. The fine details are 
suggestive of intersubjective experiences that do not have to be completely knowable 
before exchanges occur. This subtle way of interlinking experiences is telling of the 
modernist novel, or as Mao puts it, of “modernism’s extraordinarily generative 
fascination with the object understood as neither commodity (Goods) nor as symbol 
(Gods), but as ‘object,’ where any or all of the resonances of this complexly 
polysemous word might apply” (4). In this Mao explains how the modernist novel 
endeavours to present experiences of objects through multi-perspectivism where 
perspectives are not transparent to perceivers. The interrelation of experiences in spite 
of ignorance confirms something affective hovers over experience. 
It is easy for us to discount disturbed perceptions of place. But the extremities 
of subjectivity as presented in Mrs Dalloway show that affected, biased perceptions 
do not always impede experience. At first glance, Septimus’s illness clouds his 
judgement; Rezia’s sufferings hamper a carefree experience; Maisie’s displacement 
prevents an appreciation of Regent’s Park. Yet, despite dissonance and confusion, the 
characters, along with the external narrator, reinforce the brute matter of the park—
that is, the Bath chairs. They experience the park differently: Rezia watches the 
crowd; Maisie zeroes in and identifies them as the elderly and invalids; Septimus sees 
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smudges of colours. Their visual fields are completely different, but the intricacies 
embedded within their experiences are related. Phenomenologically speaking, 
situation is dependent on facticity and the modes of givenness through which 
phenomena is presented. Each character occupies a point in the spatiality of the park 
and presents a givenness of place—the way in which the park appears to them, each 
giving different details of the park that complement another’s. The characters put 
together a narrative of the park: Septimus lays the colours of the park; Rezia informs 
of the atmosphere and general attitude of the park-goers; and Maisie highlights the 
demographics. Together, their experiences provide a more perceptive description of 
the park. The park is a lived world, its narrative enlivened by motile, affective, and 
sensuous individuals. Multi-perspectivism does not present the park as complete 
because as mentioned earlier the perceptual accounts are not interfused. Rather, it 
makes a situation out of the park. The park becomes more knowable as phenomena 
are understood in terms of how they appear to the characters. 
Septimus, Rezia, and Maisie are subjects who occupy positions enabling them 
to draw out different narratives of the same place. Separate perceptual experiences of 
phenomena intersect because the facticity of the place is constant, i.e., the state of an 
environment into which one is thrown, where she has no ability to change the pre-
existing variables in a situation. Whilst facticity is determinate, orientation and 
position Kern tells us are relative and in motion, each one responsible for a “part of 
the environment that a particular [individual] can actually experience” (137). A single 
experience of place, however myopic, is part of the montage of various positions and 
orientations that together create a circumstance, the “plurality of spaces,” as opposed 
to the “universality of a single space” (135). Massey writes in For Space that space 
can be understood through “tales of crossing and conquering space” (4). It is a 
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“collection” of stories brought about by the “specificity of place” that brings together 
the “non-meetings-up, the disconnections and the relations not established, the 
exclusions” that are usually left out (130). In Mrs Dalloway, the park collects the 
interspersed experiences of characters, even though characters themselves may not be 
aware of each other. To emphasise the lived world means to regard each experience of 
place as a piece of the discourse of place that develops as each scene unfolds. 
 
Connecting Places 
As place opens up other spaces, its inhabitant reaches out to other inhabitants. There 
is a streak of anxiety and longingness for something outside the present that runs 
through characters sharing the same place. Rezia is anxious to hide Septimus and 
yearns for Italy; Maisie is distressed and regrets leaving Edinburgh; Septimus wants 
to get away from people. Even Mrs Dempster, who has the least contact with the rest, 
contemplates her life choices and longs to visit foreign lands as she once did. A 
collective pensiveness evoking nostalgia, insecurity, and regret emanates from their 
separate experiences in the park. Most evidently, Maisie’s distress reminds of Rezia 
and Septimus, particularly because they are the causes of her uneasiness. She cries 
“Horror! Horror!” when she sees Septimus, presumably frightened by him (20). She 
does not give Septimus much thought, perceiving him as she would with the chairs 
and trees in the park. In “Narrativizing Characters in Mrs Dalloway,” Annalee 
Edmondson writes that “though she does not theorize about his interiority,” Maisie is 
“deeply affected” and “will continue to be haunted by Septimus” (27). It seems 
Septimus’s trauma is infectious, rubbing off Maisie even though she only caught a 
glimpse of him. There is an inarticulate, affective quality of experience that is outside 
preconceived knowledge and beyond the appearances of phenomena.    
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When one perceives another, something affective connects their experiences. 
Edmondson tells us that characters are “intersubjective” due to “the ways in which 
their consciousnesses register the other consciousnesses they encounter in the 
metropolis” (19). The intersubjectivity, as well as connecting experiences, is 
mentioned en passant in Phenomenology of Perception where Merleau-Ponty writes 
on the lived body in a world of other selves:   
Not only have I a physical world, not only do I live in the midst of 
earth, air and water, I have around me roads, plantations, villages, 
streets, implements, a bell, a spoon, a pipe…. I feel the close presence 
of others beneath a veil of anonymity. Someone uses the pipe for 
smoking, the spoon for eating, the bell for summoning…. (405) 
The lived body as the subject perceiving objects senses that being in a living world 
means having to deal with constant changes and degenerations of its surroundings and 
also needing to come into contact with other visible bodies. We are in a lived world as 
well as in an intersubjective macrocosm: 
Someone is making use of my familiar objects. But who can it be? I 
say that it is another, a second self, and this I know in the first place 
because this living body has the same structure as mine. I experience 
my own body as the power of adopting certain forms of behaviour and 
a certain world, and I am given to myself merely as a certain hold upon 
the world; now, it is precisely my body which perceives in that other 
body a miraculous prolongation of my intentions, a familiar way of 
dealing with the world. (412) 
It seems it is when we thoroughly recognise how the body experiences the world that 
we can identify our intentionality in the behaviour of another.  
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Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of plural bodies and consciousnesses is as always 
somatic and analytical. He uses many ifs, examples of a baby and child who are not 
aware of an intersubjective world, lovers and chess players who are conscious of it. 
Yet, in the last pages of his discussion, he uncharacteristically and rather abruptly 
invokes God: “In God I can be conscious of others as of myself, and love others as 
myself. But the subjectivity that we run up against does not admit of being called 
God” (POP 418). Omniscient and omnipresent, “conscious of others as of [himself],” 
and “love others as [himself],” God is the answer to the philosophical question of 
“how I can be open to phenomena which transcend me, and which nevertheless exist 
only to the extent that I take them up and live them” (423). Resorting to a 
transcendental Being for resolve accentuates the difficulty of reconciling “solitude” 
and “communication” (418). Merleau-Ponty urges his readers to think of them as 
“two moments of one phenomenon” (418). On the phenomenon, he elaborates: 
The central phenomenon, at the root of both my subjectivity and my 
transcendence towards others, consists in my being given to myself. I 
am given, that is, I find myself already situated and involved in a 
physical and social world—I am given to myself… (419) 
To say I am given is to acknowledge that one is part of a social world and that being 
social is part of one’s existence. Yet, to be able to say I am given is also indicative of 
one’s knowledge of one’s social situation. It is also to say,  
I am given to myself, which means that this situation is never hidden 
from me, it is never round about me as an alien necessity, and I am 
never in effect enclosed in it like an object in a box. (419) 
Contrary to popular belief, the social world is not a threat to individual solitude. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the task of phenomenology, once we are done with the 
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natural world, is to “rediscover” the social world as “a permanent field or dimension 
of existence” (421). In this world we become “a dual being”: “we are collaborators for 
each other in consummate reciprocity,” where “I am free from myself, for the other 
person’s thoughts are certainly not mine” (413). Because the lived world involves 
other selves and subjectivities, the rediscovery impoverishes philosophical rhetoric. 
We get hints of philosophy’s inadequacy from the invocation of divinity in 
Phenomenology of Perception. Structurally, the exposition on other selves is slightly 
odd, lacking the clarity and references to physiology and natural sciences from which 
Merleau-Ponty is wont to draw. Phenomenology stutters when describing the material 
experience of the self in the social world.  
This is one aspect in which the literary text can bring something particular to 
phenomenology. In Mrs Dalloway, intersubjectivity and interconnectivity are part of 
characters’ interiority. The privacy and openness of experiences are held in tension. 
Mrs Dalloway distinguishes and interpolates subjectivities, showing how experiences 
outside the first person can be constituted and shared without effacing the self. One’s 
unique existence is not compromised even though she experiences other bodies and 
shares their experiences. The affect and sociality of human beings are unexplainable 
but they connect people and places, spreading out humanity in that way.  
Apart from character-to-character narratives, situation also emerges from 
intra-character experiences. We have seen how several characters build a narrative of 
place. Place may also be built from different narratives of places threaded together by 
a single character. The novel with interspersing spatial narratives helps envision a 
place made up of separate situations and dialogues moving between places. Samuel 
Mallin notes how “situations are mastered (though never finally) through a process of 
articulation” where “aspects of a situation… interweave and are dialectically 
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interconnected” (Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy 14). It is important to register the 
various “sides” of situation because “these sides point beyond themselves in the 
opposite direction as well to something more or other than what is made available in 
the particular situation” (16). It is as if processes of telling and revealing perspectives 
of place plot a grand map of the situation. In Mrs Dalloway the map is of the city. 
Michel De Certeau avows the importance of spatial narratives and explicates how 
each is a description that functions as a tour, “conditioning a map” (The Practice of 
Everyday Life 119): “Every story is a travel story—a spatial practice” (115). The idea 
of stories as practices accentuates the intentionality that resides in the body. The body 
is a working and lived entity that preserves subjectivity, connecting, organising, and 
compressing various spaces as it experiences. This opens up the discussion of place to 
the possibilities of other extended situations which are outside the current locality. 
The connectivity between separate physical places is exemplified in an early 
scene of St James’s Park. As Clarissa enjoys her walk in the park, her thoughts lead 
from the physical visuals of St James’s to memories of Peter and herself in a similar 
park. Her memories culminate as she remembers the “scene in the little garden 
fountain” where “she had to break with him” (6). In that moment, St James’s Park 
extends beyond the existing park in Piccadilly to include the remembered park in 
Bourton that she was in with Peter. The significance of the park also extends beyond 
the temporal reality and merges with the personalised park that Clarissa remembers. 
As she recollects and concurrently experiences, the park is not quite the past or 
present St James’s Park.  
Place is not a static site on the map but becomes a situation of place that 
expands the parameters of its circumstances to include the possibilities of various 
anchorages. Woolf animates inert place through the slipping in and out of spatial 
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narratives and a continuity that juggles between an indulgence for interiority and an 
attachment to material objects. Clarissa does not announce that she is emotionally 
present in the park in Bourton but sees herself bickering with Peter and thereafter 
slowly pieces together parts of the place (the fountain and the little garden). Her 
perception of place forms through her storytelling. To use de Certeau’s words, she 
does not present a map but gives a “circuit” or “tour” of place (119). “Tour” connotes 
movement and directions that point to and describe places without categorically 
identifying them. The tour-type description shuttles between seeing, which is “the 
knowledge of an order of places,” and going, also known as “spatializing actions” 
(119). Woolf’s description of place, however, advances a relentless intermixing of 
movement and perception. Stepping into St James’s Park, Clarissa immediately also 
enters the park of her past.   
Her description joins together the processes of going and seeing, ratifying 
Massey’s theory of place as “a constellation of processes” (For Space 141). Massey 
and de Certeau recognise that place constantly wafts in processes. It is in the making 
and exists as various “sides” or “tours” which are described and articulated in relation 
to one another. This aspect of place is manifested in two separate episodes where 
Clarissa and Richard are on their way home. In the opening pages, Clarissa enters 
“the Park” and does not say which park this is; later it is revealed to be St James’s 
Park. Hugh corroborates this: “I met Clarissa in the Park this morning” (78). As she 
walks, she remembers passing by Devonshire House and the Bath House, ultimately 
“driving home across the Park” (7). Later in the novel, Richard ponders getting 
flowers as he “walk[s] across the Park to tell his wife that he loved her” (85). Because 
they both have to cross the Park to get home, and since Clarissa walks through St 
James’s Park, it is assumed that Richard is in St James’s as well. Moreover, nowhere 
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else in the novel is Park capitalised. Whenever nondescript or specific parks are 
mentioned, the word, “park,” is set in lower case. So, in this case, we assume the Park 
is St James’s.  
However, despite the inferences and much suspense, Richard is said to be 
“crossing the Green Park” (85). Green Park is towards the west of St James’s; they 
are not the same. Woolf’s meticulous drawing up of London, tracing routes through 
the city and naming specific streets and buildings, compels us to rethink the deliberate 
ambivalence of the Park. The couple needs to traverse the same park to get home yet, 
interestingly enough, Clarissa is never said to be in Green Park and Richard is never 
in St James’s. This detail, seemingly slight, is an example of how the novel draws 
connection between places, where the divide between spatial stories dissipates and 
they collectively make up the different sides of place. Richard and Clarissa’s 
narratives in and of the Park—whether it is St James’s or Green—give us a tour of the 
setting of the novel and also a map of the interior lives of the characters. They are 
disconnected but tied together. Their accounts in and of the park are articulations that 
condition and extend the map in Mrs Dalloway. Though married, Richard and 
Clarissa have a dispassionate love reflected in the different tours they take. Yet, the 
ambivalence of the parks brings them together. Being in different parks physically 
separates them, but the narrative of place connects the estranged couple. Ultimately, 
the inclusive and unnamed Park is the place around which their narratives surround, 
drawing them to the same spatiality that eludes the unsuspecting reader.   
There is something affective, something that connects people, in places. For 
Woolf, this is what makes place exciting. “It is always an adventure to enter a new 
room,” she muses in “Street Haunting,” “for the lives and characters of its owners 
have distilled their atmosphere into it” (33). This is also why places are lived and 
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animated, not just part of the experience equation in which the environment is an 
incidental external occurrence. The spaces examined thus far are mostly social and 
communal spaces like the parks and streets; they are designed to bring people 
together. Connectivity, in some way and form, is expected. Compared to public 
spaces, private and delimited places are connecting in a different way.  
 
Confining Places  
In the iconic attic scene where Clarissa retreats to rest after returning from shopping, 
the narrative is confined to a fairly small place. There is no touring, though movement 
in other ways still continues. The constraints of the attic limit Clarissa’s movements; 
she is emplaced. In the attic, place and milieu are blurred as her memory of Sally 
commingles with the memories of places. Some scholars have interpreted the attic as 
a place where Clarissa’s being and true sexuality are asserted. Shalom Rachman 
writes, “It is here that her consciousness opens into depth and she has a moment of 
vision, a moment she is her true self” (“Clarissa’s Attic” 10). In another analysis, 
Jesse Wolfe suggests that the scene “reveals the range of her curiosity about herself” 
(“The Sane Woman in the Attic” 52). The attic is commonly regarded as a means to 
Clarissa’s psyche. Veering from psychoanalytical and queer readings, this section 
focuses on the phenomenological experience of small, delimited spaces and how 
subjectivity is emplaced in such rooms.  
In the attic, the highest room of the house, Clarissa tries to remember her 
initial impression of Sally. Instead of attributing personal traits to Sally, she 
immediately pictures her sitting on the floor. She thinks of the place they first met. 
Her question (“Who is that?”), asked when she first saw Sally, is replaced with 
“Where could it have been?” (24). It is as if the answer to one of the questions 
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satisfies the other. There is a correlation between person and place here. Marcel 
Proust relates to this connectivity when he tries to recall and write about a certain 
reading experience. At the end of the recollection, nothing about the book—its author 
and content—is said, but the things surrounding Proust whilst he reads saturate the 
narrative. Just as he does not remember the book but only remembers the 
interruptions, one does not need to know the story because the narrative of his 
situation suffices. It is as though place, its atmosphere and objects, tells a story that 
surpasses the one that is expected. Proust shares his thoughts: 
I feel myself live and think only in rooms where everything is the 
creation, the language, of lives profoundly different from my own, of a 
taste opposed to mine, where I can find nothing of my own conscious 
thoughts, where my imagination is excited by feeling itself driven into 
the heart of not-me…. (“On Reading” 12) 
Situations have creative powers that form narratives. Through the language and style 
in which they are delivered, situations delimited in place narrate experiences that are 
comparatively originary because according to Proust there is “nothing of [one’s] own 
conscious thoughts” (12). Proust’s experience can be read phenomenologically. What 
began as an explanation of the book ends up being a description of the situation 
around him. Likewise, as Clarissa tries to remember Sally, she recollects the situation 
of their first meeting, which reveals more about Sally and their relationship than the 
direct characterisation of her.  
Clarissa’s substitution of Sally’s presence with the place she occupies erases 
boundaries between place and body. Her wondering about Sally proceeds by way of 
association and adjunction. According to Lodge, Clarissa remembering Sally presents 
the metaphoric and metonymic modes that are characteristic of modern fiction. Whilst 
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her perception is metonymic, associating Sally with the place in which she sat, the 
superimposition of the upper room in Bourton onto the London attic room is by 
means of metaphoric similarity. In order to remember Sally, Clarissa has to situate 
her. She sees her in a particular position—“She sat on the floor”—and that is her first 
impression of her (24). In metonymic contiguity, Clarissa puts together an image of 
Sally by visualising the place of encounter. As she continues to think of Sally, she is 
transported to Bourton, back to the night where they “sat, hour after hour, talking” in 
a room “at the top of the house” (24).  
It is no coincidence that Clarissa confined to her attic room remembers an 
experience she once had in a similar attic-like place. In that moment, the actual place 
of the attic room in London intermingles with the remembered bedroom at the top of 
the house in Bourton. Somehow the rooms become almost synonymous. The 
similarity between them, pronounced by metaphoric perception, proffers a narrative 
of the room—the situation of place that goes beyond the temporal and extends the 
spatial dimensions of the transfixed place of the attic. Exchanges between characters 
and places not only accentuate the knitted relation between body and place, they also 
bring to the fore how perception and the narrative method in which it is delivered—
metonymic or metaphoric—can blur the “clear distinction between what is actually 
‘there’ and what is merely illustrative” (Lodge 494). According to Lodge, it is 
characteristic of modern fiction to challenge “positivist distinctions” (494), for 
“nothing is simply one thing” (495). This tendency sits well with phenomenology’s 
idea of situation as a set of possibilities of positions. The recollection of Sally leads to 
the recollection of the room in Bourton, in turn offering a lens through which the 
present room in London can be viewed.  
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The exchange between the experience in the attic and recollection of the other 
room is symbolic of emplaced subjectivity. This is not the same as place being a 
vessel that fleshes out invisible psychological processes. Place is not incidental; it is 
intentional. It positions the individual in a way that elicits certain responses to the 
environment. For instance, there is a connection between the attic room barely 
furnished with a narrow bed and the “emptiness about the heart of life” (MD 23). In 
the spartan room, Clarissa adapts to place and takes off her feathered yellow hat. 
Gaston Bachelard describes the attic, or the upper room, as a place that “gives 
mankind shelter from the rain and sun he fears” (The Poetics of Space 18). It is a safe 
haven where encumbrances are stripped off, where women “must put off their rich 
apparel” (MD 23). To Rachman, Clarissa’s disrobing in the attic is a symbolic ritual: 
Only in her attic can she let herself truly be, truly be Clarissa that is, or 
in other words, eliminate momentarily the censor that keeps the real 
Clarissa repressed and for a moment feel whole before assembling and 
composing herself for the world, even the world that is her own house. 
(11) 
Somewhere in her analysis finds the paradox of the room. The space anchors Clarissa, 
enabling her to be herself: she is safe in the attic, shielded from the outside world. 
Yet, the peace seems temporal (“momentarily” and “for a moment”). The transitory 
nature of the room could be attributed to the short span of time Clarissa spends there. 
But it is more notably a result of the room alternating between a place where Clarissa 
rests from the world and one where she prepares for the world.  
There is something ascetic about the attic. Lying in the monastic room, 
Clarissa “could not dispel a virginity preserved through childhood which clung to her 
like a sheet” (23). Words like “clean sheets” and “virginity” connote innocence. The 
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layout of the room (object, place) and the chaste body (subject) are mutually 
dependent. They co-create an atmosphere impervious to the corruption of the world. It 
is in this place and state that Clarissa remembers the “purity” and “integrity” of her 
feelings for Sally (25). As Bachelard affirms, “Up near the roof all our thoughts are 
clear” (18). The attic provides Clarissa with a conducive environment that she may, in 
a stripped down room, recollect an experience pure and genuine.  
It is rather interesting that Clarissa compares her feelings for Sally with those 
for men: “It was not like one’s feeling for a man… it had a quality which could only 
exist between women” (MD 25). To scholars, this admission reveals “Clarissa’s true 
nature is Lesbian” (Rachman 10). It is not her sexual orientation, I argue, but the 
dialectic of who Clarissa was and who she has become that sits at the centre of this 
scene. Before going into the attic, Clarissa is Mrs Dalloway shopping for flowers and 
preparing for her party. She is a wife, a hostess. Upon entering the attic, she removes 
her rich apparel, leaving those identities behind. She is “[l]ovely in girlhood,” visited 
by a “virginity preserved” (23). She is the young Clarissa back in Bourton, who 
“knew nothing about sex—nothing about social problems” (25). In the attic, she is the 
Clarissa she was before marriage who “could not take her eyes off Sally” (24), who 
“spoke of marriage always as a catastrophe” (25). In the attic, Clarissa is safe, curious 
as a girl, chaste as a nun.  
The room provides solace and clarity where she rests from the rest of the 
world. But the stability is for a moment. Even Clarissa is suspicious of the goodness: 
“‘Oh this horror!’ she said to herself, as if she had known all along that something 
would interrupt, would embitter her moment of happiness” (27). True enough, within 
moments and without warning, the atmosphere changes and she starts thinking about 
her illness and reaching fifty-two. The fear of death creeps in. Anxiety is exacerbated 
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as the place of Bourton, feelings of joy, youthfulness, and camaraderie fade away. 
The scene is filled with brittle objects (glass and bottles) on the dressing-table, with 
her green evening dress hanging in the cupboard, reminding her of the present, she as 
a hostess, as a wife and mother, as Mrs Dalloway. It seems as if stillness is temporal, 
shifts are imminent, because space resists stagnancy. In the attic, spatial objects 
disrupt stasis.  
 The fragile and sharp objects lying on the table threaten the peace in the attic. 
Accentuated by the diction (“icy claws,” “broken,” “untouched”), which adds a touch 
of coldness and detachment, they generate uneasiness and fear (27). The change in 
tone and atmosphere can be explained by tracing Clarissa’s movements and what she 
sees. She moves to the dressing-table, presumably from the bed, and sees herself in 
the mirror and the dress she is supposed to wear. This side of the room and furniture 
confront Clarissa with the reality of the party and of who she has become. In the 
mirror she sees faces of  “the woman who was that very night to give a party; of 
Clarissa Dalloway; of herself” (27). The selves she strips off when she first enters the 
attic come back to her as she remembers her party and gets ready for it. Finally she 
exits the room pondering over what she has to do for the party. As the atmosphere 
shifts and Clarissa is once again preoccupied with the preparation for her party, the 
attic is no longer where she seeks rest from the world. Along with the changes, the 
attic becomes the place that prepares and reminds her of her roles in the world. 
Such is the multiformity of places, however small and confining they are. In 
fact, smaller places more effectively draw out plurality. Despite the circumscribed 
space of the attic, multiple places are explored and even the functions of the room 
vary within itself. Its function is not one of utility, or of materiality per se; rather, it is 
how the subject perceives its materiality that determines what function of place it is to 
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her. As discussed earlier, whether the attic is a place of rest or reminder of unrest 
hinges on how its facticity is taken up by Clarissa. Place is never incidental or solely 
contingent on consciousness. Its function may be arbitrary but its materiality is 
intentional. Intentional space situates and directs its inhabitant. In the attic-room 
Clarissa is emplaced in a way that recalls memories of Sally and Bourton. But, in 
many other ways, places are intentional in ways that disadvantage female inhabitants.  
Small places are also places that control and limit women. Figuratively, they 
reflect women’s situations. This does not mean that men are not imprisoned by their 
circumstances, but their situations are largely affirming. If we follow up on Young’s 
argument and see situations as cultural and socio-economical, then majority of 
women’s places are veritably smaller and narrower than men’s. The kitchen and the 
fitting room, for example, are small places associated with women. We think of the 
kitchen and picture women cooking; we think of the changing room and see them 
shopping. What underpin these associations are ideals of women as domestic and 
vain. Women are physically limited in small spaces, also figuratively confined to 
socio-cultural norms. To dismantle stereotypical ideas of domesticity and femininity, 
we have to start from within the walls of delimited spaces.  
In Mrs Dalloway is a narrative of the kitchen. It is an intentional, small place 
where Mrs Walker works within domestic space to figure a way around the walls of 
entrapment without leaving the kitchen. The kitchen is traditionally associated with 
women and domesticity. De Beauvoir caustically describes how women fatuously 
make meaning of household chores:  
With her fire going, woman becomes a sorceress; by a simple 
movement, as in beating eggs, or though the magic of fire, she effects 
the transmutation of substances: matter becomes food. There is 
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enchantment in these alchemies, there is poetry in making preserves; 
the housewife has caught duration in the snare of sugar, she has 
enclosed life in jars. Cooking is revelation and creation; and a woman 
can find special satisfaction in a successful cake or a flaky pastry, for 
not everyone can do it: one must have the gift. (472)  
“Cooking is a revelation and creation” is the myth of domesticity. Deprived of the 
chance to write poetry and practice alchemy, women busy themselves with chores to 
mimic the works of men. But the “magic” dissipates as soon as “repetition” sets in 
(472). Mrs Walker goes through the motion; she seems apathetic and lacks interest. 
But, in spite of this, she is not desensitised. Rather, I think her composure—the grace 
and clockwork precision of her actions in the kitchen—is born out of the very 
conditions to which her class and gender subject her. This will become clear in the 
next few paragraphs. 
As the Dalloway household entertains its distinguished guests, the scene is hectic: 
the servants, Lucy and Agnes, are running up and down; the ladies are going upstairs to 
change; the gentlemen are pacing, waiting, in the hall. Mrs Walker, amidst the chaos, is 
detached from the conviviality. Even the Prime Minister’s entrance does not faze her. 
Here the Prime Minister represents two powers: the male patriarch and the highest 
authority in society. Despite his prominence, she remains indifferent: “Did it matter, did 
it matter in the least, one Prime Minister more or less? It made no difference at this hour 
of the night to Mrs Walker” (120). Her nonchalance is not a passive acceptance of her lot 
but is proof of the unspoken power held by a woman who has mastered her situation after 
years of inhabiting a disadvantageous position. In the kitchen Mrs Walker makes slight of 
the Prime Minister and the power with which he is associated. Her “saucepans, 
cullenders, frying-pans, chicken in aspic, ice-cream freezers, pared crusts of bread”—and 
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the list goes on—override his entrance: “one Prime Minister more or less made not a 
scrap of difference” (120). In the banality and routineness of her chores, she has 
somehow acquired power in the place of the kitchen which affords her the power to 
ignore and act, quietly but surely, against the status quo.  
 De Certeau states that “without leaving the place where he has no choice but to 
live,” one can still “establish within it a degree of plurality and creativity” (30). He 
speaks of a strategy that makes the most out of circumstances. The kitchen, gendered and 
“bewitched by the invisible powers,” domesticates women, but as soon as Mrs Walker 
“delimits” her own place from the “environment,” she acquires power (De Certeau 30). 
She carves her space as she works in the kitchen. Cooking salmon and spinning plates are 
her ways of experiencing and working in the kitchen. They are practices that she has 
acquired as she adapts to the stereotyped feminine place. In “Negotiating Space in the 
Family Home,” Moira Munro and Ruth Madigan affirm that “women often create social 
space… by using their role as ‘housewife’ or ‘carer’ to distance themselves” (115). By 
deliberately busying herself, Mrs Walker carves a space for herself where she is able to 
control the forces of society by interpreting them in the language of her own space. She 
sees the Prime Minister as nothing more than her pots and pans in the kitchen, bringing 
him down to her level of perception. She is more concerned with the doneness of the 
salmon than his arrival. One could say, as de Certeau would, that Mrs Walker has 
“mastered” places, possessing the ability to “transform foreign forces into objects that 
can be observed and measured” on her own terms (36).  
It can be argued that, despite creating a space of her own, Mrs Walker is after all a 
servant excluded from the party and on-goings in the hall. But as Alison Light notes in 
Mrs. Woolf and the Servants,  
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[Servants] were witnesses and eavesdroppers, allies and sometimes 
friends, whose emotional and sexual lives were entangled with those 
who gave them orders. Ruled by the cash-nexus, service was a 
relationship of trust which involved a mutual dependence. (4)  
Whilst the servant is subordinate, dependent on the employer for food and money, she is 
privy to household secrets. She is also “amphibious,” shifting between spaces and 
allegiances, gaining insights into different situations and worlds (2). With such 
knowledge, it is true: “The servant, however vulnerable, wield[s] a precarious power” (4). 
It is not a stretch to say that Mrs Walker in possessing such secrets is a ‘master’ of the 
house in her own way, especially also because she has in the de Certeauian sense 
mastered her practice, that is, being exemplary in her role as the cook.  
 An analysis of Mrs Walker, the fictional Georgian cook, cannot be divorced from 
Woolf’s writing of the servants and her experiences with her own cook Nellie Boxall.37 
Woolf was often frustrated with Nellie’s complaints and agitations, and as Light 
describes, the employer and servant were in a “cat-and-mouse game” in which Nellie 
threatened to leave and Woolf searched for replacements (172). The fact that the 
employer could easily have dismissed the servant but she would not suggests an 
inexplicable hold the servant had over her. Talking about her mother in “A Sketch of the 
Past,” Woolf ruminates on how “invisible presences” have “influence” on our lives, 
whether or not they “attract or “repel” us (80).38 It is this “influence” that diminishes the 
absolute dominance of the employer and highlights the servant’s “precarious power.” The 
influence over Woolf was reinforced by Nellie’s almost “first-class” culinary skills (174), 
equivalent to Mrs Walker’s mastery of the kitchen as aforementioned, “old loyalties” 
                                                
37 Nellie Boxall had lived with Woolf for eighteen years, and for ten years she was her only live-in 
servant. The duration and intensity of the relationship “testified to their intimacy” (Light 165).   
38 Light adds “women who were meant to be invisible but whose presence disturbed her much” to 
Woolf’s “invisible presences,” including the servants (xx).  
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(207), and the basal desire of masters which Light rightly points out, “she wanted her 
servant to love her” (208). Thus, whilst Mrs Walker is the cook from a lower social class, 
subservient to the status quo as represented by the Dalloways and their distinguished 
guests and the Prime Minister, she is nonetheless a force, an “invisible presence” so to 
speak, who can from within the domestic realm express her difference and question, even 
threaten, the fixed power structure.  
It should also be emphasised that the servant’s precarious power does not catapult 
her from a low social position to a higher one. In the case of Woolf and Nellie, the crux 
of the relationship was need: in Nellie’s “neediness” was also “Virginia’s need of her” 
(Light 221). It is a symbiotic relationship, one almost harmonious despite differences and 
struggles. An example of this plays out in a scene from Between the Acts where the cook 
Mrs Sands and Mrs Swithin are in the kitchen: “Mrs. Sands fetched bread; Mrs. Swithin 
fetched ham. One cut the bread; the other the ham. It was soothing, it was consolidating, 
this handwork together” (34). The co-relation is evident. Their thoughts are digressing, 
but they work in tandem. The mirroring effect may be less obvious in Mrs Dalloway but 
it nonetheless puts the power relation between the classes and gender in conversation. 
The chaos in the hall mirrors the busy scene in the kitchen. The Prime Minister is the 
patriarch, head of power, in the upper room; Mrs Walker has sole reign in the kitchen. It 
is not the case of pitting one power against the other; rather the illustration highlights the 
changing power relations and new freedom that modernity affords. Possibilities of 
“recreation,” Light observes, alongside the desire for “self-respect” fed into “the idea of 
more equal relations” (183-184). New ideas of the self, the increasingly aware modern 
individual regardless of class promise mobility, visibility, and the hope of new 
relationships and solidarity between women from different backgrounds and contexts. 
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To go further, especially given the period in which Woolf was writing, we can see 
Mrs Walker as the cook who is emerging from the Victorian basement and cluttered 
kitchen, destabilising traditions and reflecting a society on the cusp of socio-political 
changes. She is one of the “unrecorded” lives mentioned in A Room of One’s Own that 
must be written, whose life must be lived with curiosity and dignity (89). “All that you 
will have to explore,” urges Woolf (89). Herein is the call for the modern woman to 
explore physically, emotionally, and mentally the myriad of possibilities that are within 
her, that are not governed by the phallocratic order and her father, brother, teacher, etc.. 
She does not leave the house per se—the early 1900s was not the time, yet—but she 
abandons the Victorian domesticity and feminine ideal in search for a room of her own 
and masters it. Such mastery of position and place affords her a way of negotiating power 
and relating to the larger forces at play in the social order that can only happen given her 
particular constraints. To be emplaced is not necessarily disempowering. The very 
predicament of being confined to small places enables women to create new means of 
experiencing limiting circumstances. 
 
Towards Feminine Experience 
We have seen how Clarissa and Mrs Walker in small spaces experience and cope with 
limitations, and also how Rezia and Maisie Johnson experience social spaces. The 
question haunting the discussions centred on women’s experience is what makes 
women’s experience, or what constitutes feminine experience. There is no one female 
perspective—to say so is to essentialise experience. But there is something about how 
women interact with places designed to keep and limit them that connects their 
experiences. From what has been discussed so far of women’s situations and how the 
female characters experience places, feminine experience has to do with women’s 
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emplacement and limitation. The conditioning of women’s experience and the relegation 
to socially engineered and gendered spaces do not necessarily work against them, but 
place them in situations where they can experience differently. Understood as such, this 
experience is one that forms from a disadvantaged subject’s interaction with the world.  
 The kind of experience I am expounding on is not singularly female-centric. 
Whilst ideally understood through women’s interaction with place, given the policing 
of the female body and the normative behaviours and ideas of femininity entrusted to 
women, feminine experience emerges from delimited and disadvantageous situations 
and political conditionings that compromise the ability to experience the world in its 
givenness. A critique of gender opens up larger identity politics that are not exclusive 
to female existence. The gender-stratified world with its social norms and hierarchies 
predisposes its inhabitants to internalise certain beliefs which inhibit experience. Mrs 
Walker is a woman of the lower class; Rezia is a woman of foreign nationality. Other 
non-gender related issues affect them. Amongst the pariahs, most curious is Septimus 
who stands at the crossroads of historical, social, and gender inscriptions.  
 By Woolf’s admission, Septimus reflects “the world seen by the sane and the 
insane side by side” (A Writer’s Diary 51). On Mrs Dalloway, she writes: “I want to 
give life and death, sanity and insanity; I want to criticize the social system, and to 
show it at work, at its most intense” (56). Septimus embodies the dichotomies that 
structure the social system and its debilitating effects on those who do not fit in and 
try to break away. He is a man who falls short of the expectations of Man, hence 
subjected to scrutiny and brutality of the upholders of Proportion and Conversion. The 
first is standards that define a person (say, if “a doctor loses” his sense of proportion, 
as a doctor he fails); the second is the sister of Proportion: “she feasts on the wills of 
the weakly, loving to impress, to impose, adoring her own features stamped on the 
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face of the populace” (MD 73-74). Personifying the two fulcrums of the system as 
male and female reveals men and women’s complicity in oppression and division. 
Hermione Lee writes on this: 
But the social arena of the Dalloways… reflects Virginia Woolf’s 
fascinated dislike of the world of society hostesses, eminent 
politicians, distinguished doctors and lawyers, and grand old dowager 
ladies, in which powerful men talk a great deal of nonsense and the 
woman’s place is decorative, entertaining and subservient. (The Novels 
of Virginia Woolf 94) 
There is awareness of the performance of experience orchestrated by myths, gender 
and social norms. In presenting how characters perceive and act in situations, Mrs 
Dalloway reveals the workings of these inscriptions and how the individual forges a 
different personal experience. In this regard, the novel, although primarily revolves 
around Clarissa, is not about a female protagonist’s experience of her environing 
physical and social milieus. What this implies, in terms of our discussion here, is that 
the modality of feminine experience is framed by human beings who are subjected to 
similar conditioning processes imposed on women. Just as not all women are 
feminine and men masculine, feminine experience is non-exhaustive. Neither is it tied 
to, as Young puts it, “distinctive structures and behavior typical of the situation of 
women” (140). To do so is heteronormative and essentialist. Feminine experience is 
an alternative narrative of experience that voices the silenced and makes visible what 
is neither-here-nor-there and in between.  
 An analysis of the scene with Septimus and Rezia in the sitting-room reveals 
more about how feminine experience embraces the ambivalent. Resting on the sofa in 
the sitting-room, knitting hats and bantering, Rezia and Septimus are “perfectly 
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happy” (MD 106). Behind the blissful front, Septimus struggles to be sane, looking 
cautiously to make sure things are “still” and “real” (103). The room from his point of 
view shuffles between the real and his vision: “Septimus Warren Smith lying on the 
sofa in the sitting-room; watching the watery gold glow and fade with the astonishing 
sensibility of some live creature on the roses, on the wall-paper” (101). It is a liminal 
space between sanity and insanity. Comparing the scene to Regent’s Park where he 
refuses to sit down and is paranoid about Evans, in this room he is composed: “He 
was not afraid” (102). In this episode, fluency and eloquence of the language play a 
big part in mitigating the disorientation and blending well jarring images. When 
Septimus is first seen in the sitting-room, he has his hand on the back of the sofa and 
looking at it, it is like “he had seen his hand lie when he was bathing, floating, on the 
top of the waves, whilst far away on shore he heard dogs barking and barking far 
away” (101). The narrative eloquently develops a far from logical perceptual 
experience. It first describes his hand lying as it would when he bathes which, 
although departs from present reality, is reasonable. The leap from bathing to floating 
is more difficult, but the water imagery holds them together. Finally, waves evoke 
scenes of shores, so together they make sense. The interior and exterior, real and 
imagination, are brought together.  
 Unity is intensified in an intimate moment shared between Septimus and Rezia: 
He would look over the edge of the sofa down into the sea…. But 
‘Lovely!’ he used to cry, and the tears would run down his cheeks, 
which was to her the most dreadful thing of all, to see a man like 
Septimus, who had fought, who was brave, crying. And he would lie 
listening until suddenly he would cry that he was falling down, down 
into the flames! Actually she would look for the flames, it was so 
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vivid. (102) 
The first sentence brings together the conflicting images of the inside and outside 
envisioned by Septimus. Its conciseness and simplicity normalise the otherwise 
jarring images (the waves and flames). There is nothing overtly confusing in the 
description, as compared to the references to the carnival and clashing colours in 
Regent’s Park. Furthermore, given how Rezia could not reach out to Septimus in the 
park, this scene is a stark contrast, accentuating the connection between the couple. 
Here we see Rezia searching for the flames that exist only in Septimus’s mind. 
Although it is a hallucination, it is so perceptible that Rezia believes it. The affect 
between them is intensified by free indirect discourse; we slip from Septimus’s mind 
to Rezia’s. Woolf’s formal technique, as Lee describes, demonstrates “a fluid 
transference of recurrent images from one character to another” (93). It allows Rezia, 
also the reader, to perceive from Septimus’s point of view, which up until this point in 
the novel has been inaccessible. The example begins with Septimus’s perspective of 
the room but as tears stream down it switches over to Rezia who sees the tears as the 
“most dreadful thing of all” (MD 102). To her, it is most excruciating to watch her 
husband cry. Here is a rare moment of empathy and connection that erodes the 
distinction between sanity and insanity. This moment she participates in his 
experience. In spite of the chaos, the narrative reconciles the real and unreal in that 
moment of connection. For once we see the Smiths happy and intimate. The scene is 
disjointed, as mad as its characters, but it shows an alternative means to understanding 
the couple’s experience. Along with Rezia, we are drawn into Septimus’s world and 
share his pain.  
 The intimacy between Septimus and Rezia is short-lived. The looming arrival of 
Holmes interrupts the moment and drives Septimus to head for the window. It is 
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significant that Septimus “would wait till the very last moment,” as if savouring every 
last chance he has in the room (108). He has acquired a way experiencing with his 
sane and insane mind that enables him to reconnect with Rezia and reignite lost 
affection. He is finally happy. “He did not want to die. Life was good” (108). But, at 
the last moment, just as Holmes stands outside the door ready to burst in, Septimus 
throws himself out. Many interpretations of the poignant scene concentrate on the 
evanescent moment of Septimus’s death that simultaneously connects and separates 
Clarissa and Septimus who are, according to John Roberts, “opposite phases of an 
idea of life itself” (“‘Vision and Design’ in Virginia Woolf” 837) Critics like Roberts 
see the “Clarissa-Septimus combination” fully realised in Septimus’s suicide (837). 
Such analyses hark back to ideas of “accessible minds” and collective interest,” which 
are related to affect studies (Edmondson 28).  
 These interpretations aside, I read Septimus’s suicide as an attempt to preserve 
his experience and safeguard his space. He stays by the window, taking in all of his 
last moment in the room, and just before Holmes intrudes into the realm that he has 
created for himself, he jumps. Something about the experience in that space is worth 
protecting. Lee interprets Septimus’s suicide as a result of his inability to “distinguish 
between his personal response and the indifferent, universal nature of external reality” 
(109). Whilst the outside world is external, emplaced subjectivity already interweaves 
physical and interior spaces. From a phenomenological perspective, Septimus’s 
suicide can be read as a valiant act of preserving an experience unique to his social 
position and mental state. Just as Mrs Walker buries herself in work, cooking the 
salmon and washing dishes, Septimus’s choice of safeguarding his space (though 
destructive and extreme) is, in some sense, a strategy towards mastering place.  
 Following her husband’s death, Rezia experiences a series of conflicting spatial 
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images reminiscent of Septimus’s visions: 
… on to some hill, somewhere near the sea, for there were ships, gulls, 
butterflies; they sat on a cliff. In London, too, there they sat, and, half 
dreaming, came to her through the bedroom door, rain falling, 
whispering, stirrings among dry corn, the caress of the sea, as it 
seemed to her, hollowing them in its arched shell and murmuring to 
her laid on shore, strewn she felt, like flying flowers over some tomb. 
(109) 
Like Septimus, she experiences the crisscrossing of nature and London, interior and 
exterior, continuing his way of experience. The long sentence is intermittently 
punctuated, as if pausing to ruminate on each detail as Rezia stops to behold the scene 
before her. The commas slow down the narrative; the clauses pronounce each detail; 
they mimic the flow of Rezia’s perception. This carefulness is deliberate and recalls 
Septimus’s perception of the room: “He began, very cautiously, to open his eyes…. 
First he looked at the fashion papers on the lower shelf, then gradually at the 
gramophone with the green trumpet” (103). Rezia now sees in the way that Septimus 
would have seen. This is captured in her final moment of revelation: “She saw the 
large outline of his body dark against the window. So that was Dr Holmes” (109). It 
seems strange to announce her recognition of Holmes when this is not the first time 
they meet. It is as if Rezia takes on Septimus’s point of view and for the first time 
sees the horrifying figure of Holmes that her husband always sees. In spite of death, 
there is continuity, connection between the couple, as Rezia inherits Septimus’s way 
of seeing. 
 The experience of Rezia and Septimus is a shared one. Each experiences the 
tragic scene from their own perspective, but their experiences are nonetheless 
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interwoven. Woolf suggests in Mrs Dalloway that experience is connecting and also 
continuous. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology too agrees with the notion of shared 
experience for it is about the lived world where “perceiving subjects are within” 
(Matthews, The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty 53). He describes this world: 
Not only have I a physical world, not only do I live in the midst of 
earth, air and water, I have around me roads, plantations, villages, 
streets, churches, implements, a bell, a spoon, a pipe. Each of these 
objects is moulded to the human action which it serves. Each one 
spreads round it an atmosphere of humanity…. Someone uses the pipe 
for smoking, the spoon for eating, the bell for summoning, and it is 
through the perception of a human act and another person that the 
perception of a cultural world could be verified. (POP 405) 
This is what a shared world looks like. Merleau-Ponty tries to break down and clarify 
what exactly is an “atmosphere of humanity” only to conclude that the cultural world 
is “ambiguous” (405). What he does not manage to explain, which Woolf’s literary 
text unreservedly expresses, is the emotive aspect of experience that connects people 
who feel similar emotions.  
The idea of emotive experience seems to counteract the effort to “understand 
how vision can be brought into being from somewhere without being enclosed in its 
perspective” (POP 78). Emotions can be predicative: that is, having a particular 
emotion towards something influences the way in which another is perceived. To 
borrow the proverbial saying, emotions put things into perspective instead of allowing 
them to be experienced by the body. Still, Merleau-Ponty discusses the workings of 
emotions. In one of his radio lectures broadcast in France, he relocates feelings from 
interiority to exteriority, inverting the traditional modality of experience. Arguing 
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against Descartes’s pure spirit where emotions are immanent, Merleau-Ponty posits 
that the “location” of any emotion evoked between two individuals “is in the space 
[they] both share” (The World of Perception 84). He reflects that in the moment of an 
emotion like anger, “it does not strike me that this anger was in my mind or among 
my thoughts but rather, that it lay entirely between me” and the other party in the 
brawl (84). He draws attention to the originary experience that occurs in shared space. 
Express differently, emotions must be situated and embedded in place, if not they can 
be consuming and result in parochial visions.   
 In Mrs Dalloway, place is the constant in which emotions of characters are 
situated, tempering the effects of experiencing phenomena in “antepredicative 
knowledge, in the inner communion that [one has] with them” (POP 82). We witness 
such situated, emotive experience when Peter first visits Clarissa in her house after 
spending five years in India. As they reunite and think of their shared past, the 
narrative segues into a scene set in a terrace presumably in Bourton. 
[Peter] was overcome with his own grief, which rose like a moon 
looked from a terrace, ghastly beautiful with light from the sunken day. 
I was more unhappy than I’ve ever been since, he thought. And as if in 
truth he were sitting there on the terrace he edged a little towards 
Clarissa; put his hand out; raised it; let it fall. There above them it 
hung, that moon. She too seemed to be sitting with him on the terrace, 
in the moonlight. (31) 
The scene follows Peter’s emotional state as he remembers proposing to Clarissa. 
Grief, rising like the moon, is deflected to the environment. His feelings are narrated 
at a distance in the imagery of the moon and diverted to his actions (“edged a little 
towards Clarissa” and “put his hand out; raised it; let it fall”) (31). Free indirect 
 Foo 88 
discourse further detaches him from the despair. In addition, the moon is described as 
“ghastly beautiful,” neutralising the element of grief in the imagery (31). Rather than 
indulging in sadness, the reference to an external occurrence begins to build a scene 
around the terrace.  
As the passage continues, the terrace that initially serves as a platform to view 
the hanging moon takes form as the characters occupy space and sit on it. The brief 
scene is almost anticlimactic when Clarissa does not take Peter’s hand, leaving it to 
fall. The once lovers rue the loss of love. Tension and estrangement between Clarissa 
and Peter, they who have moved on but are still attached and long for each other, are 
captured in the poignant picture of their back views: their bodies separated but united 
by a common fixation on the moon above them. The moon is mentioned again; but 
instead of being the centrepiece of the narrative (representing Peter’s grief), of being 
“looked at from a terrace,” it now hovers above them. It may have symbolised Peter’s 
grief, but it is now a phenomenon of the scene. The switch between articles, from “a 
terrace” to “the terrace,” “a moon” to “that moon,” concretises place. The sense of the 
terrace is grounded at last when Clarissa “too seemed to be sitting with him on the 
terrace” (31). She, too, is complicit in making the scene. 
Seeing Clarissa and Peter sitting on the terrace, apart, we are transported from 
the room upstairs in London, on a clear morning, to a particular terrace in Bourton 
where they once sat under the moonlight. Free indirect discourse makes it difficult to 
identify whether Clarissa shares the recollection, or if it is Peter who is imagining, or 
if it is the narrator who observes the connection between them. Either way, we catch 
on the possibility that Clarissa is too afflicted by grief as the place of the terrace 
completely materialises with both characters in the picture. Emotions are mapped 
onto the scene; it is the terrace that consummates the emotive experience. According 
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to Auerbach, such deflections in the text are “excursuses” that try to “fathom a more 
genuine, a deeper, and indeed a more real reality” (540). Place may be an incidental 
excursus but it more effectively communicates their shared grief and Peter’s despair 
than him whining, “I was more unhappy that I’ve ever been since” (31). Peter’s 
affliction is not expressed through an inward reflection of his emotions; rather it is 
affectively embedded in space of the terrace and how it is described as a situation 
where a common experience is forged in relation to the environing place.  
 The experiences of Clarissa and Peter, also that of Septimus and Rezia, not 
forgetting Mrs Walker, are spatial. Human beings are separate but we share a lived 
world. It is spatiality that characterises feminine experience. To emphasise again, this 
experience is not female. It includes the disadvantaged and marginalised, though 
women are more susceptible to discrimination. We have established that it is fluid and 
has a penchant to shuffle between separates like sanity and insanity, interior and 
exterior, past and present. In addition, feminine experience is affective, transferrable 
to some extent. Mrs Dalloway gives us a sense of a potential feminine experience. It 
has also helped elucidate phenomenological ideas and build a spatial vocabulary 
which will be used in subsequent chapters. The next chapter on Djuna Barnes’s 
Nightwood discusses in detail disadvantageous situations and what it means to be 
positioned and orientated.  
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3. Bent on the Dark: Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood 
Nightwood is a novel set in darkness. Its world at night puts characters in precarious 
positions where visibility is low and obscured. Whilst the women in Mrs Dalloway 
are usually in motion, Barnes’s women are still and kept in the dark. They are caught 
up in vicious cycles and trapped in rooms, seated or standing. Inertia offers a different 
perspective on experience where to participate and be involved in situations is to be 
still and remain in excruciatingly painful positions. Emplacement is often by choice in 
Nightwood. And, the women have to face the consequences of their choice to be at a 
disadvantage. Robin Vote is mostly inactive; Jenny Petherbridge is a thief; Nora 
Flood is mired in sorrow. They experience in the dark, offering blurred glimpses of 
the dismal places that reify their abjection. Still the sense of place is not lost but 
becomes more visceral as darkness falls.  
The world at night is the same world as we know it by day and yet is estranged 
as the veil of darkness spreads over us. Merleau-Ponty reflects on the strange quality 
of the night: 
Night is not an object before me; it enwraps me and infiltrates through 
all my senses, stifling my recollections and almost destroying my 
personal identity. I am no longer withdrawn into my perceptual look-
out from which I watch the outlines of objects moving by at a distance. 
Night has no outlines; it is itself in contact with me and its unity is the 
mystical unity of the mana.39 (POP 330) 
                                                
39 The word, mana, of Polynesian origins, connotes the unexplainable. It has an abstract quality to do 
with the supernatural, luck, and magical practices. Its larger significance is, according to Claude Lévi-
Strauss, one that “occur[s] to represent an indeterminate value of signification, in itself devoid of 
meaning and thus susceptible of receiving any meaning at all” (Introduction to the Work of Marcel 
Mauss 55). The mana is a “floating signifier which is the disability of all finite thought (but also the 
surety of all art, all poetry, every mythic and aesthetic invention)” (63). 
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The enveloping darkness is numbing. It destroys “the world of clear and articulate 
objects” and subsequently any clear space for reflection (330). In the world at night, 
thinking, which “relates its parts to each other… starts from nowhere” (330). Whilst 
unity through rational thought and clarity is suspended in the night, there is a different 
kind of unity at work. This other unity is propelled by the mysterious desire—“an 
uncaused and tireless impulse”—for anchorage (331). Merleau-Ponty believes “it is 
from the heart of nocturnal space that I become united with it” (330).  
The allure of the night, for Merleau-Ponty, is mana and the phantasmagorical 
world experienced by the sleeper. There is an “unreality” to the night that reveals how 
events, “which have a place in objective space, are drawn away from it in the dream 
state, and settle in a different theatre” (331). Whilst the night is a space of unity and 
revelations, viewing it as a theatrical stage that informs of or contrasts with the 
workings of actions and gestures, thought-processes and desires that are off-stage is 
counterproductive for the study of women’s experience of place. For Barnes’s 
women, nocturnal place is not an alternative unreality. It is their only reality. There is 
no daytime that serves as a gauge for what is clear-headed and rational experience. 
The women do not begin from a place of outlines and move into one of none. Neither 
are they conscious of how their bodies behave and emote in broad daylight.  
The narrative of place in the dark tells the experiences of subjects who are 
unable to see rightly and clearly because of certain disadvantages. Because the night 
is a natural occurring phenomenon, seeing at night does not seem unique to women’s 
experience of place. Yet Barnes’s method of placing and arranging characters in these 
dark scenarios—they are postured—compels a re-reading of what it means to 
experience with difficulty. The extent to which characters go to experience things in 
the dark demands an examination of what the night stands for. Nightwood shows that 
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being at a disadvantage and experiencing place like that is not so much a disability as 
it is a different view of the scene at night, a view that motivates other ways of 
adjusting perception for the dark. Significantly, the different perception of place 
belongs to the social and gender nonconforming individual who chooses to see at a 
slant and remain bent. Her experience of the dark runs parallel to her non-normative 
existence. 
From the outset of the thesis, the subject with whom I am concerned is the 
woman who lives in a world that naturally and purposefully disadvantages her. 
Human beings are naturally disadvantaged in the living world, facing circumstances 
like nightfall or blurry vision, but woman is additionally challenged as she lives in a 
socially engineered and politically ordered world that works to the advantage of her 
male counterpart. There is yet an added marginalisation to the situation of Barnes’s 
women: they are queer. They reject straightness, refusing to move. Immobility is their 
resistance. The women are willing to stay put and keep their positions even if they are 
disadvantageous to experience. 
Though dormant and put at a disadvantage, the women of Nightwood are not 
powerless. To clarify, to be at a disadvantage is not the same as being powerless. As 
Black feminist bell hooks tells us, “Women, even the most oppressed among us, do 
exercise some form of power” (Feminist Theory 90). Power exists, but it is often 
“suppressed” or “exploited” (93). To be disadvantaged is to be deprived of 
opportunities because of social, racial, gender, and class differences. The word 
“advantage” from the Old French avantage, means superiority and advancement. To 
be dis-avantaged is to move backward from the position of superiority and thus to be 
in an inferior position. Thinking of disadvantage as being diminished of power adds a 
new significance to the idea of dormancy and also brings into view the invisible 
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oppressor, i.e., the one who has the advantage and is superior. The prefix “dis-” also 
means “away” and “apart.” We can interpret “dis-advantage” as a situation set apart 
from one of advantage. Dormancy, or to be unmoving in a particular place, can mean 
passivity but also resistance, the unwillingness to move and thus remain in the 
position of the disadvantage. Put differently, to remain apart from advantage, from 
superiority, from the dominant. This might seem counterintuitive but dormancy in 
Nightwood as we shall see is not an end to experience but a means to exploring the 
potentiality of the body—what is it capable of?—precisely because it is placed in 
disadvantageous situations.  
To remain in the dark, as Nightwood advocates, is not a bad thing. I venture to 
say that to be disadvantaged is advantageous to configuring a non-normative modality 
of experience. In Nightwood, being at a disadvantage is a result of conscious decisions 
of characters to deviate from dominant ideologies of the world, to be off the course of 
heteronormativity, and to trespass the boundaries of what is deemed permissive in the 
social world whilst remaining within its physical premise. On a literal level, left in the 
dark and fixed in position, characters experience the things they see and also what 
they cannot see. Symbolically, seeing in the dark and left in the margins of a socially 
stratified world bring to light the possibilities of alternative modes of experiencing. 
Characters do not see straight but at a slant. This slanted perception tries to grasp the 
world whose standards they have fallen short of. Unable to see straight and think 
rationally, the women’s experiences of the world at night are particularly sens-ing in 
that they are directed towards a slanted world in which their views are affected by 
their sexual orientation and twice marginalised position.40   
                                                
40 Although I focus on women’s experience, it should be noted that Felix and the Doctor (one is a Jew 
obsessed with masking his identity and the other, a transvestite) do not fit into hetero-/normative roles. 
Like the women in Nightwood, they too are disadvantaged. 
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The narrative of experience in Nightwood is sensing, as in feeling, and sens-
ing, as in directed. The visual impairment inflicted by the night forces characters to 
sense experience what is before them (the term will be explained later), whilst their 
sexuality and social position direct them to experience the upright world in their own 
terms. It is as if the odds are against the queer. Nightwood keeps thrusting onto its 
characters obstacles that compromise vision, keeping them in stilted positions with 
their bodies bent and bowed down, with a bad and slanted view of the world.  
The novel presents a complementary take on what Merleau-Ponty calls “sense 
experience” (POP 60). Le sentir in the French (sentir meaning to feel with the 
senses), sense experience is “that vital communication with the world which makes it 
present as a familiar setting of our life” (61). It connects the perceiver to the object of 
perception. It is how we know the world. Sense experience is not privileged over 
common experience, for with this connection also comes the problem of a priori 
forms of knowledge about the world. The difference is sense experience fleshes out 
how we perceive the world somatically through “affinity,” to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
word, instead of association (61).41 Sense experience always relates back to the body. 
It is how the body connects and makes sense of its environment. The focus is on the 
body—its position and place in the world.   
The phenomenologist believes in “the physical world” because he has before 
him “a perceptual field, a surface in contact with the world, a permanent rootedness in 
it” (POP 240). Somewhere in Merleau-Ponty’s idea of place accounts for why 
phenomenology fails to differentiate the female experience from the male, or the 
lesbian experience from the straight for that matter. He does not consider the nature of 
                                                
41 Merleau-Ponty uses “affinity” in the Kantian sense in which appearances share something in 
common that makes them sensible to the perceiver. It differs from association which organises 
appearances.  
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place, which, as Ahmed reminds us, has power to police behaviour and influence 
experience: “the somewhere (say, the house, the room, or the skin) shapes the surface 
of ‘what’ it ‘is’ that is brought forth” (40). So whilst sense experience puts attention 
on the body, it overlooks possible ideologies of place and underplays the influence of 
the environment. Here is where Nightwood adds to and re-envisions le sentir and puts 
significance back into place.  
This chapter explores the narrative of sense experience. It first unpacks what 
sense experience means phenomenologically and then shows how it develops and 
changes in the novel as characters experience the world at night. Phenomenology 
contends that one sense experiences because of disability or disorientation. One has 
to, usually not by choice, sacrifice normality for an organic experience. In Nightwood, 
sense experience occurs because the character chooses to dwell in positions of 
disadvantage and resistance. Her body is bent and bowed. The posture is not one of 
compromise or coercion, but of choice.  
The feminine body in Nightwood is postured, bent, and emplaced. Still and 
posed, the body speaks to a particular kind of women’s static situation. The bent body 
resists straight forms of experience. By bent I mean queer. Historically, the term 
“bent” has been used synonymously with “crooked” and is often derogatory, 
especially in the United Kingdom and European countries. In the early 1900s, “bent” 
was a criminal argot, referring to “thieves” (Dynes, Encyclopedia of Homosexuality 
313). Since the fifties, “bent” has been used to refer to the homosexual, mingling 
criminality with sexuality, i.e., to be gay is to be criminal.42 Indeed “bent” like 
“pervert” is a term borrowed “from the cant of the criminal underworld” (Norton, The 
Myth of the Modern Homosexual 112). Apart from its criminal association, “bent” is 
                                                
42 Dynes notes how the term, “straight,” has also come to mean “not using drugs” in the 1960s.  
 Foo 96 
also gestural, derived from the “limp wrist posture” which implies “sissihood and 
affection” (Dynes 475).  
Its derivations emphasise deviance from the “straight” tradition which 
colloquially translates to “honest, honorable, frank” as recorded in The Oxford 
English Dictionary in 1864.43 It is interesting that terms like “bent” and “straight” 
have borrowings from orientation and direction. Rictor Norton highlights how they 
are “directional metaphors” drawn from “navigation” (45). To navigate is to find 
one’s way, or to find the right way, to follow along society’s straight path and do the 
“honorable” thing. To be bent, or to bend, is then to move away from the straight and 
normative course.44 There is something rebellious in this move: to bend is to resist the 
straight. The recuperation of the derogatory and criminal “bent” begins by using the 
term itself, not shying away from it. In fact, terms like “crooked” and “invert” are 
“camp talk,” coded words used by queers in queer context without the presence of 
heterosexuals (Norton 112). The now embraced and politically correct term “queer” 
was, as Norton explains, “basically the criminal underworld’s antonym for ‘straight, 
respectable’” and used “sometimes in the sense of ‘queasy’” (123). Its recuperation 
into everyday language is recent, only in the last few decades have we witnessed the 
prevalent use of “homosexual” and “queer” in critical scholarship and thus 
normalising what used to be disparaging slurs.45  
Often derogatory terms are used by queers themselves: “The free and unself-
conscious use of obscenity and slang is characteristic of working-class men and 
prostitute, and the queer subculture” (Norton 112). They comprise the queer language, 
which is not to say the queer is “employing a language imposed upon him by 
                                                
43 As quoted in Dynes’s Encyclopedia of Homosexuality, p313.  
44 See more on the employment of “bent” in the directional sense in the section “Bent Bodies”. 
45 In Confucius countries like Singapore and Hong Kong, African countries, the Middle East, and many 
conservative states, these terms are still pejoratives. 
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heterosexuals” (112). The point is the use of seemingly outrageous and obscene terms 
in an unself-conscious manner; hence reclaiming what is deemed unacceptable and 
taboo. Possibly the most offensive word directed at homosexuals in our current time 
is “faggot,” yet as a matter of fact it is a queer-term created by queers and then 
appropriated by homophobes. As such, Norton argues that these terms are “not words 
of social control,” as “bent” is used in the criminal sense to refer to the sexual deviant; 
such words “are indigenous to an ethnic culture” and should not be avoided just 
because it has been adopted by the heterosexual language (123). It is thus important 
for this chapter on Nightwood which discusses queer existence and bodies and lesbian 
love to use and make common “bent.” For if queers do not use queer-terms, and 
critical works on queer do not use them, then the general public will continue to 
misread the words as derogatory and claim queer-terms as negations of 
heteronormativity.46  
The discussion on bent bodies adds a queer slant to my reading of 
phenomenology that classical phenomenology does not write about. In Nightwood 
queer bodies are entangled and in a deadlock position which unites them in its 
impossibility. The experience of the queer, lived body begins from its position in 
place and how it sees the straight world tilted. This anticipates a discussion of 
emplaced bodies where experience is somatic and spatial. Place is constitutive of the 
spatiality of a situation; it is also the spatiality of one’s experience. It encapsulates 
feelings, actions, and thought-processes evoked by the world in the dark. 
 
                                                
46 Writing on Djuna Barnes who was queer and dedicated the novel to Thelma, and being queer myself, 
it is a personal as much as a political choice to reclaim “bent” and words like “invert,” “crooked,” and 
“perverse.”   
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Sense Experience 
Nightwood, the pinnacle of Barnes’s literary success, is elusive and difficult, neither-
here-nor-there. Jeanette Winterson, in her introduction to the novel, likens Nightwood 
to the “shifting, slipping, relative world of Einstein” (x). Tyrus Miller ascribes a 
“positionless” quality to Barnes’s writing: her “runaway figural language… hinting at 
the radical loss of boundaries, the promiscuous blurring of categories” (Late 
Modernism 124-125). Whilst Winterson and Miller make good observations about 
Nightwood’s elusiveness, they prize the novel for its proclivity for flight. Other critics 
see this flight as a means to something less fixed. Mary Wilson claims that Barnes 
reaches “towards some much more inchoate space… and situates fiction in new 
territory” (“No Place Like Home” 430). Along the same lines, Joseph Frank writes 
that the novel “lacks a narrative structure” and “cannot be reduced to any sequence of 
action for purpose of explanation” (The Idea of Spatial Form 33).  
Whilst it is tempting to read the novel as positionless, fluidity between 
positions must not be confused with the state of being boundary-less. I do not think 
the novel is a “runaway” or “escape-text” (Miller 125; Winterson xvi), neither is it 
formless and without anchorages. It is true that the novel refuses to be pigeonholed 
into categories, but this is not to say that it does not experiment with positions. To 
read Nightwood as positionless is problematic, as Daniela Caselli points out, because 
this would mean it is evasive in its confrontation of ideologies, “therefore difficult to 
either recuperate under an inclusive agenda or to condemn as hiding dubious 
ideological affiliations” (Improper Modernism 169). To make sense of Nightwood’s 
lack of fixity without interpreting it as an “escape-text,” I propose to rethink its 
quality of being positionless as a result of its constant play and obsession with 
boundaries and positions. The novel carefully delineates the lines between distinct 
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identities under the cover of darkness and low visibility—a crafty gambit that whilst 
making the novel seem non-categorical and boundary-blurring exposes a scrutiny and 
mastery of positions and warring elements such as the invisible and visible, positive 
and negative, here and there. This section plunges into the world at night, showing 
how darkness as a disadvantage enables sense experience and attunes one to perceive 
phenomena reflexively in the dark.47    
 The night, its darkness, is Nightwood’s raison d’être. Figuratively speaking, 
seeing in the dark stands for situations that obscure vision. The trope of the night is 
crucial to understanding how bodies in the novel sense experience the mutable world. 
In a letter to her editor Emily Coleman, Barnes wrote that the title was a toss between 
Nightwood and Anatomy of the Night.48 Earlier considerations include Through the 
Night and Night Without Sleep. Her idea of night was inspired by William Blake’s 
“The Tyger,” from Songs of Experience, where the night paves way for an other 
world, promising a different experience. The night changes the atmosphere of the 
same environment in which experience in the day occurs. It is disorientating and 
keeps one in a state of not knowing. On the night, Merleau-Ponty writes, “it enwraps 
me and infiltrates through all my senses, stifling my recollections and almost 
destroying my personal identity” (POP 330). Such is the effect of the night: its ability 
to bracket natural beliefs of the self and reconnect the individual with the world 
without prejudice. One cannot reflect nor rely on knowledge to make out the bleary 
things of the world. To navigate the darkness, one has to sense experience. According 
to Merleau-Ponty, the night world is a “nocturnal space” that “infiltrates” our senses, 
                                                
47 The term, “reflexively,” used in this thesis, does not imply self-reflexivity. As used by Merleau-
Ponty, it is associated with involuntary responses (for example, a knee jerk reaction or a reflex action). 
48 The correspondence between Barnes and Coleman is documented in Cheryl J. Plumb’s Introduction 
to Nightwood: The Original Version and Related Drafts (viii).  
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“without surfaces and without any distance separating it from me” (330). We become 
completely at one with place.  
Before expounding on sense experience, it is worth pointing out that early in 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty rejects sensation as purely sensible. 
Such sensation, he opines, “corresponds to nothing in our experience” (1-2). In fact, it 
detracts from experience. For example, when I say I am in pain and someone replies, 
“I am in pain too,” we as sentient beings think we understand each other’s pain and 
explication seems unnecessary since the sensation of pain is incommunicable. We 
withhold communicating experience because we presume that there is between us a 
tacit understanding of pain. “We make perception out of things,” says Merleau-Ponty 
(3). Sensation becomes a kind of common sensibility which suppresses experience as 
well as expression. Taylor Carman explains how it can also turn perception into an 
inward process “from which the mind somehow extracts or constructs an experience 
of something” (“Sensation, Judgment, and the Phenomenal Field” 52). Interpreted this 
way, sensation as sensible, in shifting the focus from body to mind, is detrimental to 
experience.  
The sensation that Merleau-Ponty is interested in is different. Sensation, he 
defines in the later chapters of Phenomenology of Perception, is “communion” or 
“coexistence,” which means “it does not rest in itself as does a thing, but that it is 
directed and has significance beyond itself” (248). It reminds the sensor that meaning 
does not merely lie in the thing perceived, in one’s mind, or even in the visual data 
extracted by the five senses. Sensation is intentional, Merleau-Ponty reasons, because 
“I am brought into relation with an external being, whether it be in order to open 
myself to it or to shut myself off from it” (248). With this understanding of sensation, 
we gather that sense experience is not so much about acquiring objective knowledge 
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as it is about being in a world of other existences. Sense experience sets forth “a 
certain rhythm of existence” where the sentient subject does not posit [other beings] 
as objects, but enters into a sympathetic relation with them” (248). Experience is not 
straightforward; neither is existence self-standing. The discussion of sense experience 
and sensation from this point forward leans towards Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of 
sensation which as I will show is an inexpressible excitation uncovering our bodily 
embeddedness and interaction with the material world. 
Sense experience, or le sentir, is “that vital communication with the world 
which makes it present as a familiar setting of our life” (POP 61). To explain this 
experience, Merleau-Ponty turns to the effects of colours on human beings. For 
instance, green makes one restful and yellow has a stinging effect. In both cases, “the 
colour, before being seen, gives itself away through the experience of a certain bodily 
attitude appropriate to only that colour and precisely indicative of it” (244). Colours 
evoke sensations in those who see them, but for the colour-blind, “real colour 
produces in the subject a ‘concentration of colour experience’ which enables him to 
‘draw together the colours in his eyes’” (245).49 This indicates that the quality of any 
phenomenon is “revealed by a type of behaviour which is directed towards it in its 
essence” (245). It is not about why “red signifies effort or violence, green restfulness 
and peace,” but “we must rediscover how to live these colours as our body does” 
(245). Theoretically, Merleau-Ponty makes a point about how sensations from the 
experience of an object reveal the quality of the object in itself and not in relation to 
what one already knows about it. Practically speaking, however, it is difficult to 
discern sense experience, especially in the moment of perception. His example of 
colour-blind subjects, whilst proves his theory, is questionable. Drawing on disabled 
                                                
49 Merleau-Ponty’s analysis relies much on Heinz Werner’s inductive psychology to explain sense 
experience. Here, he quotes from Werner’s Studies of Sensation and Perception Volume 1 (160). 
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bodies to prove blindness of the trained eye overlooks the fact that disability can 
extend outside physical limitations and assumes that these subjects have a clearer 
vantage point suited for sense experience.   
In what follows I turn to Nightwood for a more inclusive exposition of sense 
experience. Using darkness as a modifier that shifts bodies from states of advantage to 
disadvantage, the novel does not describe blindness, or compromised visibility, in 
terms of disability, but treats it as a starting point to rediscover the straightened-out 
world from blurred and shrouded perspectives. Nightwood re-envisions familiar 
scenarios from prosaic reality from the viewpoint of the disadvantaged perceiver, 
illuminating darkness and blurriness with an unparalleled narrative style which lays 
out vague and jarring images in place of traditional representations of reality. As 
Frank quite accurately describes the novel, 
We are asked only to accept [the characters’] world as we accept an 
abstract painting… as an autonomous pattern giving us an individual 
vision of reality, rather that what we might consider its exact 
reflection. (“Spatial Form in Modern Literature” 435) 
The world may be dim and vague but it is the presented view. Nightwood is full of 
surprising depictions of reality, forcing its reader to see the world from varying points 
of view, in darkness and quietude.  
Barnes’s evocative and brilliantly constructed narrative of the world at night 
mitigates problems of seeing properly and mindfully as the trained eye does, enabling 
a more immediate and sensory grasp of the world. The novel presents alternative 
ways of seeing that do not conform to the straight, dominant mode of perception. We 
can say that Nightwood is a critique of normativity, breaking down the binary of abled 
and disabled experiences. It is its own collection of non-normative experiences. It 
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exposes the inhibitions of experience, which are not limited to historically and 
socially fortified obstacles, or cognitive issues of consciousness-directed experience, 
but include gendered strongholds as well.   
Nightwood interrogates what it is to be in the lived world, to be invariably 
affected by external changes and happenings. Seeing in the dark and having things 
hidden from view are very real obstacles to vision, especially when one cannot move 
and adjust one’s body. These situations are described at length in Nightwood where 
characters are compelled to view situations in their givenness, to focus on what is 
visible, and to make out what is barely visible. Blurrings, disorientation, and dimness 
make explanation and prediction immensely difficult. Characters must only describe 
what they sense, in spite of distance and disruption.   
The first time Nora meets Robin captures the sense experience that pervades 
Nightwood. The section begins with specific details: “The Denckman circus… came 
into New York in the fall of 1923. Nora went alone. She came into the circus of the 
ring, taking her place in the front row” (59). The circus acts are described through 
Nora’s viewpoint and appear in the order they enter the scene: first the clowns; the 
black horse; the tiny dogs; the elephants; and the girl sitting beside her. In the 
description of the animals, the narrative does not directly refer to Nora, though it is 
implicit that it proceeds from her point of view. This changes with Robin’s entrance 
into the scene: “A girl sitting beside Nora took out a cigarette and lit it; her hands 
shook and Nora turned to look at her” (59). At first glance, following the sequence of 
actions, it seems Nora is merely reacting to the girl’s movements. Yet, the act of 
taking out a cigarette and lighting it with shaking hands occurs outside Nora’s visual 
field which as mentioned is captivated by the menagerie. This is more compelling 
when the narrative immediately follows up with an explanation that refutes the first 
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convenient logic of perception, i.e., Nora turns because she senses the girl’s actions: 
“she looked at her suddenly because the animals, going around and around the ring, 
all but climbed over at that point” (59). It is now clear that Nora turns to look at Robin 
because of the sensation of the light, her eyes following the motion of the animals. As 
the animals climb over, their light dawns on the girl. At that moment Nora turns.  
Barnes organises Robin’s entrance into Nora’s view in a fashion that initially 
fits nicely with structures of intellectualism and logic. We assume that Nora is acting 
in response to stimuli beyond her vision without examining the explained experience. 
The illusion of perception is quickly punctured as the narrative attributes sight to 
sensation. Experience is not an accumulation of actions and does not have to involve a 
sequence of events, one frame succeeding another. Rather, sense experience hinges on 
sensations that occur within a moment of concentration. Moments may entail ample 
events but they do not have to unfold sequentially. Things can occur in tandem and 
coexist simultaneously. In Nightwood, it is at that moment, when the animals have all 
climbed over and the light shines on Robin, that Nora turns and sees her. The focus on 
light accentuates the dimness of the surroundings, a peculiarity that recurs every time 
Robin appears to Nora. Although light is the sole sensation that draws Nora to Robin, 
the sensation is not an independent existence. It exists in itself only because to the 
perceiver it is for itself. The first is a phenomenal existence that is self-contained; the 
second indicates a self-reflexive existence that considers the relationships with other 
existences. This is the “dilemma of for itself and in itself” that Merleau-Ponty writes 
in his phenomenology: the conflicting but complementing relation between reflection 
and the unreflective view (POP 247).  
The sensation Nora gets when she sees the light on Robin is, to use Merleau-
Ponty’s words, “intentional, which means that it does not rest in itself as does a thing, 
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but that it is directed and has significance beyond itself” (POP 248). In this respect, 
sense experience as intentional renders the object of experience to be for itself. Here 
significance is directed. Intentional sensation brings the body “into relation with an 
external being” and this challenges the object in itself (248). Moving back and forth 
between in itself and for itself, Merleau-Ponty clarifies that although the sensation is 
being directed to something, “what it aims at is recognized only blindly,” leaving the 
object of experience “with its opacity and thisness” (248). This resolves the dilemma 
for the moment. Sense experience is independent of prestructured experience of the 
world—it exists in itself. It is also coextensive with the world—it exists for itself. 
This is apparent in the few moments following Nora and Robin’s first encounter:  
The great cage for the lions had been set up…. Then as one powerful 
lioness came to the turn of the bars, exactly opposite the girl, she 
turned her furious great head with its yellow eyes afire and went down, 
her paws thrust through the bars and, as she regarded the girl, as if a 
river were falling behind impassable heat, her eyes flowed in tears that 
never reached the surface. At that the girl rose straight up. Nora took 
her hand. ‘Let’s get out of here!’ the girl said, and still holding her 
hand Nora took her out. (60) 
Whilst there is no explicit reference to Nora’s feelings or perception, the use of the 
feminine pronoun is ambiguous. In the sentence, “Nora took her hand” (60), Barnes 
uses the personal pronoun over “Robin.” This is worth noting considering the many 
“she” and “her” that have been used prior to this sentence to refer to the lioness. 
Instead of jumping on the opportunity to clarify who “she” is, Barnes draws attention 
to the female hand reaching out for Nora’s grip, which has an uncanny resemblance to 
the lioness’s paws that reach past the bars. There is a strong parallelism between the 
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girl and the lioness, intensifying the ambivalence of the scene. It is also unclear as to 
who the narrator is at this point. The choice of “her” indicates Nora’s unawareness of 
the girl’s name; it could also be a narrative decision to perpetuate uncertainty. The 
animation of the lioness and the motion to take Robin’s hand at the precise moment 
when the connection between beast and human strikes suggest that the narrative is 
either told from Nora’s viewpoint, or that she shares a similar perspective of the 
happening. Her decision to hold Robin’s hand can then be read as a result of 
evaluating the scene in front of her, after sensing anxiety and fear in her neighbour. 
Yet, whilst Nora’s presence is bound up in this exchange, the omission of her 
sensations makes it unclear as to whether she is in fact reflecting on what she 
observes or merely acting instinctively. Her sense experience is coextensive with the 
scene unfolding before her and is, at the same time, distanced from the intensity of the 
exchange.  
As Nightwood demonstrates, sense experience is both experience in and for 
itself. The attitude towards a quality of something may be conditioned—that is, a 
reflection of some sort precedes experience—but rather than meditating on the 
significance or origin of the quality that deviates from the moment of experience, any 
reflection on the quality “must elucidate the unreflective view which it supersedes, 
and show the possibility of this latter” (POP 247). The attitude of sense experience is 
not so much a meditative reflection as it is a reaction to sensations. Merleau-Ponty 
describes sense experience as “a certain bodily attitude appropriate only to that 
[phenomenon] and precisely indicative of it” (244). Attitude is a semantic conflation: 
the term denotes ways of thinking or feeling about something; it also means physical 
postures or behaviours indicating state of mind. Bringing sensations and attitudes into 
the discussion, sense experience straddles the reflective and unreflective in order to 
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elicit what is real and not “syntheses represented by judgements, acts or predications” 
(POP xi).  
The scene where Nora sees Robin before she leaves with Jenny unveils the 
tension between the reflective and unreflective. In the following passage, Nora has 
just woken up from a dream and roams the dark corridors in a somnambulistic state. 
From her window, she sees the shadowy figures of Jenny and Robin embracing by the 
statue in her garden: 
Waking, she began to walk again, and looking out into the garden in 
the faint light of dawn, she saw a double shadow falling from the 
statue, as if it were multiplying, and thinking perhaps this was Robin, 
she called and was not answered. Standing motionless, straining her 
eyes, she saw emerge from the darkness the light of Robin’s eyes, the 
fear in them developing their luminosity until, by the intensity of the 
double regard, Robin’s eyes and hers met. So they gazed at each other. 
As if that light had power to bring what was dreaded into the zone of 
their catastrophe, Nora saw the body of another woman swim up into 
the statue’s obscurity, with head hung down, that the added eyes might 
not augment the illumination; her arms about Robin’s neck, her body 
pressed to Robin’s, her legs slackened in the hang of the embrace. (69-
70) 
Nora can barely see Robin who is concealed from view. The paragraph begins with 
Nora’s apprehension; she does not know if it is Robin in the garden. Then, as the light 
in the figure’s eyes intensifies, the narrative ascertains that it is she: “Robin’s eyes 
and hers met” (69). Once again the sensation of light resurfaces. Arguably, as this 
luminosity develops in Robin’s eyes, Nora’s vision becomes less vague as well, hence 
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the moment of connection they both recognise. This gradual adjustment of vision that 
enables them to see in the dark emulates the physiological workings of the visual 
purple, a photosensitive pigment in the human eye responsible for perception in 
poorly lit conditions. As it picks up on any available source of light, the eye adjusts to 
the dimness and begins to see as the light or lack of light allows—a process known as 
dark adaptation.50 In Nora’s case, she fixates on the “light of Robin’s eyes” and as she 
does so, she recovers more visuality (69). It is a reflex that requires time to manifest. 
The body is physically incapable of viewing reflexively and has to adapt to whatever 
is perceptible.  
Read from a different perspective, Nora’s sense experience of Robin seems as 
imaginary as it is originary. The language brings out the uncertainty. Is the figure 
Robin or a conjuring of the mind? The phrase, “thinking perhaps this was Robin,” 
suggests that Nora may have imagined her. After all she has just awoken from a 
dream about Robin. The language is also tentative. Words such as “faint light,” 
“double shadow,” “multiplying,” and “perhaps” add to the ambivalence of the scene, 
whilst phrases like “straining her eyes” and “developing their intensity until…” speak 
to the extent to which the body would go in order to see Robin (69). These signs 
suggest that vision is possibly a product of reflection.  
But this is precisely the effect of sense experience. According to Merleau-
Ponty, it presents possibilities of reflection whilst retaining the integrity of experience 
by “leaving it with its opacity and thisness” (POP 248). The body adopts an attitude, 
physiologically and mentally. The mental state is deep contemplation, but a way of 
feeling that pertains only to a particular phenomenon—in this case, it is Robin’s 
                                                
50 Riggs, Lorrin A., and Charles E. Sternheim. “Vision.” AccessScience. McGraw-Hill Education, 
2014. Web. 30 Apr. 2014. 
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luminous eyes that stimulate Nora’s visual clarity. Sense experience is for itself. To 
explain in phenomenological terms, Robin, who is the object of vision, “is made 
determinate as an identifiable being only through a whole open series of possible 
experiences” and she is accessible and “exists only for a subject [Nora] who carries 
out this identification” (POP 246). On the other hand, the perceived is also in itself, 
for it is uncertain that the senses of the half-awake Nora “retain any cognitive power” 
(247). Incapable of reflection, she describes Robin as her body lives the scene and 
takes up the situation in the dark.  
 
Position and Power 
In addition to the night, the women of Nightwood are unable to see straight and clear 
because of their stilted positioning in place. Awkward positions and postured bodies 
rattle the narrative of experience. Positionality is not an unfamiliar trope in Barnesian 
scholarship. Many readers have looked into the novel’s shifts from positions, its 
compulsion to be here and there and nowhere. Douglas Messerli states that Barnes’s 
earlier characters are dispersed within “the metaphysical structure that bears 
resemblance to the Great Chain of Being,” whereas others are “positioned along a 
spectrum of their relationship to these two extremes [between the angels and the 
beasts]” (“The Newspaper Tales” xvii). Positionality in this regard is related to 
movement between categories and within hierarchies. Approaching positionality from 
a different angle, Kenneth Burke argues that Nightwood’s concern is not a here-there 
issue but an upward-downward tension. Downward positions, he writes, symbolically 
embodied in the chapter “Bow Down” and “Go Down” return to the “‘primal’ story of 
all mankind” (Language as Symbolic Action 244-245). In moving downwards, the 
novel transcends upwards. The tendency to associate positionality with movement, I 
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believe, comes from an eagerness to draw characters together in relation to one 
another, to make sense of one character’s absence with the presence of another. This 
approach, however, does not examine characters in situ.  
Given the lack of movements in Nightwood, the still and stilted bodies demand 
extra careful examination. Returning to the same scene where Nora sees Robin in the 
dark, it is notable that Nora is extremely still and does not re-position herself to obtain 
a clearer view. She is “motionless” throughout the scene and is “[unable] to turn her 
eyes away” (NW 70). She is trapped in her body, forced to make out the scene with 
poor visibility, from a fixed position. Having established that compromised visuality 
is a condition for sense experience, this section shows how postured bodies hamper 
reliance on sedimented experience and enact the female bodily existence in a lived 
world. Posturing abled bodies in seemingly disadvantageous positions may inhibit 
experience, but it figuratively reflects how many women are still trapped in socially 
and politically determined roles, if not patronised and coddled by their more assertive 
counterparts into playing well their allocated roles as mothers, wives, and muse, to 
name a few. These postures are propagated by the phallocratic order and operative 
myths.51 As Luce Irigaray states, such ideologies have “no possible place for the 
‘feminine’” and describe women “in terms of deficiency or atrophy, as the other side 
of the sex that alone holds a monopoly on value” (The Sex Which is Not One 68-69). 
Being physically postured in fixed and awkward positions puts on view what it means 
for women to be in the world.  
Generally speaking, to be in the world, as in Mrs Dalloway, is be actively 
involved with the world. Nightwood lacks activity in that sense. Characters are often 
                                                
51 In the chapter, “Dreams, Fears, Idols,” from The Second Sex, de Beauvoir writes: “[men’s] codes of 
law have been set up against [the woman]; and thus she has been definitely established as the Other. 
This arrangement suited the economic interests of the males; but it conformed also to their ontological 
and moral pretensions” (171).  
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standing, lying down, and seated in awkward positions, confined to tight spaces. 
Instead of following the footsteps of characters about places in a videographic-like 
fashion, Barnes lays bare a tableau of still shots of characters. Or, as Frank describes 
in The Widening Gyre, the novel hinges on “a static situation” seen “from different 
angles” (31). Nightwood approaches movement differently, where being in the world 
does not equate mobility. Characters do not shuffle back and forth but are positioned 
such that they seem incapacitated. In Nightwood, being posed is tantamount to being 
dormant—a recurring motif that is especially associated with Robin. To Felix, Robin 
is an “old statue” rooted to the ground (45); to the Doctor, she resembles “the 
paralysed man in Coney Island” (155); to Nora, she is “like something dormant… 
moved out of death’s way by the successive arms of women” (70).  
Towards the end of the chapter, “Night Watch,” in the scene where Nora sees 
Jenny and Robin together, it is literally Jenny’s arms and Nora’s eyes that keep 
Robin’s lifeless body in position. It is not just Robin who is immovable. In the scene 
all three women are motionless, caught in a freeze frame of their actions. Robin’s 
dormancy and invisibility force her perceivers (Jenny and Nora) to move in spite of 
physical immobility. Postured, they do not move in the traditional sense. The women 
advance forward or withdraw by either concentrating or blurring images, according to 
what they can and cannot make of the scene. Focalisation and de-focalisation help 
compose, frame, and make sense of the visual field; they are ways of movement for 
the motionless women.  
 To explain how dormancy provokes movements, let us return to the scene in 
Nightwood. Deprived of a clear view of Robin and unable to move, Nora focuses on 
Jenny. Compared to the shadowy figure of Robin, who is only recognised by her eyes, 
Jenny appears in full form, her limbs and body tactile and imposing. Nora turns her 
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eyes to what is perceptible: that is, Jenny, in order to see Robin. The references to 
actions done unto Robin can be read as Nora reiterating her lover’s presence, 
compensating for the absence and lack of mention of the physical body: “her arms 
about Robin’s neck, her body pressed to Robin’s, her legs slackened in the hang of the 
embrace” (70). The emphasis may also be interpreted from Jenny’s point of view: as 
the descriptions of the posture unfold in the sentence, each phrase begins with a part 
of Jenny leeching onto something of Robin, forcefully making connections with the 
dormant body to bring it into existence. Jenny may be motionless and trapped in the 
embrace, but the way the postured bodies are described shows her actively taking 
possession of Robin.  
Being positioned imposes restraints on movement, literally and figuratively 
mirroring the entrapment of women. On another level, the concomitant dormancy 
functions as a jarring contrast to the inward restlessness and anxiety that propel the 
body to move in any way it can. In the case of Nora, perceiving Robin through Jenny 
indicates the extent to which she has tailored her vision to focus on Jenny and de-
focus on the obscured Robin. Her devotion to Robin enables her to tolerate the sight 
of her lover with another. She can only see Robin through the body of her mistress: 
Unable to turn her eyes away, incapable of speech, experiencing a 
sensation of evil, complete and dismembering, Nora fell to her knees, 
so that her eyes were not withdrawn by her volition, but dropped from 
their orbit by the falling of her body. Her chin on the sill she knelt, 
thinking, “Now they will not hold together,” feeling that if she turned 
away from what Robin was doing, the design would break and melt 
back into Robin alone. She closed her eyes, and at that moment she 
knew an awful happiness. (70) 
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Nora’s refusal to “turn away” from the “design” finds and preserves Robin (70). She 
chooses to stay in position. It is a perverse stillness, but one that gives her an “awful 
happiness” (70). Being motionless locks the body in position and brings attention to 
the body. Because Nora is unable to turn away, the focus is on how she fully 
experiences the objects before her. Since her experience is contingent on her strong 
feelings for Robin, it is impossible to eschew an analysis of embodied feelings. The 
dormant, postured body compels an interrogation of the relation between the body and 
feelings, extending our discussion to feeling bodies.    
Julie Taylor in Djuna Barnes and Affective Modernism writes extensively on 
embodied feelings. She points out the intimate relation between feelings and body: 
“Memory and emotion… reside in—as opposed to moving out from—the body” (16). 
Embodied feeling may recall Merleau-Ponty’s embodied subjectivity, but the feeling 
body is performative and has little room for “depth psychology and interiority” (13). 
It reveals “Barnes’s emphasis on surface and performance” (13). Taylor’s exposition 
of the lived body shows how the body can be manipulated to pose in certain ways and 
that it is intentional and directed. Taylor is keener on the affective interaction between 
bodies than their interactions with the working world. Also, what is ironic is the focus 
on surface and performativity, which should implicate some form of external agency, 
directs attention away from environing phenomena and places. Whilst feelings and 
the body are intertwined, the focus on the performing body commands attention to the 
performer, her performance, and her audience. For the purpose of a phenomenology 
of place, the discourse of the body has to consider both the feeling body, and also the 
postured feeling body. This consideration factors into account positionality—what it 
means for the feeling body to be fixed in a position in place. 
 Foo 114 
Position is always spatial. To be positioned is to be placed. Space is inherent 
in the discussion of positionality and posture. What I mean to say in relation to the 
performing body is the body-as-staged is important only if we consider the how and 
where of the performance. Positionality steers the discourse back to place that is 
neither slight nor incidental in the expression of feelings through the staging of the 
body. Nightwood feeds my project of place by presenting space as perceptible and 
potentially transgressive when emotions, affect, subjectivity, thoughts, and other 
forms of interiority are bound up with the body, specifically the feeling body as it is 
postured in the lived world.  
 The postured, feeling body is displayed in the scene where Robin and Nora’s 
bodies are intertwined. The scene of them embracing one another in their house 
describes their love and the nature of their bond. It begins with, “Yet sometimes, 
going about the house, in passing each other, they would fall into an agonized 
embrace” (63). The image of them walking casually about the house, then suddenly 
embracing each other is dramatic, almost camp. This is juxtaposed with the intensity 
of the coupling where their bodies are “so strained together that the space that divided 
them seemed to be thrusting them apart” (63). The sentence is encumbered with 
conflicting expressions which when threaded together masterfully describes the 
anguish of their embrace. Their bodies are so strained from entwining that their 
efforts to cling onto each other amplify their separateness. The strain is physical and 
emotional. They are two bodies interlocked in one posture, trying, but failing, to 
thoroughly merge as one. An embrace is often gentle, but the diction (“strained,” 
“thrust,” “two heads in their four hands”) points to violence (63). The language 
roughens the bodies and sculpts them into one agonised posture. There is something 
stiff and mechanical in the symmetry of the posture that makes the embrace painful 
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and unbearable to watch. Although the posture apparently unifies the women, the 
tension between the bodies created by the narrative is dismembering and breaks the 
human body down into its parts.  
There is tension in the way they are positioned: two bodies tightly yoked yet 
undeniably independent of one another. The image reflects their grave desire for one 
another and the impossibility of fulfillment. The posture is a visual illustration of their 
feelings and depicts on their behalf the “insurmountable grief” of their sapphic love; 
Robin’s “tragic longing to be kept” in spite of “knowing herself astray” (63); and 
Nora’s endless wait for the one who “has forgotten [her]” (165). For Nora, it confirms 
that “there [is] no way but death”; for only “in death Robin would belong to her” (63). 
As one entity, their posed bodies reflect and fortify their strained union such that 
Robin’s attempt to leave the position is equivalent to a “betrayal,” a “return” to where 
she belongs (63). Herein is an indelible connection between positionality and place. 
To stay in position is to remain in the world they both built. Conversely, to fall out of 
it is to abandon their place and one another.   
The posture, sustained by passion and anguish, repulse and attraction, is 
contrasted with Jenny and Robin’s impassive one-sided embrace. Returning to the 
scene at the end of “Night Watch,” Nora first sees the body of Jenny “swim up into 
the statue’s obscurity” and then proceeds to describe her clinging onto Robin (69). 
From where she stands, Nora sees Jenny forcing herself upon a shadowy figure 
“falling from the statue” (69). The association between Robin and statues once again 
surfaces (Felix envisions her as a statue as well). She continually needs to be pinned 
down to place. Unfortunately for Jenny, her affectionate moves towards Robin are 
unreciprocated and Robin is detached from the embrace. Concealed by the statue, she 
is doubly removed. Here the narrative follows Nora’s point of view as she awakes 
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from her dream and roams the corridor. The use of present continuous tense makes it 
seem as if the scene is happening right at the moment. We go along with Nora on her 
walk; like her, we see Robin as the shadow of the statue, whereas Jenny is vividly 
perceived. The position of their coupling presents a different strain from the embrace 
between Robin and Nora, because this time Robin is still and dispassionate, whilst a 
brazen Jenny places “her arms about Robin’s neck, her body press[es] to Robin’s, her 
legs slacken in the hang of the embrace” (70).  
Jenny’s enthusiasm translates to the force and intensity in the way her body is 
posed—her hands wrapped around Robin’s neck, supporting the weight of her body. 
It is as if she is strangling her lover—her love gone rogue. The violence is contrasted 
with the nonresponse of the dormant lover. On the other side of the embrace, 
comprising the other half of the posture, is a fading and almost non-existent Robin. 
The difference in affection and engagement affects how the bodies are positioned. In 
the agonised posture of Robin and Nora, the bodies are almost symmetrical, with 
“their two heads in their four arms” (63). With Jenny, however, there is imbalance, 
mirroring the power dynamics of the relationship. In both embraces, the postured 
bodies reflect the women’s feelings, or lack of feelings, towards the other. 
The position of one body in relation to another reveals power relations. It also 
shows the intensity of feelings and desire. In the above examples, the women are 
caught up in various unmoving postures because of their feelings for one another. 
Their desire to possess keeps them still. They stick to the positions they are in, 
positions of pain and of disadvantage that prevent them from normative ways of 
seeing. There is an emotional attachment and commitment to a common disadvantage. 
It keeps them together and underpins the sense of fixity they forge for themselves. 
This fixity is an alternative version of settling down that they, as “inverts,” have to 
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invent (NW 145).52 In keeping their positions, they also maintain their orientation 
towards objects, which results in blurred and incomplete visions. Still, this is the 
givenness of the world they present for others alike and also the reader. In this sense, 
the women’s refusal to move holds the narrative and presents the scene from their 
stilted positions. The idea of orientation then becomes key. It is a spatial cue, a 
material manifestation of the characters’ sexual orientations and inclinations, which in 
turn directs them to see at a slant.   
 
Bent Bodies  
Queer permeates Nightwood’s dark and inverted world. Characters are queer and live 
queerly. Ahmed affirms that sexual orientation is “a matter of residence”: it affects 
“how we inhabit spaces, and who or what we inhabit spaces with” (“Orientations” 
543). Queer suffuses their beings and comes through their positions in place. To 
restate, Nora, Jenny, and Robin are relentless in keeping positions, almost 
comfortable in their awkwardness. Bent bodies speak of queerness and also the 
reluctance to budge, refusing to be straight and see right as explained in the 
introductory section of the chapter. The queer women resist heteronormativity, 
turning away from the right and accepted way of living, choosing to put themselves at 
a disadvantage. This “turning away” is captured in the bent posture of bodies that 
refuse to be straight.   
The word, “bent,” suggests deflection and describes orientations that are not 
straight. The idea of bent bodies helps us to think of the women’s awkward physical 
positions in relation to sexual orientation. In Nightwood the women who refuse to see 
straightly take up a queer orientation that veers off the course of the normal visual 
                                                
52 In Nightwood the Doctor uses the word, “invert,” to mean the homosexual: “what is this love we 
have for the invert, boy or girl?” (145).  
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route. Ahmed examines in Queer Phenomenology how orientation is lived out in 
space, and how being queer and off-course “redirect us and open up new worlds” 
(19). Her refreshing take on lived space and orientations of alterity (homosexuality 
and race) is enlightening for the study of women’s experience of place. An 
understanding of queer prevents the universalising of women’s experience, lest a 
feminist phenomenology project should assume a dominant women experience.    
Since the advent of queer theory in the early 1990s, studies surrounding 
lesbian, gay, transgender, bisexual, and intersex people and culture have acquired 
their own field, albeit born out of gender and women’s studies. No more contented 
with categories like gay and lesbian, queer is more inclusive. According to Eve 
Sedgwick, queer refers to “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances 
and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of 
anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify 
monolithically” (Tendencies 8). Sedgwick investigates the etymological roots of 
queer: “it comes from the Indo-European root—twerkw, which also yields to the 
German quer (transverse), Latin torquere (to twist)” (xii). Put another way, queer 
embraces different “across formulations” (xii). It is a way of thinking about how lines 
and boundaries are crossed with regards to sexuality. This is also its greatest departure 
from feminist theory which concerns itself with gender and sex.53  
Sedgwick is correct to point out that exploitation from gender and sexuality-
related differences are “differently structured,” “each oppression is likely to be in a 
uniquely indicative relation to certain distinctive nodes of cultural organization” 
(Epistemology of the Closet 33). Whilst feminism is commonly associated with the 
                                                
53 Sedgwick defines sex as “chromosomal sex,” which has “the meaning of a certain group of 
irreducible, biological differentiations between members of the species Homo sapiens who have XX 
and those who have XY chromosomes”; gender builds on this and is “the far more elaborated, more 
fully and rigidly dichotomized social production and reproduction of male and female identities and 
behaviors—of male and female persons—in a cultural system” (Epistemology of the Closet 27). 
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conception of gender, queer largely responds to perversions of categories concerning 
sex and sexuality. Following this distinction, Mrs Dalloway and Good Morning, 
Midnight (which is read later) are concerned with how women’s conceived roles in 
the public or private affect their experiences as they walk the streets or stay in rooms. 
Nightwood, on the other hand, is rendering of queer experience. How and what 
exactly is it to experience the world as we know it without seeing it through the lenses 
of heteronormativity and normality? How does the world look like to a queer who is 
not granted the privilege of the reigning majority? To address queer existence, the 
novel first tears apart heteronormative experience and straight seeing. 
Before examining the overt queerness of Nightwood, let us look at Merleau-
Ponty’s address of queer experience. His application of the queer relates to being 
inverted, which uncannily recalls the Doctor’s use of the word, “invert,” to describe 
homosexuals. Merleau-Ponty refers to something called the “queer” effect which 
occurs when objects appear “slantwise” and images are “oblique (or inverted)” (POP 
289). Queer is mentioned twice in Phenomenology of Perception, always in inverted 
commas, perhaps aware of its social implications but careful to not to allude to the 
same meaning for the given context.54 When queer moments occur, they are discussed 
as a kind of inversion where the top and bottom are reversed and the body is forced to 
re-orientate itself.  
Merleau-Ponty cites the example of a subject whose world is inverted as a 
result of wearing corrective glasses. At first, the view is “unreal and upside down,” 
but with time “normal perception begins to reassert itself”; the subject “has the feeling 
that his own body is upside down” (285). With more time, “the landscape is no longer 
                                                
54 It should be pointed out that Merleau-Ponty does consider sexual orientation in the chapter, “The 
Body in its Sexual Being,” and would have been aware of non-heteronormative orientations. Ahmed, 
however, thinks differently: “when Merleau-Ponty discusses queer effects he is not considering ‘queer’ 
as a sexual orientation” (67). 
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inverted” and the body “progressively rights itself, and finally seems to occupy a 
normal position” (285). When the glasses are removed, “objects appear not inverted” 
but “motor reactions are reversed” (285). The experiment shows that the “conflict of 
images can end only if one of the two contestants withdraws” (286). Gradually, “the 
normal situation is restored” and the “new image of the world and one’s own body” 
begins to “displace” the world before (286). This re-orientation seems like a natural 
transition: the subject gets used to the new normal after the initial uneasiness. Ahmed 
explains reorientation as “the ‘becoming vertical’ of perspective,” where “the ‘queer’ 
effect is overcome and objects in the world no longer appear as if they are ‘off center’ 
or ‘slantwise’” (65). This newly acquired “normative dimension” is “redescribed in 
terms of the straight body” (66). The problem with this line of argument is it 
presupposes that normal is necessary and desired. But Nightwood writes differently 
on the queer experience and problematises the attempt to overcome the queer effect. 
Firstly, queer experience in Nightwood is not straightened out or reversed. It exists 
alongside the normative but reveals the incongruities between the worlds. The world 
at night is as real and ordinary as the world by day. Secondly, characters are acutely 
cognisant of the pains of remaining in their positions, and even as they try to 
experience as fully and immediately as possible, they never correct themselves. 
To bend is an out and loud gesture that protests against being straight. It 
insistently makes slant one’s perception of the world. Bending deviates from a neutral 
position; the body moves away from what is considered normal since it stands straight 
in order to have a clear and optimal view. The practice of straightness, Ahmed writes, 
is like following a line that is created “by being followed and [is] followed by being 
created” (16). Straight are the lines that direct how one should live: “they depend on 
the repetition of norms and conventions, of routes and paths taken” (16). Accordingly, 
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to stand straight is the first step to walking the line of normativity. Conversely, to 
bend is to sidetrack. In Nightwood the queer people are bent.  
In Feminism is Queer, Mimi Marinucci argues that queer theory’s “critique of 
binary and hierarchical reasoning recognizes and addresses all forms of oppression as 
part of a logic of domination” (106). Queer criticises “the logic of domination”; it 
rethinks the hierarchical manner in which people interact with the world: “a manner 
that justifies the systematic subordination of those who lack power by those who 
possess it” (106-107). This is important in Nightwood where sexuality, gender, and 
power intersect. The novel twists lines and oversteps boundaries. It is about the queer 
lived experience, in all senses of the word. Queer frustrates preconceived structures of 
experience and compels a re-examination of our straightforward views of the world.  
To see as bent bodies do goes against the logic of seeing straight. To see 
straight, or to have a straightforward view of the world, does not necessarily cognate 
with heterosexual attitudes. But it is consistent with the natural attitude, or to be more 
precise, the natural straightforward attitude.55 According to Husserl, this attitude is 
formed from “straightforward living” which is the “naturally normal [manner]” in 
which “we are awake to the world and to the objects in the world” (The Crisis of 
European Sciences 144). Living in a “pregiven world,” which is “the world as world 
for us,” “we function together, in the manifold ways of considering, together, objects 
pregiven to us in common, thinking together, valuing, planning, acting together” 
(109). There is solidarity and structure in the straightforward life that help us agree on 
what is natural and normal, acceptable and right. Yet, this way of life is also 
incredibly limiting. Husserl puts it this way: “We, the subjects, in our normal, 
                                                
55 The natural attitude is unquestioning and accepts things as they are have been presented and made 
available to us. It stands in contrast to the phenomenological attitude where the natural beliefs about 
the world are bracketed and every sense of the things occurring around us is rediscovered in their 
givenness.    
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unbroken, coherent life, know no goals which extend beyond [the pregiven world]” 
(144). So when something swerves from the dominant course, we cannot comprehend 
difference and deem the odd one out unnatural and abominable. The majority may 
even try to “straighten” the oddity or extricate her from the dominant narrative. 
 Louise Levesque-Lopman elaborates on the natural straightforward attitude:  
In our natural attitude we take it for granted that others exist and that 
they will act in ways typically similar to ours, will be motivated by 
typically similar motives, and will interpret our actions in substantially 
the same way as we meant them. (Claiming Reality 81) 
This attitude is a “taken-for-granted” schema of the world (81). It prefers familiarity 
to diversity, denying “the oppressed” of the freedom to “create an alternative” (82). 
Appropriating this for Nightwood, to be straight is more than assuming a heterosexual 
orientation; it is to subscribe to the natural attitude that “accept[s] and reproduce[s] a 
predefined malestream notion of human experience” (82). What is required to 
counteract the straight and natural, according to Levesque-Lopman, is “a new 
orientation that deconstructs and reexamines what ‘appears’ to be gender-neutral; that 
transcends the limitations imposed by male culture” (82). The call to “transcend” the 
male culture by “starting from women’s perspective” may raise red flags with some 
postmodern feminists who argue that such transgression fortifies arbitrary gender 
constructs (82). Yet, to think that a narrative starting from women’s perspectives 
would tread the dangerous male-female dichotomy is to assume the existence of a 
female-centric discourse substantial enough to come close to its male counterpart. 
This is another myth. As de Beauvoir writes, “man represents both the positive and 
the neutral… whereas women represents only the negative” (15). It is therefore 
pertinent for women to lay foot in the neutral. Nightwood begins from not only 
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women’s perspective but from the oppressed and the queer. It refuses to conform to 
the natural attitude. It is stubbornly queer, advocating the need to be bent and to bend 
to see, opposing the dominant straight culture of seeing.  
Bent bodies insist on a slanted perspective of the scene. The women arrange 
the situation by orientating the scene around their bodies. Their bodies shape the 
narrative of place. As Ahmed writes, “space is dependent on bodily inhabitance” (6). 
Space comes into being, or rather becomes something familiar, only when, upon 
establishing an orientation, we reach out to inhabit it: “The familiar is an effect of 
inhabitance; we are not simply in the familiar, but rather the familiar is shaped by 
actions that reach out toward objects that are already within reach” (7). Inhabitation as 
the key to shaping place is important to understanding a shifty novel like Nightwood. 
By focusing on how bent bodies inhabit space, hidden places emerge from the 
background and become less strange. One gets to see beyond what is straight ahead.  
This is seen in the scene where Jenny dines with Robin at a place not clearly 
named: “Perhaps at the Ambassadeurs (Jenny feared meeting Nora). Perhaps dinner in 
the Bois” (NW 75). The adverb makes ambiguous the meeting place. Nothing much is 
revealed about place. It is only through seeing Jenny and Robin’s bent bodies that 
place is brought into view. The scene reads: 
Jenny leaning far over the table, Robin far back, her legs thrust under 
her, to balance the whole backward incline of the body, and Jenny so 
far forward that she had to catch her small legs in the back rung of the 
chair, ankle out and toe in, not to pitch forward on the table—thus they 
presented the two halves of a movement that had, as in sculpture, the 
beauty and the absurdity of a desire that is in flower but that can have 
no burgeoning, unable to execute its destiny; a movement that can 
 Foo 124 
divulge neither caution nor daring, for the fundamental condition for 
completion was in neither of them; they were like Greek runners, with 
lifted feet but without the relief of the final command that would bring 
the foot down—eternally angry, eternally separated, in a cataleptic 
frozen gesture of abandon. (75-76) 
What is immediately striking is the tension between the women. The body language, 
Jenny “leaning far forward” and Robin “far back,” tells the nature of the relationship 
(75). Jenny is the predator and Robin the withdrawn. The diction (“whole backward,” 
“so far forward”) puts the two bodies in stark contrast. Jenny’s commitment to her 
posture, “ankle out and toe in, not to pitch forward on the table,” emphasises the 
tautness of the body (75). Robin, at the other side of the table, may be reclining but 
her body is not relaxed. The need to “balance” suggests effort, evident in the violent 
image of “thrusting” her legs under Jenny. The bodies are strained, striving to keep in 
position. Still, to envision the bodies—their entirety and in relation to one another—
the space in which this power struggle occurs needs to come into view. For a 
phenomenology of place, more salient is the dismissive treatment of place and what 
this entails for the nature of women’s relationship to space. Here space is not 
nebulous or Euclidean, but refers to the physical space of a situation. In Nightwood, 
whilst space may not be as physically present and described in the way that it is in 
Mrs Dalloway, it is not an elusive construct. Place is meant to be ambivalent and 
material at the same time.   
We must read between the lines and through bodies to uncover a narrative of 
place. To find place in the dining scene, we look at the barely mentioned table and 
chairs. It is significant that the narrative never pins down the exact venue of the 
dinner but is quick to emplace the women. They appear in front of one another at “the 
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table,” already seated in “the chair[s],” occupying space (75). The definite article, 
“the,” is used instead of the indefinite, “a,” and whilst this indicates specificity, so 
acknowledging space, the objects of space only come into existence when they are 
cited in reference to the bodies. The table and chairs become meaningful, their 
materiality emphasised, because actions occur across and on the furniture. They must 
exist in order for the scene to take place even though they remain in the background. 
This attitude towards place is clarified with Ahmed’s notion of “acts of relegation,” 
where “some things are relegated to the background in order to sustain a certain 
direction; in other words, in order to keep attention on what is faced” (31).  
Ahmed furthers her explanation with the example of Husserl writing in a 
summer house where place provides the setting for the “familiar [to slide] into the 
familial” (32). As the philosopher is working at his table, back facing his children, he 
does not see them but “they are sensed as being there,” their presence “made available 
through memory of even habitual knowledge” (32). The children are relegated 
because they are in the background and also because they can be neglected in favour 
of work. “Such acts of relegation,” Ahmed explains, “are forgotten in the very 
preoccupation with it is that is faced” (31). She points out that our attention to certain 
things involves a “more general orientation toward the world” and that the “objects 
that we direct our attention toward reveal the direction we have taken in life” (31).  
In the context of the dining episode, what is faced is the exchange between 
Robin and Jenny, and what is relegated is the space in which this happens. It is 
neglected because the general orientation of the trained eye and mind is tailored 
towards the main conflict. An act of facing always involves an act of relegation. What 
is superficially seen in the dining scene is a straightforward presentation of two 
women in a tug of war. As Ahmed observes, “The objects we direct our attention 
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toward reveal the direction we have taken in life” and quite often this involves “a 
more general orientation toward the world” (32). Nightwood works against the grain 
of the general and presents the relegated—that is, the background, the subliminal, and 
the unperceived. It illuminates on the queer experience via a different sort of 
bracketing from the epoché, which is the suspension of natural beliefs and judgements 
about the world. It suspends the general orientation and introduces a different angle to 
things. Returning to the scene, Barnes may have purposefully presented what is 
obvious, namely the tense bodies, but once attention shifts to that which is relegated, 
the bent bodies emerge. One who is used to seeing straight fails to notice place or the 
slanted bodies, imposing instead a rigid orientation on the scene so that focus is on the 
animosity between the women. Putting place back into the narrative reveals that what 
prevents the perception of place is the imposition of a general orientation, a dominant 
consensus of how and what things should be, which dismisses alternative angles and 
orientations of seeing.  
Details of place are scarce in this scene. But, as I will argue, a single table 
suffices to expose the normative modality of experience that hinders exploration of 
relations outside social norms. The narrative seems to be ambivalent about place (is it 
the Ambassadeurs or the Bois?) but, in actuality, Barnes has already drawn up a very 
tangible place that can only be seen by a perceiver who is willing to undertake the 
slanted orientation from which place is conceived. Jenny and Robin’s postures reveal 
the dynamics of their relationship. But if their postures are re-examined in relation to 
the table, then the power relation between them is played down and what becomes 
visible are two bodies slanted in the same direction. Instead of opposing one another, 
the bodies are now alike. No wonder “they present two halves of a movement” (NW 
75). The table is not a banal object that comes into being because of the women but it 
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is always there, waiting to be noticed. And once noticed, it turns into the main fixture 
of the scene. It is now clear that what is slanted are the bodies. And since they keep 
their positions, we have to bend to see the slant-ness. The table and the women are 
stationary, but the other perceiver—the reader—is re-orientated. It is when the bodies 
are seen inhabiting place that one realises it is not disparity between the women but 
their very sameness that marks the fatality of their liaison.  
As we yield to the direction to which the bodies are slanted, two almost 
parallel bodies emerge. They are diagonally stretched: one towards the table and the 
other away from it. Like two parallel lines that run alongside each other but never 
touching and forever divided by the gulf stretched out by the table, Jenny and Robin 
share a “desire” that “can have no burgeoning” (75). They remain bent as “two halves 
of a movement” that are ready to go (75); yet, like “Greek runners, with lifted feet but 
without the relief of the final command that would bring the foot down,” they do not 
move (76). This is a rare moment between Jenny and Robin where a sense of Robin’s 
feelings is vaguely palpable and implicitly expressed. The novel never expresses how 
she feels towards Jenny, but here there is whisper of a possible reciprocity, or at least 
it hints of camaraderie. Then, as though preferring malaise, the narrative returns to the 
women’s destructive love. The concluding sentence seals their fateful and hopeless 
union: they are “eternally angry, eternally separated, in a cataleptic frozen gesture of 
abandonment” (76).  
 The women seem to be self-sabotaging, subjecting themselves to unfavourable 
conditions, frozen and abandoned. Motionless, in spite of their anger and strained 
bodies, Robin and Jenny are too intentionally passive. As aforementioned, the women 
are moved into their respective positions by circumstances beyond their control and 
are kept still because of one another. They actively fight to remain in a position of 
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non-movement, of a supposed passivity. This passivity must not be mistaken for non-
resistance or conformity that makes them victims of circumstances. Here I argue that 
passivity is a response, or rather the lack of need to respond, that arises from complete 
embracing and acceptance of who one is and to whom one is devoted. There is no 
need to move and unsettle position if she is resolute and even happy, albeit an “awful 
happiness,” with where and who she is and what she believes in (NW 70).  
To clarify, happiness and comfort do not diminish anger nor deflect the issue 
of marginalisation. As Nightwood guarantees, the women are “eternally angry” (76). 
Anger, I contend, is directed to the standards of society and its people who abandon 
those who live along the margins. To move is to be straightened out by the dominant 
culture. Bodies remain bent because they are committed to their positions. More 
importantly, it is the shared experience of being bent together that empowers queer 
women to continue rejecting proper or natural positions so as to see straight. This is, 
unfortunately, not quite the case for the men.  
  Taylor observes how characters in Nightwood assume the “downward pose of 
shame” in which bowing down is “a physical act performed by shamed characters and 
as a textual symptom through the repeated emphasis on descent” (115). Although 
Felix, the Doctor, Nora, and Robin are shamed by their disqualifications, she asserts 
that shame must not be associated with depravity but with performativity, therefore 
crucial in the process of identity-making. Taylor’s most compelling argument on 
shame centres on Felix and the Doctor: 
Barnes explicitly links Felix’s bowing down to his internalized sense 
of shame and his wish to assume a coherent and socially acceptable 
identity. His ‘diversity of blood,’ his mixed history and race, has made 
him ‘the accumulated and single—the embarrassed’…. Felix is so 
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thoroughly shaped by shame that the interest-excitement that forms the 
basis for his ‘bowing down’ has become wrapped up with the 
mechanism of shame: his shame response, through its centrality to his 
affective life, becomes itself an affect invested with interest. (116-117) 
Felix carries the generational shame of his race. Whilst the Doctor bears the “painful 
isolation and wish for self-effacement associated with homosexual shame” (128), his 
shame “ultimately concludes in the embarrassment of the figure called upon to 
produce his shame” (129). Yet, although more transgressive, this feeling related to 
homosexuality is constantly shuffling between “queer shame and gay pride.”56 Taylor 
elaborates on how the Doctor’s identity is “born out of a negative”: 
[The] language in which O’Connor in particular describes himself 
suggests that his queer subjectivity has been formed in the wounds of 
insult. Some of his most insulting self-descriptive epithets were 
excised during the editorial process (presumably to prevent censors’ 
objections), including the italicised portion of the following: ‘“You see 
before you, madame,” he said, “one who in common parlance is called 
a ‘faggot,’ a ‘fairy’, a ‘queen.’ I was created in anxiety”’. Not unlike 
the word ‘queer’, the terms O’Connor uses to describe himself are 
rooted in homophobic shaming. (131)  
For Felix and the Doctor, the provenance of shame is trauma that results from “failed 
communication” between subjects (131). Following Taylor’s argument, the failure to 
recognise oneself in another disrupts identification, resulting in shame which is 
fundamental in shaping identity.  
                                                
56 “Queer shame or gay pride?” is the title of one of the sections in Taylor’s chapter on Nightwood. It 
discusses the tension between shame and pride experienced by the homosexual and Taylor concludes, 
“Pride itself takes on the characteristics of shame, and is ultimately felt as a kind of physical trauma” 
(134). Shame is laden with mixed feeling and necessary for the creation of pride.     
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For the women, however, there is little textual evidence to link shame to failed 
communication of this nature. Taylor connects their shame to sex and/or “human 
proximity to animal” (142). She refers to an omitted “scene of guilt” (119), where 
there is “an explicit description of oral sex between two women” (118). The scene, 
retrieved from Barnes’s related drafts, reads:  
… a girl standing before her girl, her skirts flung back one on one, 
while between the columns the handsome head of the girls made boy 
by God, bends back, the posture of that head volts forth the difference 
between one woman and another—crying softly between tongues, the 
terrible excommunication of the toilet. (Nightwood: The Original 
Version and Related Drafts 262) 
Whilst the graphic description supports Taylor’s claim that guilt stems from sapphic 
erotics, this removed portion, which is supposed to be part of the Doctor’s speech, 
does not describe Nora, Robin, or Jenny. In another example of shame, one that is not 
removed, Barnes describes Robin’s descent into bestiality in the church scene as 
“perhaps the most shameful thing imaginable,” and that “Robin’s relation to the dog 
is so intensely and uncomfortably physical” that some have thought it to be “sexual in 
nature” (142). Whilst the coupling in the toilet is obscene and the church scene 
degrading in Robin’s atavistic morphology, these do not speak of anxiety and 
embarrassment stemming from the women’s identity or their love for one another. If 
they are ashamed, it has nothing to do with their nonconformity and fluid identity. 
The men in Nightwood, falling short of the normative definition of man, struggle with 
inadequacy, as misfits of society. The women do not share this struggle, at least not 
with regards to their orientation.   
 Foo 131 
Given that shame is foregrounded by personal or collective histories and 
identity crises (as with the Doctor and Felix), and is a result of the failure to identify 
with the dominant culture, the same cannot be said about Nora, Jenny, and Robin. 
Their feelings do not vacillate between queer shame and gay pride. It is not a question 
of why and how they inherit their sexual orientation. Focus, I think, should be on the 
effects of affirming non-normative orientations and modes of perception. More 
significant is the concomitant affective and unifying space that is built from the 
experiences of bent bodies. It is interesting that the word, “bend,” used as a verb, 
comes from the Old English bendan, which means to bind, as in binding a bow with 
strings. Thinking along these lines, to bend is to join and string one and one together. 
In Nightwood the women are united as they turn from the world and bend towards one 
another. Their symbiotic relationships are sustained by intense and mixed feelings. 
The destructiveness of the nature of their relationships constructs a bond between the 
women that ties them together and keeps them going.  
The connection between the women is best summed up in the Doctor’s 
description of their perverse solidarity. He says to Nora, 
… in the end you’ll all be locked together, like the poor beasts that get 
their antlers mixed and are found dead that way, their heads fattened 
with a knowledge of each other they never wanted, having had to 
contemplate each other, head-on and eye to eye, until death; well, that 
will be you and Jenny and Robin. (107) 
The bodies are twisted together in confusion and mess. There is at once unity and 
disharmony. The image of beasts entangled, their antlers mixed, reflects the complex 
dynamics of the relationship between the three women. Like the deer trapped, they are 
caught in a passionate imbroglio caused by the drives to possess and dispossess one 
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another. The Doctor’s vision somewhat comes to pass when they are present together. 
We get a closer look at the dynamics of the relationships and the deadlock that ensues 
in one of the later scenes where Nora visits Jenny.  
Although Robin is not physically in the apartment when Nora visits Jenny, her 
presence pervades. Apart from the photograph and doll, Robin is also present through 
her thoughts and voice that haunt Jenny and Nora’s exchange: 
In great agitation, she said, ‘I went out this afternoon, I didn’t think she 
could call me because you have been away to the country, Robin said, 
and would be back this evening so she would have to stay home with 
you because you had been so good to her always…. She had told me 
often enough, ‘Don’t leave the house because I don’t know exactly 
when I am going to be able to get away because I can’t hurt Nora.’ 
(150) 
Shuffling between the pronouns and repetiting Robin’s words, Jenny brings Robin 
into the dialogue. She preserves Robin’s presence by speaking as she did; in doing so, 
she re-creates the scene that occurred earlier in the day. She involves Nora in the 
reenactment, giving her a clearer sense of Robin’s feelings for her in the last days of 
their relationship. Not only is Robin brought into the present scene, Nora is also led 
back to the earlier happenings in the apartment. This explains the effect of Robin’s 
words on Nora, whose “voice broke” upon hearing her (150). The moment is climatic 
and poignant, for up until this point Robin has never initiated anything as close to a 
confession of affection as this: “‘I don’t know exactly when I am going to be able to 
get away because I can’t hurt Nora’” (150). 
By the end of the exchange, Jenny is “shuddering” and falls on Nora’s lap, and 
Nora is hurt and “dead” (150). They are aggrieved and suffering. Sharing the same 
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lover, Nora and Jenny are rivals, but at the same time one is to the other “someone 
who might understand her torture” (150). Between Jenny and Nora, Jenny and Robin, 
Nora and Robin, a labyrinth of conflicting feelings emerges. They are entangled in 
opposing feelings for one another, unable to retreat or advance. The impossibility of 
progression or regression, the predicament of being stuck, materialises in the figure of 
the doll. Symbolic of “the life they cannot have,” it is a physical embodiment of 
impossibility (151). The sense of impossibility is passed from Nora to Jenny, shared 
by the lovers. It is a visual reminder of their entanglement, a perverse promise that 
they will always be connected. It is an impossibility that holds them together and 
keeps them striving. In the words of Nora, “Only the impossible lasts forever; with 
time, it is made accessible” (148).  
The set-up of place reinforces the engulfing impossibility. For instance, when 
Nora recounts her meeting with Jenny to the Doctor, she begins by recalling her 
entrance into the house and what she sees:  
I went to see Jenny. I remember the stairs. They were of brown wood, 
and the hall was ugly and dark, and her apartment depressing. No one 
would have known that she had money. The walls had a mustard-
coloured paper on them as far as the salon, and something hideous in 
red and green and black in the hall, and away at the end, a bedroom 
facing the hall-door, with a double-bed. (149) 
The house is as wretched as Jenny. Wilson observes, “Barnes’s description so blurs 
the lines between Jenny, her possessions, and the house that contains them all that our 
image of Jenny is of those objects” (439). The house is stale and has a depressing 
atmosphere, akin to the feeling Jenny stirs in others. Its ugliness takes after its owner 
who is closest to an antagonist in the novel. Jane Marcus also highlights the “vitriolic 
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description of Jenny” and crowns her “as the most abject character” (162). Jenny’s 
aptitude for destruction is fortified in the appearance of her run-down and dilapidated 
apartment. 
The house also becomes a site where the conflict of emotions between the 
women is localised. Robin’s need to stay home with Nora and her begging Jenny to 
not “leave the house” reiterate the connection between staying home and staying with 
one’s beloved and/or leaving home and leaving one’s beloved. This is also expressed 
by Nora who feels that in their house she “had to watch [Robin] wanting to go and yet 
to stay” (148). The house is a spatial embodiment of their love. As the women enter 
and exit their abodes, they also return to and leave their loved ones. The houses of 
Nora and Robin and Jenny and Robin are sites of beginnings and endings, reflecting 
their pining and abandonment. These tense situations parallel the circumstances of the 
queer world, where to be at home is never to be able settle down. On homes in 
Nightwood, Wilson writes: “In attempting to place themselves, to make homes that 
will give them a place in the world, to shelter queer or unorthodox relationships, they 
end up with dwelling places that are no place like home” (433). Jenny’s apartment 
and Nora’s house become places where their sapphic loves are housed and struggles 
enacted. Taken further, places in Nightwood can be read as shelters where the 
imperceptible and impermissible become describable and possible.  
 
Body-World 
As seen in the previous section, the struggle and state of characters are not only 
reflected in their entangled bodies but also in place. Feelings are both embodied and 
emplaced. The women are impossible to move just as their situation is impossible. 
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Their bodies are acted out and displayed in ways that mirror the fatality of their love. 
Body and place are one, manifesting in the everyday lived experience. 
In his later work, The Visible and the Invisible (1968), Merleau-Ponty 
discusses the intertwining of the self and world. He reflects: “the sole means I have to 
go unto the heart of the things” is “by making myself a world and by making them 
flesh” (135). One is in and of the world. There is a body-world relation that needs to 
be clarified, in which the body is not only receiving but also contributing to making 
meaning. Merleau-Ponty writes: “There is a circle of the touched and the touching, 
the touched takes hold of the touching; there is a circle of the visible and the seeing, 
the seeing is not without visible existence” (TVTI 143). It seems tautological but there 
is communication between the two sides, where one’s “movements no longer proceed 
unto the things to be seen, to be touched or unto [one’s] own body, but they address 
themselves to the body in general and for itself” (143). So the body does not just 
receive meaning but echoes in some ways the spatiality of the external. Conversely, 
place is not wholly outside the body; it can take form through the body. The exchange 
is part of the process of reversibility. In “The Body as a Basis for Being,” Suzanne 
Cataldi sums up Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility: “It contains the idea that one’s 
external perceptions and subjective impressions can switch places—reversibly wind 
up on their ‘opposite’ sides” (100). There is a “cross over” of impressions as the body 
“incorporates” the external into its bearing (100).57 
To borrow Cataldi’s terms, women’s situation in Nightwood, precipitated by 
impossible love and love-hate relationships with one another, “reversibly crosses over 
onto [them] and is expressed in and through [their] bodies” (101). The body is spatial, 
                                                
57 Cataldi explains reversibility in context of eroticism: “a woman’s perception of herself as sexually 
‘cold’” and “sexually incapacitated” is “indicative of a perceived coldness” and “lack” in her external 
situation (100).  
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and through it place is personified and becomes feeling. As Ahmed affirms, “spaces 
are like a second skin that unfolds in the folds of the body” (9). This section discusses 
the emplacement of feeling bodies where the feeling of the body is also the feeling of 
place, that is to say places are spatial extensions of feelings.  
Each character in Nightwood has a dwelling place, an edificial projection of 
his/herself. Take Nora’s house for example, which is a “salon” for “poets, radicals, 
beggars, artists, and people in love” who “could be seen sitting about her oak table 
before the huge fire” (NW 55). It is not quite a home, but is a reception room because 
Nora is too compassionate to turn people away: “Nora had the face of all people who 
love the people” (57). In contrast, Jenny’s place reeks of “second-hand dealings with 
life” (72). Whilst Nora “robbed herself for everyone”—her home crowded with 
strangers; Jenny robbed others for herself—her house packed with stolen loot. Their 
abode is a part of and an extension of themselves.   
The notion of emplaced feelings, or emplaced feeling bodies, is useful when 
analysing Robin who is wont to escape. The places with which she is associated are 
telling of who she is. When Robin first appears, the narrative follows the gaze of Felix 
who is hiding behind the palms:  
On a bed, surrounded by a confusion of potted plants, exotic palms and 
cut flowers, faintly over-sung by the notes of unseen birds, which 
seemed to have been forgotten—left without the usual silencing cover, 
which, like cloaks on funeral urns, are cast over their cages at night by 
good housewives—half flung off the support of the cushions from 
which, in a moment of threatened consciousness she had turned her 
head, lay the young woman, heavy and disheveled. (37-38) 
 Foo 137 
Felix does not see the supine woman but is greeted by a scene reminiscent of Henri 
Rousseau’s The Dream. The young woman is seen from a distance. Although she is 
the focus of the picture, her presence pales in comparison to the display of potted 
plants. The flux of descriptions encased by parenthetical commas overloads the 
sentence, as though the physical details are prying their way into the narrative before 
the young woman comes into the picture. Like the birds that refuse to be forgotten, 
place refuses to be relegated to the background.   
The scene lays bare a setting so catching and vivid that intimate details like 
the woman’s facial features are dim in comparison. If one is to see the woman, one 
has to abandon traditional modes of association and deduction and focus on the 
postured body. The body has to be seen in its givenness, broken and contorted. Like 
Felix, we see the woman’s legs “spread” and her long hands reach over “either side of 
her face,” as though pulled by two warring worlds (38). The positions of her limbs pin 
down the body in place. Her body stretches out to the vertical and horizontal planes of 
the room, as if to cover all grounds, as if to “cross over” to the external (Cataldi 100). 
Her limbs push against the luscious surroundings and cut into negative space which 
the body is, in actuality, not occupying. To recapitulate, negative space, according to 
Kern, is space unoccupied by the positive, the surrounding space that is not in focus. 
Her stretched arms and legs lead our attention from the body to the room, like lines 
that reach out from the body to the environing place. This way, the body, though 
dismembered, is rooted in place.  
The place in question is the jungle-room. It is a set-up of an exoticised Eden, 
blending prelapsarian innocence with an uncanny, menacing excess. The physical 
arrangement of place introduces Robin to the reader. The theatricality of the scene 
(how it is set up to resemble Rousseau’s painting) and its purposeful confusion (a 
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seemingly natural environment decorated with potted plants in a hotel room) present 
Robin as “a ‘picture’ forever arranged” (NW 41). Robin’s constructed nature, the 
theatricality of her presence, so to speak, is not new; Nightwood makes it clear that 
her existence is one construed by the narratives of others. But this scene, in mapping 
Robin onto place, gives us a spatial perspective of the elusive protagonist. The scene 
is described to be a “confusion” that holds the tension between two extremes (37), 
articulating Robin’s biformity: “the troubling structure of the born somnambule, who 
lives in two worlds—meet of child and desperado” (38). Tension is also physically 
visible in “the pose of her annihilation” as opposing forces threaten to tear her apart 
(39). Still, in spite of the disharmony, Robin lies undisturbed. She is posed in a way 
that angularises her body: her legs open sideways whilst her hands extend over her 
face. There is a mannequin-like artificiality about the position that contrasts with the 
“earth-flesh” perfume and “texture” of her flesh, of “plant life” (38). Robin’s body 
effortlessly blends in with the jungle, but her posture suggests rigidity and limitation. 
Just as the child and desperado are fighting to coexist, her posture and body described 
as though they are from separate beings, the wilderness and the walled room are in 
conflict.  
Looking at her position in the juxtaposition of places, one realises that Robin 
is not quite struggling with the tension between the innocent, primitive girl and the 
rapacious, depraved woman lurking inside her. Rather she adapts to the duality and 
lies restful. The way in which she sleeps, how her body is positioned, and where it is 
placed are at odds, but they work together to capture and develop the sense of Robin. 
When she finally comes around, the awakening is violent and she utters, “I was all 
right,” dramatically “[falling] back into the pose of her annihilation” (39). The use of 
past tense is peculiar. The assurance also points to her being comfortable in position, 
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emplaced and asleep. She is after all la somnambule. The regression into her initial 
pose is momentous. She willingly returns to the posture that makes her feel “all 
right,” as though if awakened she would have to face the physical manifestations of 
her inner chaos (39). The body is expressed through the falling back into position in 
the jungle-room; Robin accepts the confusion and embraces her biformity. Her 
involvement with place is guised in the extreme interlocking of emotions and 
expression. The little we know of Robin is magnified and expanded when deflected to 
the place of the jungle-room. 
Place, as an extension of the body, expresses on behalf of the postured feeling 
body. Lying down, Robin occupies the topmost layer of the existing superimposed 
space of the jungle and room. Her flesh is described as of the “texture of plant life”; 
her head is like the sun “glowing about the circumference of a body of water” (38). 
The body lies in a perverse Eden that embodies the trinity of Creation—the earth, 
light, and sea manifest through the being of Robin. The spatial images do not 
intermesh but structurally divide the body. On the surface the body takes on the 
texture of plant life and beneath it is decaying soil. Because of the position, the head 
is elevated. It is a protrusion severed from the rest, the beacon of light shining upon 
the water in which the body is lying. Layers emerge as the body is broken down into 
parts. The body is topographical. Recumbent, it outlines gradient and contours that 
trace the form of the landscape. The jungle scene is no longer a two-dimensional 
painting but gains texture and thickness through the body. The mystery of Robin 
slowly dissipates as the topography drawn out by her posed body beckons a re-seeing 
of the body in place as a lived body in a world of textures.  
This deflection of existence to surrounding place is apparent the second time 
Felix encounters Robin. This time, she is “[r]emoved from her setting” and he is 
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much closer, walking “a little short of her” (44). Whilst the dense setting in the 
previous episode reflects Robin’s confusion, the “bare chilly gardens” divulge little of 
she who is no longer posed in place and observed from afar (44). The scene adopts a 
more familiar mode of characterisation:  
Her movements were slightly headlong and sideways; slow, clumsy 
and yet graceful, the ample gait of the night-watch. She wore no hat, 
and her pale head, with its short hair growing flat on the forehead 
made still narrower by the hanging curls almost on a level with the 
finely arched eyebrows, gave her the look of cherubs in Renaissance 
theatres; the eyeballs showing slightly rounded in profile, the temples 
low and square. (45) 
Robin’s movements and features are in focus. Like Felix, the reader is given a head-
on profile of Robin. One stands in close proximity to her and is given personal details 
that are absent in the previous scene. Yet, the overall profile, aside from unbridled 
contrasts (“headlong” and “sideways,” “clumsy” and “graceful”), is insipid and lacks 
the intensity of the Robin who first appeared in the jungle-room. Without place, 
without being emplaced, Robin is more removed from the narrative. Ironically, seeing 
the body from a distance, shaded and obscured, grants a more intimate access to 
Robin than being close beside her.  
Somewhere in the scene, as though conscious of the importance of place as an 
anchoring force, the narrative shifts from tracking Robin’s movements to positioning 
the body in place. At some point Robin is likened to “an old statue” that “symbolizes 
the weather through which it has endured” (45). The moving body is not actually 
posed, but the reference keeps her still and situates her in a different garden that is 
subjected to “the work of wind and rain and the herd of seasons” (45). A more ancient 
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and weathered garden, evidently not the Luxembourg, is called into the scene. An 
alternative image comes to mind, hinting of the primal garden with which Robin is 
first associated. The phrases (“the work of man,” “formed in man’s image”) laced 
with biblical undertones further accentuate the connection. Robin seems to be in 
another place. The text subtly invokes a more substantial narrative of place: the 
spatialised narrative place hampers direct contact with Robin but emplaces her such 
that she is more intimately perceived through place. A linear narrative of the body is 
supplanted by a narrative of its surroundings. It is as if the narrative reflexively directs 
attention to place so as to locate it. The body of Robin comes into existence only 
through its emplacement.  
Since both accounts of Robin, in the jungle-room and in the Luxembourg 
Gardens, are told from Felix’s point of view, it is his perception that has altered. No 
more trying to catch an up-close view of Robin, he now emplaces her, grasping her 
through the surrounding space. This way of seeing is counterintuitive. The shift in 
focus is also evident when Nora turns from seeing Robin, who is the primary object of 
her vision, to Jenny, who stumbles into her visual field. Instead of a tunnel vision of 
Robin, her perception widens; she sees past the object of her vision. The subject does 
not move but perception has shifted. Felix and Nora have re-orientated their gazes. 
The adjustment of perception is explicated in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of spatial 
vision, where to see something is to “take a certain hold upon it, to be able to follow 
on its surface a certain perceptual route” (POP 295). Felix’s eyes follow the space of 
the room; Nora’s are fixed on Jenny. As they follow these perceptual routes, their 
gazes “favour certain directions,” leading them to “the very significance of the object” 
(294). They learn to see the body in its place, to see where the body is not, spatialising 
and emplacing the body.  
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Negative Space 
The queer, lived body takes perceptual routes that diverge from heteronormative ways 
of seeing. In Nightwood the favoured perceptual route is a spatial one; it directs the 
eyes away from what is natural and positive to the negative. Nora sees Robin by way 
of a curious deflection; she looks away from Robin to better see her. Where the 
beloved is out of sight, the lover invokes her presence. Strangely enough, this kind of 
seeing brings the hidden, negative space into view and expands place. 
The positive comprises the things visible and in the foreground; the negative is 
the obscured surroundings. Though obscure, the negative is more than a background. 
It has, as Kern argues, a “positive, constitutive function”: “the background itself is a 
positive element, of equal importance with all others” (153). Kern’s proposition of the 
negative as equal runs the risk of supposing an equilibrium where things are stable. 
Also, whilst it draws out the hidden and relegated, there is unevenness resulting from 
the shift of focus. It is difficult to regard elements of the positive and negative as 
equal because from any given viewpoint, there surely exists a certain focus that blurs 
out others. A hierarchy of significance, of what is in and out of focus, always remains.  
What is important about the negative as a positive element is the raised 
awareness of the shifting nature of what is positive and negative, and of the flexibility 
of the hierarchy of their significance. Place cannot be in abeyance, comprising the 
background, for it is more invasive than elusive characters. Nightwood incessantly 
gives presence to the invisible, forbidden, and ambivalent through narratives of the 
negative. Narratives of the positive are constantly intercepted to the point that 
characters develop a reflex that brings negativity into perception. This reflex is 
indicative of a heightened sensitivity to place. Here I want to suggest that negativity is 
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restorative, that attention on the negative can reinstate agency and transgressive 
power that place potentially wields. 
A few things are needed to explain negativity before it is discussed in the 
context of the novel. Negativity, from the Latin negare, means the denial or 
displacement of something. To be of something implicates the presence of the 
negated. It intends the positive. The negative is not a spatial cue that directs to the 
positive; it is an equally important signifier. It is also a receptacle for meaning. On the 
relation between the positive and negative, Merleau-Ponty writes about a 
philosophical negativity that “remain[s] strictly opposed and strictly commingled” 
with positivity (TVTI 52). Being is intuitively associated with “absolute positivity,” 
stopping the consideration of anything outside the realm of what is visible and known 
(52). Such is experience that has been passed down and regarded as real. In order to 
“rediscover the prereflective zone of the openness upon Being,” one has to “empty” 
the self and “discover it as the ‘nothing,’ the ‘void,’ which has the capacity for 
receiving the plenitude of the world” (52). If we stop thinking of meaning as positive 
and turn to the negative, we open up other sets of meaning. Merleau-Ponty is correct 
to say that “everything depends on the strictness with which we will be able to think 
through the negative” (53). The more we experience the negative, the more we are 
“purified” from “designations” like the mind and Ego that keep us within the positive 
(52). Experience is not mediated, for the negative only leads the eyes along a different 
perceptual course. 
Nightwood reverses the order of perception. It draws out a spatial route that re-
arranges objects of vision. This is evident in the episode where Nora visits the Doctor 
in his house. Although the room is small and Nora instantly sees the Doctor who is 
right in the centre, she moves over the surroundings:    
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… she opened the door and for one second hesitated, so incredible was 
the disorder that met her eyes. The room was so small that it was just 
possible to walk sideways up to the bed; it was as if being condemned 
to the grave the doctor had decided to occupy it with the utmost 
abandon. 
 A pile of medical books, and volumes of a miscellaneous order, 
reached almost to the ceiling, water-stained and covered with dust. Just 
above them was a very small barred window, the only ventilation. On a 
maple dresser, certainly not of European make, lay a rusty pair of 
forceps, a broken scalpel, half a dozen odd instruments that she could 
not place, a catheter, some twenty perfume bottles, almost empty, 
pomades, creams, rouges, powder boxes and puffs. From the half-open 
drawers of this chiffonier hung laces, ribands, stockings, ladies' 
underclothing and an abdominal brace, which gave the impression that 
the feminine finery had suffered venery. A swill pail stood at the head 
of the bed, brimming with abominations. There was something 
appallingly degraded about the room, like the rooms in brothels, which 
give even the most innocent a sensation of having been accomplice; 
yet this room was also muscular, a cross between a chambre à coucher 
and a boxer's training camp. There is a certain belligerence in a room 
in which a woman has never set foot; every object seems to be battling 
its own compression—and there is a metallic odour, as of beaten iron 
in a smithy. 
 In the narrow iron bed, with its heavy and dirty linen sheets, lay the 
doctor in a woman's flannel nightgown. (84-85) 
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Like Felix in the jungle-room, Nora is overwhelmed by the surrounding objects. Her 
eyes are fixed on the negative; she is directed towards the various objects in the room. 
Instead of looking to the Doctor, Nora is more curious about the room and its details. 
She embarks on a perceptual route that turns away from the centre, as if deliberately 
looking away from the subject whom she is so anxious to find in the first place.  
 Despite the desperation, exacerbated by Nora’s urgent need for answers to 
Robin’s departure, the pace of the narrative is moderate, almost slow-moving as the 
room is carefully surveyed. Time seemingly stretches out and the sense of urgency 
dissipates. As Nora looks around the room, the narrative describes its appearance 
according to her gaze. Within the long sentences are short phrases that take inventory 
of objects, one by one, carefully documenting what she sees. The excessive commas 
retard the flow of the narrative, tracing Nora’s eye movement, as she slowly surveys 
the things on the dresser. Structurally, the punctuations separate the frames of the 
objects, distinguishing and highlighting each detail. Writing on vision and sexuality, 
Jean Gallagher analyses Nora’s view, describing it as “a photographic perception… 
reminiscent of one that accompanies the clicking of a camera’s shutter” (“Vision and 
Inversion” 290). As Nora’s eyes moves from one thing to another, she notes their 
existence in a perfunctory manner. Photographic perception suggests a detachment 
from the scene, with emphasis on the mechanics of perceiving and preserving 
impressions.  
 Nora’s perception is arguably more videographic in its compulsion to pan, to 
move in a particular direction, to capture a wide area. There is a flow in the way the 
room is described, “A pile of medical books… reached almost to the ceilings,” “Just 
above them was a very small barred window,” “On a maple dresser,” “A swill-pail 
stood at the head of the bed,” that emulates a continuity (85). The prepositions flesh 
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out spatial relations, moving the narrative from one point of the room to another. The 
videographic view of the room is telling of Nora’s want to give direction and organise 
the room, to make sense of the visual disorder, of what she cannot understand.  
 By focusing on the negative, the narrative of the Doctor is replaced with the 
narrative of his room. This inverts the trained eye’s order of perception. The Doctor 
is, in some sense, deprived of his significance and becomes, to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
own coinage, a “being-for-the-gaze” instead of a “being-for-the-thinking-subject” 
(POP 295). The shift occurs when the Doctor, who is initially Nora’s prime focus, 
ceases to become the main objective of the scene. Nora only meets him later in the 
narrative as she slowly surveys the room. When she does encounter him, he is 
described with reference to “the Red Riding Hood and the wolf in bed” (85). Nora 
stops thinking of the Doctor as a counselor and sees him in and through the disarrayed 
room. The focus on place, on that which is the background, changes how we view 
Nora’s experience and how we see the Doctor from being-for-the-thinking-subject to 
being-for-the-gaze.  
 Despite the detachment and apathy evoked by the tone of the narrative through 
the listing of objects (one that shows Nora’s distance from the Doctor who has been 
established as a being-for-the-gaze), Nora’s presence permeates the scene. She is 
excluded from and included in the narrative, her gaze still steering the narrative. The 
analysis of the room and how it is presented show Nora to be occupying a position 
somewhere between the first-person and third-person positions. Her rendering of 
place is up-close and self-excluding, personal and objective. The dual perspective 
allows Nora to see in two positions, from two distances. 
 Distance, to Merleau-Ponty, ensures a “privileged perspective [that] ensures the 
unity of the perceptual process” (POP 354). He explains, for maximum visibility, 
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“there is an optimum distance from which [every object] requires to be seen” (352). 
He expands on the method of determining this distance: 
This is obtained through a certain balance between the inner and outer 
horizon: a living body, seen at too close quarters, and divorced from 
any background against which it can stand out, is no longer a living 
body…. Again, seen from too great a distance, the body loses its living 
value, and is seen simply as a puppet or automaton. The living body 
itself appears when its microstructures is neither excessively nor 
insufficiently visible. (352)  
At its core, the argument promotes a balance achieved via a negotiation between near 
and far. Balanced perception offers clarity without scrutiny, respecting the inherent 
distance between body and object without excessive blurring. Merleau-Ponty likens 
its workings to that of the microscope where one analyses the specimen closely whilst 
maintaining a critical distance ensured by the lenses. Nightwood finely reproduces 
this balance in a literary context through Nora’s privileged perception that enables her 
to be at once involved and self-excluded. Through narrative strategies and language 
that are unlike Woolf’s free indirect discourse, the novel creates distance between the 
perceiver and the perceived, creating its own spatial perspective that embraces both 
the first and third-person positions. 
 Nora’s complicity in the description of the scene, though nuanced, is important 
because her fixation on the negative inclines the paragraphs towards a narrative of 
place. Her view of the scene reveals how the negative expresses on behalf of the 
positive and how the narrative of place prepares and provides for that of the body. 
Nora’s position, as the first and third-person, is revealed in the perceptual route about 
the room which unravels in two ways: firstly, through spatial cueing, which are 
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signals for actions that direct and organise the narrative according to what she sees; 
secondly, through spatial language, which concerns how she expresses space (via the 
omniscient narrator). At the beginning of the episode, Nora is miserable and calls on 
the Doctor at three in the morning. The anxiety and desperation that broke the sleep of 
the concierge permeates the first two paragraphs, but diminishes in the third as the 
scene is narrated in a more detached voice. On first reading, as the narrative names 
the items in the room, the long section seems to be a third-person narrative situation. 
Yet, the videographic gaze of the narrator leads from the books on the floor to the 
ceiling, to the window, the maple dresser, and finally the bed.  
 Although Nora’s eyes follow the mess of the room—“so incredible was the 
disorder that met her eyes”—the narrative gaze is continuous (84). This is due to the 
spatial cues that help join the fragments of the scene. Prepositions (“above,” “On a 
maple dresser,” “From the half-open drawers”) and verbs (“reached almost to the 
ceiling,” “stood at the head of the bed”) create and direct movement, also shaping and 
manipulating the reading experience. Place is not described from a wide perspective 
view from above, but more possibly seen through the eyes of Nora who stands at the 
door, confronting the claustrophobic room and its dishevelled dweller.  
 Movement is also propelled by listing, which consecutively brings one object 
after another into view as each one is named. Listing also directs us to the unveiled 
aspects of characters. In this instance, Nora’s list of things, which she picks out and 
arranges, amidst the disorder reveals much about the Doctor. The section begins with 
a sketchy account of medical equipment, probably because there are “half a dozen 
odd instruments that [Nora] could not place” (85). As the passage unfolds, the lack of 
precision is superseded by a confident identification of the variety of make-up and 
female clothing. The list grows more specific. Phrases are less tentative; parenthetical 
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descriptions are shortened, more precise: from the phrases, “a rusty pair of forceps,” 
“a dozen odd instruments,” to “pomades, creams, rouges, powder… chiffonier hung 
laces, ribands, stockings” (85). The overall shift in language and narrative mood 
suggests that whilst Nora is not the overt third-person narrator, her silenced presence 
is vocalised, her perception brought into view.  
 The list may appear objective, affirming a third-person narrative situation, but 
the objects and descriptions plot a narrative of place that is in keeping with Nora’s 
fixation on the negative. The argument that Nora reaches the Doctor through his 
possessions is crucial in mapping the spatial route which traces how the narrative of 
the body crosses over into place. Nora first glances at the medical books, then at the 
“rusty pair of forceps,” “a broken scalpel,” and the other instruments, before finally 
seeing the half-open drawers of ladies’ clothing and make-up (85). Her gaze actually 
traces the disintegration of the Doctor’s identity: from the façade of a man of 
medicine; to a doctor who is away from practice, rusty and broken; and finally, to a 
dolled up transvestite. The language is laced with irony that can only be appreciated 
by one who knows the Doctor’s double life. For instance, the “rusty pair of forceps,” 
“a broken scalpel,” “almost empty” perfume bottles, “an abdominal brace” take on a 
very different meaning when paired with details of the Doctor (85). His dubious 
medical credentials, camp and flamboyant mannerism, along with over-emotional 
ramblings, are dispersed in the banal objects lying around his room. Every object that 
“seems to be battling its own compression” is a reflection of the Doctor’s untamable 
ramblings (85). He is trapped in his own battles, imprisoned in a narrow room with a 
“barred window” and “iron bed” (85).  
 Listing objects may seem banal, but each object itself is symbolic. They are 
selected examples of the Doctor’s possessions, compiled into a list and arranged such 
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that the body can be seen in place. Discussing the use of examples, John Nash 
explains that whilst exemplification forms narratives, examples are not just 
“explanatory” but “carry a distinctiveness that propels narrative and opens it to 
multivocality” (“Exhibiting the Example” 3).58 With this in mind, examples or the 
things in the Doctor’s house take on a narrative of their own, describing place and 
revealing the perceptual route of Nora and her view of the Doctor. Whilst the things 
do not guarantee a more vivid picture of characters, the Doctor’s possessions viewed 
through Nora’s eyes construct an organised disorder that can be interpreted as “more 
coded exhibition than personal insight” (Nash 19). From a narratological standpoint, 
listing is a narrative move that, on the surface, works towards a straightforward 
presentation of things; but more critically, it works within the linear structure and 
paves gaps in the list that make space for the negative, for alterity and diversity. One 
is re-directed and exposed to the unexpected. Because re-orientation occurs gradually 
within the structure of the list, one progressively adapts to the subtleties and becomes 
sensitive to minute details of the big picture that are usually overlooked. In this case, 
attention is directed to the objects scattered across the room which collectively piece 
together a semblance of the Doctor.   
 The problem with listing, though, is the list lacks personal touch. The catalogue 
of nouns and long descriptions is neutral and impersonal, emerging from what seems 
to be an authorial rather than first-person or figural narrative situation. Still, if we 
examine carefully the adjectives in narrative, it is arguable, a faint tinge of Nora’s 
thoughts and feelings glosses over the list. The specificity of the things stands in 
contrast to the superfluity of the list. The descriptions, “a rusty pair of forceps” and “a 
broken scalpel,” point not only to the things themselves but also the state of the 
                                                
58 Nash’s discussion is specific to Woolf’s Jacob’s Room and Night and Day. 
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things. The parenthetical clauses, “certainly not of European make,” “almost empty,” 
are descriptive. The impersonal narrative is interjected by rather subjective opinions 
explaining the condition of things. The adjectives describe more vividly the Doctor’s 
living environment; more significantly, they add to and reflect the state of existing 
things, presenting a consistent image of the Doctor’s fall from grace.  
 As mentioned earlier, the descriptions take on deeper significance for one who 
knows the Doctor’s double life. It might be said that she is Nora; the descriptions are 
her addition to the list. Nora’s impressions and thoughts about the things disrupt the 
linearity of the list. “Rusty” and “broken” do not merely describe the state of the 
tools; they also imply that the things are once a significant part in the Doctor’s life. 
They point to a past that is not disclosed in the novel. Put differently, things have a 
temporality and context. The bottles that are “almost empty” are remnants of past 
actions; the “half-opened drawers” inform of unfinished actions. Though inanimate, 
their presence and state, alongside the somberness of the room, depict the conflict of 
the Doctor’s dual life. They reveal his “unobserved self,” the self that Felix describes 
as “a melancholy that had no beginning or end” (117).   
 Nora’s perspective embedded in the third-person narrative enlivens the narrative 
of place. The tactility and condition of things, also how Nora’s gaze progresses in the 
house, expand place without reimagining an abstracted version of space. The small 
room enlarges as the narrative presents the scene from an amalgamation of positions. 
Nora, as the first and third-person voices, opens up another dimension of meaning to 
the descriptions, one that embellishes her initial passing thought that “it was as if 
being condemned to the grave the doctor had decided to occupy [the room] with the 
utmost abandon” (84). The metaphor, “grave,” materialises in the form of the deathly 
jail-like room. Nora follows up with this image by turning away from the positive—
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the subject matter of the scene—and moves over to the physical place of the room. 
This particular spatial route that Nightwood traces for its characters is framed by the 
language and structure of the narrative. In this example, the Doctor is seen from two 
positions, through the third-person description of the things in his room as things in 
themselves, and also through the first-person narrative of the things for themselves. 
Together, they depict the Doctor’s physical mess and, on a deeper level, his identity 
flux, without having Nora directly confront the positive.  
 The play on narrative perspective, distance, and voice is overt in Nightwood. 
Nora’s thoughts woven into the third-person narrative is a variant of free indirect 
discourse, described by F. K. Stanzel as “namely the combination of the speech, the 
perception or the thought of a fictional character with the voice of the narrator as the 
teller” (A Theory of Narrative 219). This creates a “dual perspective” which involves 
“two persons with different points of view, opinions, judgements, and so on” (224). 
This mostly occurs in the third-person narrative but in the example above the third-
person voice is closely knotted with Nora’s consciousness. Whilst the passage is set in 
the style of a third-person narrative situation, the dual perspective is “between the 
narrating self and the experiencing self” (224). Nora’s thoughts (“a dozen odd 
instruments she could not place… which gave the impression that the feminine finery 
had suffered venery”) are so seamlessly weaved into the narrative that the narrating 
self somewhat fuses with third-person narrator (85). Stanzel explains that this manner 
in which thoughts are rendered “effect a narrowing of the focus of the presentation on 
the experiencing self in its Here and Now” (224). Whilst it does focus on the present 
moment in the Doctor’s room, thereby temporally limiting the experience, Nora’s 
experiencing self also spatially expands the boundaries of the small room. Looking up 
and down, around the room, her perception magnifies the situation, both physically 
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and narratively. The doubling effect, a result of distance and close proximity, brings 
us into the Doctor’s world. More importantly, it opens up a spatiality of the narrative 
according to Nora’s experience, corresponding to her visual field. Nightwood uses the 
formal structure of the text, perspectives and points of view, to build the architecture 
of the novel.59  
 The similarities between framing narratives and designing architectural forms 
have been discussed in notable texts like Susanne Langer’s Feeling and Form and 
Gèrard Genette’s Figures I-III, and Joseph A. Kestner’s The Spatiality of the Novel. 
Philosophies on form contribute to what Kestner terms, a “spatial methodology” (10), 
which recognises and works with the “spatial poetics” of the novel (11). Whilst this 
approach to interpreting texts begins with analysing the language of place and scene, 
its chief motive is to bring attention to spatial form. With its steely focus on spatial 
form, spatialist poetics walks the line between physical and novelistic space, looking 
at the potential of space rather than actual somatic experiences (69). It is not quite 
interested in why and how certain places are affective or what place may mean to 
characters. Whilst my discussion of place does not read the architecture of the novel 
as Kestner intends, the ways in which spatial poetics approaches fiction space and 
identifies spatial properties within its construction help make sense of Barnes’s 
challenging narrative. Reading formal structure as a sort of architectural construct 
adds a spatial dimension to the seemingly desultory and rambling conversations that 
form a significant part of the novel’s fragmented narratives.  
                                                
59 Theories on architecture and literature relate the novelistic structure to the architectural, noting how 
authors use geometry (lines, symmetry, points, and etc.) to frame narratives just like architects, 
painters, and sculptors.  
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What of the Night? 
Nora’s angst is diffused as she organises the messy room; Felix’s curiosity dampens 
as he tries to see past the verdure of plants; Jenny remains alone in her house of stolen 
goods and loves; the Doctor regresses into a mess, dilapidated as his room. Such are 
the effects of place. The physical structure and sense of place set the atmosphere. It is 
affective, evoking feelings and provoking responses. Place in Nightwood is hazy, of 
low visibility, minimally lit. It stirs up the darker and depressing side of characters, 
emphasises the destructiveness of their desires, and pronounces the inevitability of 
their unions. The night changes places and perception; things appear in literally a 
different light. Nightwood, with its rhetoric of the night, undercuts stability and 
questions what is normal. Seeing properly and mindfully, clearly and straightly, are 
practices of normativity that have been imbibed and regarded as the exemplar of 
perception. Nightwood forbids these taken for granted modes of experience, showing 
how reality can be fuzzy and inverted, confusing and slanted.  
Phenomenology is transcendental philosophy, which “puts essences back into 
existence” and “places in abeyance the assertions arising out of the natural attitude” 
(POP vii). Whilst Nightwood challenges the natural attitude and describes sense 
experience more holistically through the emphasis on place, it neither puts essence 
back into existence nor rebuilds the “primitive contact” with “the world which is 
always ‘already there’ before reflection begins” (POP vii). The world exposed in its 
narrative is not transcendental or abstract. It emerges when the power is out, when the 
sun goes down. In this world of the dark, visibility is impaired. Experience cannot be 
pure or knowledge-imparting; it also must not be remedied and altered in order to see 
the world as it should be. In Nightwood, disadvantage is manageable and embraced in 
the dark. Whilst phenomenology counteracts impediments to experience, I argue that 
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Nightwood’s embrace of the night is a kind of corrective to the fixity of Merleau-
Ponty’s postulated perception.  
Darkness in Nightwood is usually discussed in light of its queerness and 
spatiality. According to Brian Glavey, “[Barnes] seems to suggest that a spatial 
poetics might be well wrought without being well lit…. Nightwood is a work oddly 
dedicated to visibility” (“Dazzling Estrangement” 753). Visibility in relation to 
darkness is an idea picked up by Heather Love, who mildly suggests that the 
aesthetics of darkness share “an indeterminacy” with the queer (“Introduction: 
Modernism at Night” 747). She elaborates that queer modernism is “an encounter 
with the illegible”: “Queer lives and queer feelings scribbled over but still just 
visible—you can half make them out in the dark” (747). Gallagher also discusses 
about how the night is “a subject of anxious scrutiny,” illuminating “the anxiety-laden 
conditions of visibility for the newly emerging gender identities of the modernist 
period” (282). The night is explicated only by implication and in conjunction with the 
illegible and half visible, in other words, things of the unknown.  
For Glavey, Love, and Gallagher, Nightwood “offers a vocabulary for talking 
about queerness, modernism, and the aesthetic” (Glavey 751), where darkness, like 
the queer, is a “force of disruption” and has an “unlocatable quality” (Love 744). 
Such understandings deem the night almost transcendental, neglecting the very point 
of the night, which is, I believe, to bring to light the experience of the lived 
disadvantaged body. Nightwood does not attempt to create a new reality or hark back 
to a world that is already there. Rather, it uses the night to discover boundaries and 
disadvantageous circumstances, creating a scene for seeing in the dark that is not 
exclusive to the experience of the powerless body. Studies on Nightwood discuss 
poetic darkness and metaphorical invisibility, but do not explain the novel’s relentless 
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harping on the night and its darkness. The question asked at the outset remains. Why 
so bent on the night? To try to answer this, and also to round up the chapter, we 
follow Nora and bring questions about the night to the Doctor. Like her, we ask: 
Watchman, what of the night?  
 “Watchman, What of the Night?” and “Go Down, Matthew” are the longest 
chapters in the novel featuring conversations between Nora and the Doctor. They are 
also the most heavily cut sections, with portions that were edited out constituting the 
bulk of the discarded related drafts. Despite the edits, Barnes felt that all the changes 
made it “still more the Doctors and Noras book.”60 Interestingly, the titles correspond 
to the two main concerns raised in this chapter—the night and positionality. Whilst 
the latter has been expounded on, it is difficult to pin down what exactly is the night. 
It is literal darkness, the aura and atmosphere of place. It also sets the tone of scenes; 
it has its own language and poetics. The night is the theme, content, and form of the 
novel. On how the two chapters elucidate the night, Teresa de Lauretis writes:  
The fifth and seventh chapters, the longest in the book, each consists of 
a conversation between Matthew and Nora, although they are rather 
monologues than dialogues. It is tempting to read them as a kind of 
theoretical or philosophical core of the novel, for they are thematically 
focused on what Barnes calls “the night,” a figure for sexuality as a 
traumatic, unmanageable excess of affect leading to abject 
degradation. (“Nightwood and the ‘Terror of Uncertain Signs’” 120) 
For her, the night is a figurative representation of enigma and trauma: “I think the 
‘terror of uncertain signs’ that made Nightwood unreadable for me was the disturbing, 
spectral presence of something silent, uncanny, unrepresentable, and yet figured” 
                                                
60 From Barnes’s 28 June 1935 letter to Coleman (quoted in Plumb’s Introduction to Nightwood: The 
Original Version and Related Drafts, p. xiii).  
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(129). This uncertainty is precipitated by the darkness engulfing the novel. The 
garrulous Doctor, who supposedly has the answers, fails to clarify what exactly is the 
night. Instead of coming straight to the point of the night, he bursts into a digressive 
sermon that is, frankly, exasperating to listen. Yet this is not a deliberate excursus but 
an “unmanageable excess” (de Lauretis 120). He keeps exclaiming that he is coming 
to the night of nights, beseeching Nora to be patient and wait for him. His anxiety is 
plaited with excitement, as if he cannot help rambling on about the interminable night.  
  The Doctor’s obsession is established at the beginning: “his favourite topic, 
and one which he talked on whenever he had a chance was the night” (NW 86). He 
begins by talking about the “polarity of times and times” and immediately sets up a 
dichotomy between day and night: “Every day is thought upon and calculated, but the 
night is not premeditated” (87). Day is aligned with the Bible that “lies the one way”; 
the night is a “dark door” (87). Whilst the day is associated with the righteous, the 
night opens to a “Town of Darkness” (87). Taken further, the day represents the 
objective and straight, the law unbending, where “everything is thought upon and 
calculated” (87). It stands for the dominant ideology upholding social structure.  
In contrast, apprehension and uncertainty rule the dark. The night “does 
something to a person’s identity” and “his ‘identity’ is no longer his own” (87). It 
defamiliarises the ordinary. Even fear becomes “bottom-out and wrong side up” (87). 
An inversion takes place. It is repeated when the Doctor mentions a certain “Great 
Enigma” that can only be understood “unless you turn the head the other way, and 
come upon thinking with the eye that you fear, which is called the back of the head” 
(89). The night inverts the ways of seeing, turning against the trained eye. The 
difference in perception by day and night and the inversion that takes place are 
condensed into the Doctor’s questions for Nora:  
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‘Do things look in the ten and twelve of noon as they look in the dark? 
Is the hand, the face, the foot, the same face and hand and foot seen by 
the sun? For now the hand lies in a shadow; its beauties and its 
deformities are in a smoke—there is a sickle of doubt across the cheek 
bone thrown by the hat’s brim, so there is half a face to be peered back 
into speculation. A leaf of darkness has fallen under the chin and lies 
deep upon the arches of the eyes; the eyes themselves have changed 
their colour. The very mother’s head you swore by in the dock is a 
heavier head, crowned with ponderable hair.’ (92)   
He speaks of the veil of uncertainty that the night throws upon things. The body, as a 
whole, appears differently. It is different because it is clearer. Darkness does not 
obscure, only bringing out curves and protrusions.  
A cursory understanding of the night renders the act of seeing in the dark 
obfuscating, but meticulous attention to the language uncovers the surprising clarity 
brought by the night. In the passage cited, in spite of the tentative manner in which 
the body is described (“smoke,” “doubt,” “speculation”), there is precision and clarity 
in the language. For example, “doubt” denotes uncertainty, but its vagueness is 
counteracted by the phrase, “a sickle of doubt,” where the odd use of “sickle” implies 
sharpness and precision, invoking the image of a distinctly curved blade. This stylistic 
manoeuvre occurs again in the description of the “leaf of darkness” that “lies deep 
upon the arches of the eyes” (92). “Deep” suggests that the leaf is probably beyond 
sight, lost in the arches; it also indicates how deeply set the eyes are. Note that the 
sickle of doubt is cast “across the cheek bone” and the leaf is lost in the “arches,” both 
of which are contours of the face best highlighted with shades of dark and light tones. 
This points to the much-neglected fact that whilst the night questions the certainty of 
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things seen by day, it is not complete darkness but brings shades to what would 
otherwise be supposedly bright and clear. In her 23 June letter to Coleman, Barnes 
wrote that she liked Nightwood for the title because “it sound[s] like night-shade,” 
emphasising her penchant for shades of darkness.61 Having shades is the foremost 
quality of the night. Because the night encompasses shades of the dark, it makes use 
of light as well. In the presence of shadows and some dim light, things in the dark can 
be vaguely made out and seem familiar, though they appear different and new.  
The night does not change things; it presents them in a different light, leaving 
the perceiver with a vagueness that defamiliarises what is known and suspends natural 
beliefs. It functions somewhat like conditions of disability (for instance, a person with 
colour blindness or an anosognosic) that interrupt causal relations and reason, which 
indirectly cause phenomena to be perceived as organically as possible in the moment 
of experience. For Merleau-Ponty, the experience of a person with disability is a way 
of explaining how the disunity of bodily functions can thwart the workings of a priori 
sedimented experience.  
The trope of the night also works to challenge experience, except Nightwood 
does not present the night as a disability but as a naturally occurring situation. This 
puts disability into perspective, for it is not necessarily a condition from which some 
suffer. It certainly is not the same as being disadvantaged. It follows that if anyone 
can suffer from such disadvantage then by the same token, everyone possesses the 
propensity to see things in their givenness and not as they are known. The night 
provides that opportunity. One does not have to be disabled to be impervious to the 
ready-made world. The night can offer a scene to re-see the things that are deemed 
                                                
61 From Barnes’s letter to Coleman on the 23 June 1935, quoted in Plumb’s Introduction, p. viii.  
 Foo 160 
true and unquestionable by day. Nightwood reveals the night as not a handicap to 
visibility, but a visual aid that un-trains the eye.  
 The night tears down the world as it is known and shows the world as it is 
given. This is seen in the Doctor’s lament for the pariahs of the night: 
… those who turn the day into night, the young, the drug addict, the 
profligate, the drunken and that most miserable, the lover who watches 
all night long in fear and anguish. These can never again live the life of 
the day. When one meets them at high noon they give off, as if it were 
a protective emanation, something dark and muted. The light does not 
become them any longer. They begin to have an unrecorded look. 
(101) 
The entourage carries with them a “protective emanation” of the dark, which “turn[s] 
the day into night” (101). They effuse the aura of the night, preventing the light from 
becoming them. In other words, they do not have to conform to the day and what it 
presupposes. This “unseen adversary,” presumably the night, which deals “continual 
blows” to the miserable and broken, is not inflicting harm but is “protective” of them 
(101). Light thus has no effect on them; they refuse its enlightenment. It is noteworthy 
that the people of the night are marginalised, not disabled. Being marginalised, 
ironically, qualifies them for the night scene; their “unrecorded look” gives them the 
privilege of being nameless (101). The night reduces one to a state of anonymity, 
where ideally she forgets associations and knowledge in the temporal moment of 
experience. In doing so it empowers and sets the scene for somatic experience. The 
thinking body is reduced and gives way to the emplaced feeling and lived body.   
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In the concluding lines, the Doctor expresses what may be the ultimate affect 
and substance of the night. In a black wagon, going down under the trees quietly in 
darkness, he says to himself: 
The trees are better, and grass is better, and the animals are all right 
and the birds in the air are fine. And everything we do is decent when 
the mind begins to forget—the design of life; and good when we are 
forgotten—the design of death. (112) 
The environing world looks better when knowledge fails. The night compels the mind 
to forget what it has learned. Forgetting goes in line with perceiving: “To perceive is 
not to remember,” writes Merleau-Ponty (POP 26). By forgetting, one resists “a host 
of impressions accompanied by memories capable of clinching them” (26). It is good 
to be removed from the design that maps and organises experience. Even better is to 
be removed from the self that thinks before existence. The idea of giving in to the 
night and forgetting the design of life that presides over the day wrecks the unity of 
the thinking body and the objectivity of its sensibilities. This is not to put forward the 
night as the ideal scene for experience in opposition with the day. Rather, the night 
throws light on the problems of experiencing straightly and uprightly in the day.   
But darkness does not go easy on its prisoners. Addicted, forsaken, miserable, 
and in fear, the people of the cabalistic night are broken. The odd situation of being 
unfinished causes them to forget themselves and recklessly receive the world. Nora 
gives herself up for Robin; she lives by a “self-sacrificing devotion” that denies her 
own existence (Frank, The Widening Gyre 39). Jenny is forever removed and can 
never belong: “She has the strength of an incomplete accident—one is always waiting 
for the rest of it” (NW 105). Felix is a wandering Jew, the Doctor a transvestite. And 
Robin is the “innocent” (NW 155), who “has not reached the human state where moral 
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values become relevant” (Frank 34). The characters lack enlightenment in one way or 
another. They are fundamentally beings that put themselves out there in the working 
world, craving to experience other selves, the world and its places. 
The night scenes—we recall bent and posed bodies sustained by queer desire, 
consuming feelings, resistant to conformity—are painful to read. Experiencing in the 
dark is laborious and agonising, but it is the only way to bring up experiences of the 
disadvantaged without attributing difference to nature, causality, and disability. The 
night does not occur outside the ordinary and is part of the “taken-for-granted” 
schema of the world that Levesque-Lopman talks about (81). Nightwood uses what is 
familiar and seemingly inconspicuous to disorientate and challenge the trained eye 
and mind, bringing to light the fallibility of reality and the underlying constructivism 
of natural and normative beliefs. The world at night, with its uncertainty and freedom, 
offers anonymity and privacy, where the unspeakable and unpresentable—the queer 
folks—are visible and out in the open. Although they can “never again live the life of 
the day” and sit “sighing at the turnstile of heaven,” the queer continue to experience, 
to maintain contact with “the floor” which represents the tangibility of the material 
world (NW 101). This longingness to experience and cry out in spite of fear and 
melancholy is satisfied in the night, in ambivalent space. 
Nora’s parlour—a guesthouse for vagrants; Jenny’s inherited mansion—a 
museum cluttered with loot; and Felix’s house, built on spurious claims to aristocracy, 
are places of threshold. They negotiate the irreconcilable and make space for co-
existence. The Doctor comments on one such place: “Look for the girls also in the 
toilets at night, and you will find them kneeling in that great secret confessional 
crying between tongues” (101-102). The toilet, secret and liminal, is an exclusive 
place for women built within the public sphere, providing some privacy for her to 
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hide away and cry. The next chapter on Rhys’s Good Morning, Midnight discusses 
women’s experiences in such spaces, where experience can be many and fixed at the 
same time, simultaneous and not successive, limiting but not oppressive. Following 
the Doctor’s advice, we will look for girls in toilets, or lavabos as Rhys calls them, 
and examine their experiences of liminal places. It is in the toilet and hotel rooms 
where we find the women of Rhys’s texts re-experiencing places of their past.  
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4. A Room of Her Past: Jean Rhys’s Good Morning, Midnight 
In Nightwood, the night obscures vision and brings to light other ways of seeing. In 
Jean Rhys’s Good Morning, Midnight, darkness comes in the shade of the past. It 
shrouds the cities of London and Paris, obscuring vision and blurring the boundary 
between past and present. The world presented is dark and macabre, inhospitable to 
the lone woman. Published in 1939, Good Morning, Midnight was Rhys’s worst 
received novel since Quartet. Lillian Pizzichini, author of Rhys’s biography The Blue 
Hour, writes, “No one wanted to read it…. Jean’s dark vision was too much for her 
contemporaries” (220). The story of the aged and lone Sasha Jenson, it is true, is 
depressing to read. The setting is just as dismal. Descriptions of rooms are stale, 
almost repetitive. Ergo a room is always the same room…. 
In Good Morning, Midnight, former experiences of rooms are revived and re-
explored in present rooms. The past in context is not thought. It does not clarify the 
ambiguities of the present, or serve as a priori knowledge. Rhys presents a subjective 
past that neither repeats nor represents events, disrupting the perpetuation of certain 
knowledge. Rather, in the Platonic sense, the past manifests in the consequential 
reappearance of the absent, of an event, for example, that has happened and haunts the 
individual, reappearing as an image or scene in the present, which is the result of a 
complex mix of memory and imagination. The past, in the form of memory, to use 
Paul Ricoeur’s words, is “a simple presence to the mind” (Memory, History, 
Forgetting 17). It is an integral part of Sasha’s consciousness that evokes “pathos,” or 
“affection” each time she recalls something (26).62 It inhabits her perception, creating 
as a Lockean store-house of ideas, except hers is not an inventory of mental notes of a 
                                                
62 Ricoeur differentiates memory as evocation from search: the first is affection and the latter a “search 
or recall” (26). In Good Morning, Midnight, the distinction is seldom clear, and at times the 
embodiment of the past is a combination of Ricoeur’s opposites.  
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contemplative past, but of lived experiences. The past as a continuing presence in the 
present is formative to consciousness, providing a useful additive to a 
phenomenological understanding of the past or neglect of the past. 
The past has hitherto not been discussed with regards to phenomenology for 
the simple reason that Merleau-Ponty has little to say explicitly about it. When it is 
mentioned, it is lost in the gossamer web of arguments about history or treated as 
“previous memories” (POP 17). This is perhaps because the past, if it is not in the 
form of memory, does not quite exist for Merleau-Ponty. He writes, 
Our individual past, for example, cannot be given to us either on the 
one hand by the actual survival of states of consciousness or paths 
traced in the brain, or on the other hand by a consciousness of the past 
which constitutes it and immediately arrives at it: in either case we 
should lack any sense of the past, for the past would, strictly speaking, 
be present. If anything of the past is to exist for us, it can be only in an 
ambiguous presence, anterior to any express evocation, like a field 
upon which we have an opening. (POP 424) 
It seems the past cannot be brought to the present by a consciousness of the past for 
such a consciousness does not exist. If consciousness-of-something indicates 
intentionality, thus a consciousness of the past directs one towards the past, then a 
consciousness of the past cannot exist because it does not point backwards to the past, 
or frame the past as “an object of thought” for the present (424). Rather one would be 
immersed in an “atmosphere” of the past, where the past is “ubiquitous” and present 
(424). And, if we were to step into this field of unreflective possibilities, where its 
opening closes on itself, we are surely trapped in the past. It is as if the past, a realm 
of potential and possibilities, is within close proximity but inaccessible. 
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Carman, too, sees the past as “forever beneath and beyond the limits of… 
immediate experience” (Merleau-Ponty 156). It cannot be apprehended by a present 
consciousness of the past because that would make it present. To Merleau-Ponty, 
there can be no graspable past, or if at all, only a vague sense of it. Two assumptions 
underpin his deliberation: firstly, the consciousness of the past directs attention to the 
past and “immediately arrives at it”; secondly, the past invoked is supplanted by the 
present (POP 424). Time is rendered asynchronous and linear. There is no room for a 
consciousness that holds experience at the threshold of the past and present. What we 
need is another means of access. What I am suggesting is to think of the past with a 
different kind of mindfulness where the object of focus is place. The idea is to get to 
the subjective past through a spatial consciousness that has been set by past 
experiences in and of places.  
Created through narratives of places with spatial vocabulary highlighting 
objects, furniture, orientations, directions, interior and exterior arrangements, spatial 
consciousness might be the panacea for phenomenology’s problems of the past as 
knowledge. It is a literary imperative that reads past experiences as embodied and 
emplaced, working out ways to talk about the subjective past as inhabiting and 
necessary. In Good Morning, Midnight, the narrative of place is the narrative of the 
past, given that Sasha’s experience of places is connected to her resistance to and/or 
acceptance of things and events from her past. She walks into new rooms and they are 
familiar; she revisits rooms from her past and they are somehow strange. Hers is not a 
consciousness of the past, but a consciousness of place.  
This chapter develops the idea of spatial consciousness and shows how the 
past is enacted in a structure of spatiality that relieves it of trauma. In present rooms 
Sasha inhabits the room of her past without the pains of re-living the trauma again. It 
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is a way of experience that helps the lone woman organise the discrepancies and/or 
similarities between what she sees and what she once saw. The chapter examines the 
elephant in the rooms of Good Morning, Midnight: the past. It shows how Sasha’s 
habit of structuring thought around spatiality acts out the past in the present, creating 
experience that is reflecting and exploratory. The discussion then moves on to the 
workings of spatial consciousness—how it recuperates oppositions like the interior 
and exterior, past and present, private and public, bringing together a plethora of 
familiar and unfamiliar images. In Good Morning, Midnight, the past and place are 
the verso and recto of spatial consciousness. They form the lens through which Sasha 
experiences rooms.  
 
Contextualising Rhysian Place 
A decade after the publication of A Room of One’s Own (1928), “this business of 
rooms” was still a matter of concern in Rhys’s writing (GMM 33). In spite of political 
and social improvements, many women struggled to find a place of their own. The 
1920s was a transformative period for women. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) 
Act (1919), Matrimonial Causes Act (1923), and Equal Franchise Act (1928) were 
some changes in social justice that helped achieve more or less equal political and 
social rights for women. In 1929, thousands of women in England participated in their 
first general election, or the Flapper election. Small wonder, by the 1930s, more than 
a third of the women population were employed. Still, notwithstanding access to job 
opportunities and greater public presence, the condition of many women did not 
improve. Even with a weekly allowance of £2 10s and many accommodating hotel 
rooms in the late 1930s, Sasha Jenson never has a place of her own.  
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Sasha moves from room to room; she is neither satisfied nor feels as if she 
belongs. Hotel rooms are claustrophobic and haunting, whilst cafés and boulevards 
are less than welcoming. Rhys is wont to create places that lack transgressive 
potential, where the glimmer of hope for change wanes. The house on Green Street is 
“dark and quiet and not friendly to me,” laments Anna Morgan in Voyage in the Dark 
(49); the cafés in Paris shone lights that “were hard and cold, like ice” on Julia Martin 
in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie (16); the Boulevard St Michel “with its rows of 
glaring cafés” deters Marya Zelli in Quartet (67). Rhysian place, unlike Woolf’s 
spirited London, is place unabashedly tied to the women’s sufferings and backstories. 
The opening line of Good Morning, Midnight reads, “‘Quite like old times,’ the room 
says. ‘Yes? No?’” (9). Place literally divulges Sasha’s unknown past—she must have 
been in a similar room before. The measure of rooms is her feelings and thoughts 
towards it. One moment Sasha snuggles under the covers of the blanket and the next 
instant the room transforms into a past-laden room reminding her of “all the rooms” 
and “all the streets” in which she has ever lived or walked (91). The narrative of place, 
especially in Good Morning, Midnight, is personal and of the past.  
In her unfinished posthumous autobiography, Smile Please, Rhys relates place 
to the past. She remembers leaving Dominica: 
[My father] came with my aunt and myself as far as Bridgetown, 
Barbados, where we caught the ocean boat. When we said goodbye, he 
hugged me tightly but I said: ‘Goodbye, goodbye’ very cheerfully, for 
already I was on my way to England…. Already all my childhood, the 
West Indies, my father and mother had been left behind; I was 
forgetting them. They were the past. (93-94) 
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Rhys’s documenting of places is telling. She is specific about the departure point: a 
sub-clause informs that Bridgetown is in Barbados, and as she boards the boat and 
looks back, she bids farewell to the entire West Indies. Here place is more than a port 
or a town. The shores of Bridgetown stand for the entire Caribbean region, more 
saliently, for Rhys’s life and everything she has. She writes on departure again when 
she recalls leaving England, associating London with her dismayed past: “I knelt 
down and thanked God for getting me away from H. E. & W. Graves and from 
London” (141). During her time in London, Lancelot Grey Hugh Smith, a previous 
lover, regularly sent cheques to her via his solicitors at H. E. & W. Graves.63 Leaving 
London meant she could get away from the torrid affair which left her disillusioned 
and lost. Disappointment and humiliation were etched into the city of London. As 
with leaving Dominica, Rhys left behind London, Lancelot, lost love, and hope. She 
was forgetting the past. Places exist for Rhys as physical structures of the past. In her 
fiction, places are also spatial manifestations of her characters’ inner lives. 
Another writer whose narrative of place tends towards the qualities evoked by 
Rhysian place is Katherine Mansfield. Brought up in New Zealand, which was then 
under colonial rule, Mansfield wrote short stories that sometimes share a similar sense 
of dislocation. Her travels about continental Europe and moves between London and 
New Zealand parallel Rhys’s turbulent journeys. Both writers were alienated from the 
cultures of their birth countries and dislocation is a recurring theme in their oeuvres. 
Mansfield’s “The Swing of the Pendulum” (1911), which is about a destitute woman 
living in a rented room who encounters a strange man who forces himself on her for 
money, is reminiscent of Good Morning, Midnight’s denouement. Like Sasha, Viola 
                                                
63 Pizzichini notes that when Rhys received the first of a series of cheques she was “hurt and angry by 
Lancey’s display of careless wealth and would have torn the cheque in two and send it back to the 
lawyer” if not for the exact moment that “her rent was due” (113).  
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is a self-proclaimed pacifist: “I never wanted to fight” (781). But whilst Rhys’s 
protagonist is nonresistant till the end, Mansfield’s retaliates and wins her first fight. 
Still, the predicaments of women in stories like “Life of Ma Parker” and “Miss Brill,” 
both published in 1922, echo the displacement of Rhys’s women. These parallels, 
explored later in this chapter, resonate more significantly given both authors’ status as 
outsiders and their straitened circumstances.64  
  On the relation between self and place, or the lack of self and placelessness, 
Kerry Johnson states, “‘woman’ and ‘landscape’ cannot be disengaged from one 
another” (“Mapping the Sea Change” 58). Through a mainly post-colonial viewpoint, 
Johnson argues that spatial representation in Rhys’s work is contingent on the female 
character’s fractured identities. Place is unwelcoming because the colonial subject is 
displaced. Andrew Thacker attributes the “rather negative representational spaces of 
the city” to European Imperialism and Rhys’s identity as a Creole woman exiled from 
Dominica and marginalised in England and Paris (Moving Through Modernity 194). 
Snaith, too, emphasises “the single colonial woman” (“‘A Savage from the Cannibal 
islands’: Jean Rhys and London” 76). Johnson, Snaith, and Thacker and are not alone 
in their post-colonial reading.    
With the success of Wide Sargasso Sea, Rhysian scholarship is caught in the 
undertow of identity and racial-related readings. Critics ascribe intention for writing 
to “political and economical identity, driven by the history of white racism” (Savory, 
Jean Rhys 134), and “the remembrance of a lost Creole or Caribbean past” (GoGwilt, 
The Passage of Literature 85). Mary Lou Emery goes so far as to say, “Viewing Rhys 
as a Third World writer as well as a woman in exile in Paris helps us to understand 
                                                
64 This is not to label them as post-colonial writers, but to recognise that their experiences of 
Imperialism have influence on the portrayals of women living in Western metropolises.  
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better her outsider status there” (Jean Rhys at “World End” 9). Interweaving fiction 
with autobiographical material is an undertaking incidentally endorsed by Rhys in an 
interview with Mary Cantwell: “Whenever I asked about one of them—Jean Rhys’ 
women they’ve been called—she replied with ‘I’” (“A Conversation with Jean Rhys” 
23). Studying Rhys’s works as post-colonial and autobiographical is important and 
contextualises the experience of dislocation. But a phenomenological reading can 
deepen the understanding of how subjective experience is situated experience, tied to 
and shaped by the material, working world. It adds a layer of personal interpretation 
and subjective difference to those wider ideological movements.  
Post-colonial readings of Rhys tend to interpret the narrative of place to be 
political where “intimate space merges into national space” (Thacker 206). Many 
discussions of spatial arrangement start from the assumption of Rhys’s awareness of 
“the slipperiness of geographical, national and racist boundaries in the region given its 
conflicted history” (Snaith 78). Dwelling on authorial biography and the political and 
socio-cultural milieu of the time give historical processes authority and locate textual 
significance in a certain past. Phenomenology, however, approaches history quite 
differently. It sees the past as that towards which the body is directed, not originating 
from. It refrains from looking at the past with the events of history in mind, instead 
recasting the past in present perception. This way phenomenology allows for a more 
open-ended reading of Rhys’s text, with Sasha’s experience and evasions of the lived 
world at the forefront.  
 
A Radical Reflection on Good Morning, Midnight 
Good Morning, Midnight is a novel about Sasha’s experience of the present just as it 
is about her reflection on the past. She has learned from past experiences that certain 
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places are to be avoided whilst others frequented. Sasha thinks of places to go and not 
go: “avoidance of certain cafés, of certain streets, of certain spots, and everything will 
go off beautifully” (GMM 14). But her attempts at rational determinism almost always 
go awry. Instead of bypassing places of yesteryear, sticking to the itinerary of “Eating. 
A movie. Eating again. One drink. A long walk back to the hotel. Bed. Luminal. Sleep” 
(14), Sasha finds herself re-entering the sites of her past. The novel documents her 
journeys in and out of places that trigger or suppress her memory of the past. In Good 
Morning, Midnight, past and present coincide, reflection and experience intersect, 
thinking and seeing happen concurrently. In the last pages, Sasha laments: “I am 
uneasy, half of myself somewhere else” (148). She is, I argue, always half in the 
present and half in the past, half-perceiving and half-thinking, wandering present 
places and wondering about past rooms. Phenomenologically speaking, this makes 
Sasha a reminiscing subject or a thinking body, her experience of the present thought-
out before the moment of experience.  
We confront once again the mind-body dualism where thinking is the will of 
the mind and seeing is a bodily act of that will. Knowledge and the past are sediments 
that intercept primary contact with the world. They are kinds of thought, of a priori 
knowledge and pre-history. Alcoff explains on how thought puts Man at the centre of 
the universe: “Man organizes and shapes his world, conferring on it meaning and 
intelligibility, and thus man is constitutive for all knowledge” (40). Man is 
aggrandised and assumes absolute knowledge and objectivity. An expositor of 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, Albert Rabil, Jr., highlights the “appeal to an absolute”: 
“the thinker is an observer of a world from which he can remove himself” (Merleau-
Ponty 19). The problem of thought arises when it is automatically equated with 
knowledge. Alcoff and Rabil recapitulate the longstanding idea in Cartesian tradition 
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that man with his all-knowing mind is the centre around which the world revolves. 
The phenomenologists believed in a different world, a lived world which, according 
to Merleau-Ponty, 
is there before any possible analysis of mine, and it would be artificial 
to make it the outcome of a series of syntheses which link, in the first 
place sensations, then aspects of the object correspondingly to different 
perspectives, when both are nothing but products of analysis. (POP x-
xi) 
Phenomenology’s problem with the Cartesian tradition is the supremacy of reason: 
“there is no thought that embraces all our thought” (xv). To reason is human, but to 
claim reason as knowledge is to return to cogito, ergo sum.  
The resolution is to situate thought in the lived body, within a corporeal 
structure of subjectivity. To subsume thought into the lived experience, Merleau-
Ponty suggests that we think of knowledge not as an absolute preexisting substance 
that determines experience, but rather he admits “provisionally that there is a merely 
possible stuff of knowledge” (281). Possibilities become meaningful only when 
realised in relation to the body. The stuff of knowledge, in the hands of rationalists 
and empiricists, is knowledge that is single and absolute. But to the phenomenologist, 
it is a product of “thinking, judging, believing, remembering, imagining, expecting” 
which are all processes ultimately “anchored in the body and so bear traces, if only 
faint ones, of the situatedness of perception” (Carman, Merleau-Ponty 13). From this 
perspective, knowledge serves as another subjective but non-perceptual way by which 
the visual field can be understood. It is therefore not that the Cartesian thinking 
subject knows before his material existence, but that the lived body situated in a 
material world begins to think and remember things from its position in the world. 
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Thought, like any a priori stuff, is the bête noire of phenomenology because it does 
not acknowledge perspectivism as situated but assumes sovereignty and truth over 
experience. Should reflection and thought processes be anchored as bodily 
phenomena in the lived body in a material world, experience becomes at once 
reflecting and exploratory. 
The word, “reflect,” connotes the dual action of looking back to something 
past and also looking away from what is going on. According to Merleau-Ponty, 
reflecting involves “distancing or objectifying sensation” (such that it is diluted of 
plausible associations), and confronting it (POP 280). It is an intellectual activity that 
analyses sensations. Such reflection is tantamount to “a theoretical version of 
experience” and “should not be given any first-hand value” (280). There is another 
kind of reflection that can add to our understanding of experience, provided the 
“primary faith inspired by perception” (faith being the synthesis of data and 
preconceived structures of data) is discounted (280). This is “a new type of reflection,” 
where at the outset of perception nothing in the visual field is “thematized” or 
“posited” (281). Merleau-Ponty postulates a radical reflection, which, unlike other 
reflections, does not ascertain preconceived knowledge but strives towards 
discovering oneself :65  
The task of a radical reflection, the kind that aims at self-comprehension, 
consists, paradoxically enough, in recovering the unreflective experience of 
the world, and subsequently reassigning to it the verificatory attitude and 
reflective operations, and displaying reflection as one possibility of my being. 
(280)    
                                                
65 According to Merleau-Ponty, genuine reflection, which recognises that “expressive experience” and 
“expressive significance” are anterior to “sign significance” and assigning meaning, comes close to 
radical reflection (POP 340). This is contrasted with analytic reflection, which “does away” with the 
“relationship of the subject and the world” (340). 
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Radical reflection involves encountering phenomena as they are in the world. One 
reflects on them so as to arrive at an understanding of the world not as a singular truth, 
but as meaning in relation to the body. Instead of wondering about what appears 
before the eyes and what sensations are provoked by sight, it asks “What am I really 
seeing?” The lynchpin of radical reflection is the suspension of “vital communication” 
between acts of perception and analysis (281). This does not promise to get rid of 
synthesis and knowledge, but to “at least limit [the communication], by concentrating 
our gaze on part of the spectacle and devoting the whole of the perception field to it” 
(281). To radically reflect, Merleau-Ponty instructs, “we must keep in mind the 
moments of our exploratory journey and relate the points on the surface to each other” 
(281). We relate moments; we do not rationalise them. This makes room for reason 
without presuming that “the determinate forms reached through the critical attitude 
are actually the primordial experience” (281).  
To radically reflect is to see with our eyes and also the mind’s eye, along with 
their blind spots. Merleau-Ponty explains, 
 [the] mind’s eye too has its blind spot, but, because it is of the mind, 
cannot be unaware of it, nor treat as a simple state of non-vision, which 
requires no particular mention, the very act of reflection which is 
quoad nos [in relation to us] its act of birth. (TVTI 33) 
With our eyes, we see freely; with the mind’s eye, we, perforce, have to think before 
seeing. The mechanics of a radical reflection founded on an unreflective fund of 
experience and matures upon intersecting with a reflective attitude are, admittedly, 
paradoxical. Reflection is a two-stage process of recovering and reassigning. A way 
to approach the workings of the eyes and the mind’s eye is to examine the interplay of 
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reflection and experience, past and present, re-living and living, which is a pattern 
manifested and repeated in Good Morning, Midnight.  
An episode that illustrates the dual process of reflection and experience 
transpires in the Pecanelli bar. When Sasha decides to visit the bar, she rationalises, “I 
don’t see why I shouldn’t revisit it. I have never made scenes there, collapsed, cried—
so far as I know I have a perfectly clean slate” (34). She thinks for a moment and 
concludes that her memory of the bar is pleasant: “We used to go about there…. 
Nothing to cry about” (34). She searches for impressions of time spent in the bar to 
justify her “perfectly clean slate” (34). With the mind’s assurance, she walks in only 
to find an empty room and a new proprietor. The site of pleasant memories—she 
remembers spending time with a certain boy in the bar—suddenly transforms into a 
foreign place with exotic pictures on the walls and puzzled patrons staring at her. Her 
plan to ensure no aimless wandering falls apart and she becomes the “mad old 
Englishwoman, wandering around Montparnasse” (36). The scene, worse than she 
thought, reminds her of another time when things were also worse than imagined. Her 
mind brings up images of London where she returned after attempting to drown 
herself. She replays her family’s cruel admonishment: “We consider you as dead. 
Why didn’t you make a hole in the water? Why didn’t you drown yourself in the 
Seine?” (36). The rejection, which initiated her life of hotel hopping, drinking and 
crying, returns and hits Sasha once again as she stands in the Pecanelli now, alone, 
with no one to turn to, no place to go.  
The memory of London leads to the final thoughts on her circumstances which 
come to her as she is distracted by the difficult menu. The old menu is replaced by 
Javanese cuisine; the unfamiliar words throw her off. Sasha has to read it over and 
over again. The uneasy thoughts about her past commingle with the discomfort of 
 Foo 177 
viewing the foreign menu. Here what the mind sees conflates with the menu before 
Sasha’s eyes. This is furthered when Sasha is drawn to the back of the menu covered 
with sketches of little women and the words, “Send more money, send more money,” 
written all over (38). They remind Sasha of her own poverty, how she used to send 
telegraphs for her £2 10s.  
Analysing the menu as a narrative of social suffering, Andrea Zemgulys gives 
her interpretation of the scribblings: 
Used either to teach an English phrase to a dinner companion who will 
be ordering a telegram in Paris or to write out the worrying thoughts of 
an English speaker who will order a telegram on his or her own behalf, 
the menu documents a desperate situation—that of a person pleading 
for money in a strange city through complicated channels of language 
and technology. (“Menu, Memento, Souvenir” 31)  
The scribblings of situations mirror Sasha’s plight as she too awaits her inheritance 
money and struggles in a foreign city. Her struggle is laid out on the menu: its exotic 
cuisine alienates her and the scribblings draw her circumstance. As she browses the 
menu, she is reminded of her past. Her memory of London unfolds whilst she reads 
the menu: “All this time I am reading the menu over and over again” (38). Sasha’s 
recollection of receiving “a solicitor’s letter every Tuesday containing £2 10s. 0d” is 
arguably provoked by the scribblings on the menu (36). Here remembering and 
thinking are processes anchored in the body as Sasha sits in the Pecanelli and tries to 
read the menu. The menu provides new data for experience which only comes into 
full significance when her exploration of the menu meets up with points in her 
memory. The different moments of reading the menu—looking at the Spécialités 
Javanaises and seeing the sketches—are points in her exploratory experience that 
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reflect her position as a lone, impoverished stranger in Paris. They become significant 
when read in relation to the reflection of her past, a connection bridged by Sasha 
when she picks up a pen and writes, “I hope you got that. Yes, I got it” (38). Not only 
does she align herself with the women that came before her—they all have “no pride, 
no name, no face, no country” (38)—she also brings that part of herself, which exists 
in the past as evoked in the memory, into the present.  
As Sasha faces the scribbles on the menu, she envisions herself like the other 
women sitting in cafés requesting money. When she responds in writing, she too 
participates in the practice of sending telegrams. In that moment, the past and present, 
the women and Sasha, seem to shore in the same temporal and spatial setting. The 
request, “Send more money,” is conjugated in the simple present tense to either imply 
the repeated nature of the action or its scheduled occurrence in the near future. Either 
way, it is not bounded by time and its repetition brings the scenes of women sketching 
on the menu to the present. More significantly, Sasha perpetuates the collection of 
images by envisioning the telegraph-wires buzzing. The shift from simple present to 
the present continuous tense makes the action continuous, as if the requests or plights 
of these desperate women have not ceased. The sketches set the scene of women 
sending telegrams, which is in turn reified by Sasha in the first-person: “I think of all 
the telegraph-wires buzzing” (38). This is finally affirmed by the third-person 
narratorial voice, as if reiterating the prevalence and ongoing nature of such a scene. 
It is not just the women who were sending telegrams, but Sasha too is sending them. 
Telegraph-wires, buzzing incessantly, connecting the past and present, hover over the 
women.  
What is Sasha seeing? Is it herself or the women? I think she sees both. The 
penning of an answer confirms her identification and indicates detachment. Zemgulys 
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writes that Sasha’s reply implies “that such telegrams are futile, that the only thing 
that will be ‘got’ is the message and not ‘more money’” (31). Whilst Sasha is like the 
women, she is apart from them because she realises the senselessness of the requests. 
Zemgulys contends that although Sasha does recognise “the urgent situation,” she 
“mockingly relates to the menu’s impoverished predecessor and finds amusement to 
the futility of their urgent pleas” (31). Whilst this reading is compelling, Sasha’s 
amusement also hints of a perverse stoical resignation consistent with her self-
deprecation. Despite how her past has benumbed her and after countless rejections 
have left her shamed, Sasha, like the women, continues to ask for money. The key 
phrase, “In spite of everything,” is ambivalent, though in context “everything” could 
mean all the sufferings and poverty, failed requests and rejections, that the women 
have been through (38). It is amusing to Sasha that the telegraph wires still buzz, that 
she still sends for money, in spite of everything. Contrary to Zemgulys’s argument 
that Sasha “enjoy[s] her flush present in contrast to another’s desperate one” (31), she 
in fact mocks her own resilience and shamelessness.  
The amusement does not demand pity. Contrasted with the confessional 
account of her past in the previous section, her response does not invite empathy. 
Sasha sees herself in the scribblings but does not mull over it. She is detached, re-
visiting the past without re-living the pain. Her experience in the Pecanelli is a mix of 
reflecting and seeing, directing Sasha towards a self-comprehension in which 
destitution and melancholy are treated and understood without being caught in the 
riptide of emotions. Her past experience shows her as desperate and afflicted, but the 
present experience proves she is long-suffering. Zemgulys summarises Sasha’s 
predicament: like the young poor women, she is “desperate but not pathetic, one 
demanding our recognition but not our pity” (35). Rhys’s method of interposing 
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reflection and experience makes one think and see as Sasha weaves in and out of the 
past and present. Non-vision of the past is facilitated by vision of the present; blind 
spots of the mind are looked at again through thoughts anchored in the body. In the 
Pecanelli scene, non-vision and vision, reflection and exploration come together. The 
stuff of knowledge, to use Merleau-Ponty’s words, which is present in the past, is not 
truth but provisional possibilities that become significant when we see Sasha situated 
in the Pecanelli, in the liminal space of her past and present, memory and experience. 
 
Between Seeing and Thinking 
The interpenetration of the past and present enlarges the scope of perception, bridging 
seeing and thinking, suggesting that the processes may not be as mutually exclusive 
as we think. To recapitulate, perception involves the lived body inhabiting and 
beholding the lived world and then organising its data as they are presented. To 
perceive is to be in the world and behold it in its finitude as immediately as possible 
as it appears before the body in a given locale. The trouble with this is it precludes the 
past from what is seen. Also troubling is how perception assumes “a sedimentation 
from the past,” as though the past is the fount of all hindrances to experience (Rabil, 
Jr. 19). In any case, the past cannot appear as a given in the present scene because it 
has passed and is therefore absent. Any hint of its presence is ambivalent.  
In addition to the list of troubles is the faint air of passivity surrounding 
perceptual experience. Picture the seer looking at and receiving visual data before 
analysis and reflection take place. The body is oriented towards one object; but aside 
from the intentionality presupposed in the orientation, the act of receiving before 
organising occurs is, to some extent, passive. She is an observer of the lived world, 
not a participant. This is where phenomenology dispels the illusion of observing, 
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exposing passivity by roiling the sediments of experience. Its rigorous exfoliation 
abrades subjective experience in pursuance of an originary and immediate connection 
with phenomena. Yet being in the world means experience is coloured by thought and 
the primacy of contact is compromised. For the project of a phenomenology of place 
with emphasis on women’s experience, it is important to situate thought bodily and 
spatially so that thinking works compatibly with seeing. This calls for a rethinking of 
what it means to perceive such that experience is both subjective and originary.    
The act of seeing is invariably tied to visibility. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, this has political implications because the invisible include the socially 
marginalised and taboos (such as prostitution and homosexuality) that are usually kept 
out of sight so as to maintain order. Examining how experience transits from invisible 
to visible and the political possibilities of this change, Joan W. Scott views visibility 
as “literal transparency” where becoming visible through seeing “breaks the silence… 
challenges prevailing notions, and opens new possibilities for everyone” (“Experience” 
23).66 Seeing is epistemological: “Knowledge is gained through vision; vision is a 
direct, unmediated apprehension of a world of transparent objects” (23). The choice 
of word, “knowledge,” is intentional. Noting that vision is the “evidence of 
experience” (24), Scott explains that since “experience is taken as the origin of 
knowledge” then vision becomes the “bedrock of evidence upon which explanation is 
built”: “Questions about the constructed nature of experience, about how subjects are 
constituted as different in the first place, about how one’s vision is structured… are 
left aside” (25).67  
                                                
66 Scott, engaging with political theory and feminism in this essay, argues against the passive 
acceptance of vision as evidence of experience and transparency as a means to knowledge.  
67 Vision is used in a similar way as perception is used in phenomenology. Whilst both entail the 
receiving and organising of data, Scott regards vision as a means to reproduce knowledge in service of 
the ideological system.  
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Vision treads the delicate line between the act of seeing and the metaphor of 
visibility. To use Scott’s terms, one is “subjective perceptual clarity” and the other 
“transparent vision” (35). Clarity is given through subjective intervention, through 
forms of reflection; transparency claims unmediated vision. Although Scott’s study of 
vision is tangential to embodied perception, the schism—between seeing something 
and making it visible—evinces a blind spot in the phenomenology of perception. That 
is, the body that sees is a body that has seen; it is historical and cultural. Scott warns 
that experience cannot be naturalised, “through a belief in the unmediated relationship 
between words and things” (36), or put differently, between things as they are in the 
world and objects as they are seen through the body in the world. 
Distinguishing object from thing, Nash writes:68  
If objects are representative, for instance in denoting their class of 
items, or in embodying cultural values, or in belonging to a subjective 
appropriation, they might be thought of as something like conventional 
metonymic examples (an ‘example of its class’). The thing’s oddity, on 
the other hand, is also its singularity: it is non-representative and 
finally irreducible to subjective appropriation. (4) 
Relating this distinction to Scott’s, what is central to “transparent vision” is the thing 
which cannot be represented in any other way but in its givenness. Subjective 
perceptual clarity, on the other hand, illuminates the object, wherein seeing allows the 
subject to grasp a certain relationship between personal experiences and the object 
located in a socio-historical context.  
Working this thing-object dialectic of perception into the Pecanelli scene, the 
sketches and writings can be interpreted as a representation of class, racial, gender 
                                                
68 Nash examines thing and object with regards to shoes in Woolf’s works. 
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struggles, and power relations in society that become visible as Sasha brings them to 
life, so to speak. As the telegraph-wires buzz on, her destitution and the women’s 
sufferings become visible. The banal act of seeing the menu begins to bear political 
significance, revealing the existence of the forgotten women and voicing their appeals, 
which if not for Sasha’s itchy fingers would have been left unnoticed at the back of 
the menu, excluded from public discourse.  
A similar experience of seeing unfolds in Mansfield’s “Miss Brill” when the 
eponymous protagonist takes out her fur and stares into its “sad little eyes” that said, 
“What has been happening to me?” (331). The rhetorical question takes on a larger 
significance when Miss Brill is mocked by a girl who calls her a “stupid old thing” 
with a funny fur that is “exactly like a fried whiting” (335). It becomes clear that the 
question at the outset of the story is directed at the owner who is represented in the 
aged fur. The need to preserve the lacklustre object which has suffered a knock and is 
losing its firmness parallels Miss Brill’s overly sanguine disposition in spite of her 
disengagement. She sees herself as a romantic observer and an important participant, 
who is familiar with the Sunday crowd and events: “she had a part and came every 
Sunday” (334). But, notwithstanding the attempts to belong, Miss Brill is alone. 
Despite her efforts, she is the disengaged participant. The illusion she maintains is 
comparable to the image of the presentable fur she upkeeps. As both fantasies shatter 
at the giggle of the girl, Miss Brill uncharacteristically skips her Sunday treat, which 
symbolically points to her inability to keep up with the act and finish the show as she 
usually would. When she returns home, she “quickly, without looking, laid [the fur] 
inside” the box and put the lid on (335). The careful scrutiny in the beginning is 
supplanted by a careless tossing. The crux in the chain of actions is the fact that she 
deliberately avoids looking at the fur. This time, instead of speaking to her, the 
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ignored object cries in the dark box. More than a personification, it reiterates the 
relation between object and appearance and, more importantly, that between in-
/visibility of the personal and socio-cultural.  
If the initial perception of the fur is a transparent vision of a thing merely 
reflecting the state of its givenness, then the final encounter with it is coming into 
contact with an object where Miss Brill, without seeing the fur, experiences a moment 
of subjective perceptual clarity. The fur is pushed aside just as Miss Brill is neglected; 
its cries give away her desolation. The sprightly appearance masks the cruel blows of 
life with which the old lady has been dealt, blows that become apparent when she sees 
the moth-powdered and timeworn fur. The once revered adornment has deteriorated 
and the imagery—like a fried whiting—conjures a stiff and shriveled nonentity that is 
lost in the exuberant crowd. This sight corresponds to the circumstances of Miss Brill 
and renders visible what has been omitted in the text. Nothing about her past and 
present is specified. But, by the end of the story, we get a sense of her loneliness, of 
being left behind by the current of life that waits for no one.  
As Heather Murray notes, stories like “Miss Brill” find some of Mansfield’s 
“gloomiest moments” (“Katherine Mansfield and Her British Critics” 107). They 
depict “cruelty and undisguised suffering”: “mankind must struggle on alone” (100). 
The struggle portrayed in Miss Brill’s suffering and subjection to the forces of society 
and ethos of a pernicious materialism is shared by the invalid gentleman who is 
presumably dead. The old man whom she used to see on Sunday afternoons is no 
longer there, but she envisions him just as the band rests, when it is most quiet. In the 
brief interlude, she visualises and brings him on stage; the timely moment aligns the 
lone woman and man. The aged woman and the man share a common suffering; they 
stand for those unceremoniously discarded by a forward-moving society represented 
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by the boy and girl, the “young ones, the laughing ones” the caustic and apathetic 
(335). “Miss Brill” presents a social milieu where the young are caught up in their 
own times, where couples engage in exclusive activities,69 where groups of people 
support themselves; a society blind to the lone, wandering pariahs who continuously 
cross their paths in hopes of somehow reconnecting with the world to which they 
once belonged.  
 If Murray is right to say that “Miss Brill” depicts humankind’s “undisguised 
sufferings,” then Rhys departs from Mansfield in that her novels are unapologetically 
gender-specific (100). What is persistent in both authors, however, is how seeing 
objects makes visible the repressed and covert, extending the situation of experience 
to a wider but not abstract context—be it social, cultural, or historical—whilst 
approaching the objects as the body is oriented towards them. The intent behind 
analysing how Sasha and Miss Brill see is not to politicise perceptual experiences, but 
to open up a space for considering politics, history, culture, power or the lack of it as 
constitutive of women’s experiences of the lived world. The bodies in Good Morning, 
Midnight and “Miss Brill” are aging and have suffered; their experiences only make 
sense because their circumstances are reflected in the objects on which they fixate.   
Bill Brown explains the relation between perceiver and object perceived in his 
discussion on “the fluidity of objects” where objects “decompose and recompose 
themselves as the object of a new fascination” (“The Secret Life of Things” 3). The 
fluidity consists in “dislocating material” from its appearance “into an aesthetic scene” 
(3). Fusing the material and the poetic imagination reveals how the imagination of 
materiality asks how “human subjects and material objects constitute one another” (5). 
                                                
69 “Miss Brill” teems with images of couples: “Only two people shared her seat” (331); “An 
Englishman and his wife” (332); “Two young girls in red came by and two young soldiers in blue met 
them” (333); “Two peasant women in funny straws passed” (333). 
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In this respect, objects are appropriated and imagined, representing some context that 
matters to the subject. If so, are the women seeing or thinking when they experience? 
Or, asked differently, can experience comprise of seeing and thinking, be exploratory 
and reflecting? Radical reflection vouches for this possibility, even though the body in 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is androcentric and arguably ahistorical and apolitical. If 
the body is nostalgic like Sasha and Miss Brill’s, then radical reflection, which taps 
on the unreflective fund of experience, cannot be reflecting and exploratory since the 
past once reflected upon cannot be subdued. Merleau-Ponty likens the past to a field 
“anterior to any express evocation,” but the past is unambiguous for the women (POP 
424). It is the actual field into which they have already entered. Once accessed, the 
past spirals uncontrollably into the present. For this reason the visions the women 
conjure are very affected by their past and afflictions, pulling Miss Brill back into the 
dark room and Sasha into the hotel room, where they neither flee nor fight.  
Scott is critical of certain forms of subjectivity and ideological bent that 
formulate aspects of history as factual: they “reproduce rather than contest given 
ideological systems” (25). She explains that when we encounter the repressed and 
hidden, “we know they exist but not how they’ve been constructed; we know their 
existence offers a critique of normative practices, but not the extent of the critique” 
(25). In this regard, it seems Sasha and Miss Brill’s experiences with the sketches and 
fur expose the silent sufferings of the marginalised groups with which they identify 
but do not probe into how social and historical processes have shaped how they 
experience. Also problematic for Scott is how in feminist writings “the relationship 
between thought and experience is represented as transparent (the visual metaphor 
combines with the visceral)” (31). This is also where she and other like-minded critics 
may take issue with “Miss Brill” and particularly Good Morning, Midnight because 
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the women’s experiences are both visceral and metaphorical to some degree, which 
seems to “universalize the identity of women and so to ground claims for the 
legitimacy of women’s history in the shared experience of historians of women and 
those women whose stories they tell” (31). Whilst this is a real concern, the texts do 
not lay claim to any universal experience. They do not represent and generalise 
women or humankind’s experience—Mansfield and Rhys never let us forget how 
alone and dislocated their protagonists are. Instead, the authors show the importance 
of connection or some form of solidarity, albeit imagined, that helps their women gain 
insight beyond what they can perceive, given social limitations and displacement.  
Another difference between Miss Brill and Sasha is their thought process. 
Thought, in “Miss Brill,” is the conscious imagining of collective experience. In Good 
Morning, Midnight, however, the only matter Sasha thinks about is her past. Thought 
and action always circle back to the past. In the Pecanelli scene, we see how her 
choice of place is affected by the memory of place. Her travels about Paris are 
designed to ensure no aimless wanderings, no crying in public. She must have a 
“programme, not to leave anything to chance” (GMM 14). Given the methodical 
itinerary planning, Sasha seems to think experience rather than actually experience. 
Yet, although she sees the world with subjective perceptual clarity—after the 
clarifying moment, she sees differently, i.e., understands the present in relation to the 
past—Sasha does not dwell on the past. Instead clarity forces her to fixate on 
something else; that being place. 
A careful reading of the encounters of place reveals that Sasha’s eyes see 
where the mind’s eye misses, and the mind recovers what the eyes do not see. From 
the outset, Sasha divulges her clockwork ritual of planning itineraries: “I have decided 
on a place to eat in at midday, a place to eat in at night, a place to have my drink in 
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after dinner. I have arranged my little life” (9). The choice to visit one place instead of 
another is dependent on how much unpleasant memory is evoked in a particular place. 
When she decides to go to the Pecanelli, she reasons, “I don’t see why I shouldn’t go 
revisit it. I have never made scenes there, collapsed, cried” (34). Her consciousness of 
place is built on distressing memories from the past. Returning to Paris after being 
abandoned and losing her baby, Sasha sees the streets as sites that trigger memories of 
trauma. As she wanders about Paris, she “remember[s] this, remember[s] that”: “Here 
this happened, here that happened” (15). Significantly, hers is a consciousness of the 
past that latches onto place. It is not purely a consciousness of the past, but of place. 
Place intercepts the relation between reflecting and seeing, mitigating the crippling 
effects of the past. Sasha cannot help but connect places, or semblances of familiar 
places, to what she has experienced. So instead of recalling the past or trying to forget 
it, she relates to it through a spatiality that enables her to come in contact without re-
experiencing the trauma. This spatiality involves a vocabulary, routines, awareness of 
the potential of places, and spatial practices that describe experiences in spatial terms. 
Sasha practices a way of living that is dependent on the places she goes to and from 
morning to night, where she has her meals, where she spends time between meals. To 
stop the replay of tragedy, she comes up with a list of alternative places. 
 Alice Borinsky argues that Sasha’s decisions to visit safer places are linked to 
her guest status:  
her being a parasite is not a vocation exercised with the passion and 
capacity for manipulation associated with the role in literature. It is 
more of an unquestioned, passive acceptance of things as they are even 
to the point of constituting her own appearance from the images of 
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mannequins in display windows. (“Jean Rhys: Poses of a Woman as 
Guest” 240) 
This suggests that Sasha is a “helpless” woman of no identity (229). Far from a 
passive guest who flees from cafés, I contend that Sasha’s place-planning is typical of 
a streetwise woman. She does not recoil from places because of otherness and lack of 
belonging. Rather she is clear about the ghost of herself from her past with which she 
refuses to be associated, knowing very well to avoid places likely to bring up the past.  
Georg Simmel, in his seminal essay, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” 
describes “the metropolitan type” to create “a protective organ for itself against the 
profound disruption with which the fluctuations and discontinuities of the external 
milieu threaten it” (326).70 In a similar way, Sasha’s obsession to maintain composure, 
dressing well and having her makeup on, is a “rational” reaction, creating “a mental 
predominance through the intensification of consciousness” (326). The hard exterior 
protects her. Sasha’s composed demeanour and attitude, compared to her docility in 
Part Three where she follows Enno and is clueless about Paris, is fueled by her refusal 
to relive the traumatic past. Eschewing confrontations that imperil her, she ensures 
“avoidance of certain cafés, of certain streets, of certain spots” (14). As she walks into 
the Cinema Danton, the Pecanelli, and the Luxembourg Gardens with this intention, 
she is effectively undertaking a spatially directed motive that creates a situation of 
plotted out places and begins her narrative of place.   
Sasha has invented an alternative itinerary of Paris for the lone woman. She 
directs herself towards and away from certain places, a manoeuvre reflecting her 
circumscribed perspectival orientation, one that results from an accumulation of past 
                                                
70 Written at the turn of the century in 1903, Simmel delineates how the individual copes with an urban 
and capitalist society. Whilst he notes that the individual is threatened by the urbanising and money-
driven society which are arguably forces that oppress Sasha, I focus on the past.  
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traumas. In an attempt to avoid remembering by bypassing places, her consciousness 
of the past ironically and inadvertently transforms into a consciousness-of-place. Her 
sensitivity towards places as trigger points or comfort zones translates into a reflex 
and intuition for space that enable her to evaluate then enter or exit rooms based on 
her feelings and thoughts. Overtime, Sasha develops a habit of experiencing rooms, 
which houses together the past and present.  
 
The Habit of Rooms 
Sasha’s experience is reflecting and exploratory, mindful and embodied, teetering the 
line between past and present. She frequently lapses into the past and ends up crying 
in a lavabo; if not, she is heedlessly following the lead of the present, walking into the 
snares of the neighbour commis and René. Each resurgence of the past is not 
unexpected. The ways in which her memory is invoked trace out a pattern that 
anticipates later renascences of the past. Right at the beginning, when Sasha lays out 
how she has arranged her life by deciding on places to have her meals, she is setting 
into motion a pattern, a habit involving place, which would recur throughout the novel.  
Aside from the emphasis on place, the ritualistic quality of the arrangement is 
striking. Her experience seems to be rooted in habituation. Regardless of whether she 
sticks to the path or not, habit drives her to remember. The wanderings into “wrong” 
places are not accidental, for there is nothing aimless about her walks. In much the 
same vein, if her physical wanderings manifest her mental wonderings, then there is 
also nothing aleatory about the insertions of the past. Each time Sasha enters a place, 
the past flashes in the present. When she gets a new room, it is expected that it would 
be as the room before. For Sasha, “things repeat themselves over and over again” 
(GMM 56). This is not to say that there are no new experiences, but that nothing 
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surprises her. Hence when she does visit a place that is not previously mentioned and 
is not on her itinerary, for example when she walks the Boulevard St Michel, it is 
almost certain that she must have experienced the place before or mention somewhere 
about an element of the past. Sure enough, Sasha admits, “I have walked along here 
so often” (39). There is a pattern to her experience and memory: certain places 
automatically revive memories. Soon, it becomes normal for Sasha to habitually 
experience the past in the present. 
  The notion of habit is important because it undermines the self as a mindful 
and reflecting agent, actively recollecting and ruminating on the past. Recollection, 
according to Ricoeur, is a search where “the effort to recall constitutes a case of 
intellectual effort and is associated with the effort of intellection” (29). It requires the 
ability to recognise, appropriate, and even reconstruct memory for the present. In this 
respect, Sasha does not search for the past inasmuch as it is brought up because she is 
used to doing so. She habitually remembers rather than deliberately—an indication 
that she is not a thinking body. Hers is redolent of Henri Bergson’s mémoire-habitude, 
or habit-memory, which is not the survival of the past, but rather living the past out in 
the present experience. Habit, Bergson elaborates, is “formed by repeated actions that 
are amassed in the body: these do not represent the past, they merely act it” (Matter 
and Memory 92). This kind of memory is not recollection where the mind drifts and 
searches for a past encased in glass. Like any other habits, it involves the body’s 
motor habits: “it is lived and acted, rather than represented” (91). Just as Sasha 
habitually walks in and out of places, the past is acted out and then stopped.  
On habit-memory and how it is embodied, Edward Casey writes: 
For the habitual in matters of memory is neither strictly mental (as in 
the case of “image memory”) nor entirely physical (as in trace theory). 
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It is both at once, thoroughly mental and yet wholly bodily…. In habit, 
character, virtue, and style alike, we find an inextricable commixture 
of intention and behavior, of animation by mind and enactment by 
body. (“Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty” 280) 
Habit marries the psychological and the physical, allowing the union of two exclusive 
terms. What this means for a phenomenology of place is that the past does not act as 
sedimentation that obscures the vision of place by superimposing a representation of 
what has happened. As Bergson affirms, habit-memory “no longer represents our past 
to us; it acts it” (94). It becomes part of the lived experience, a faculty of the mind 
that is bodily and concurrent in the moment of experience. Perhaps habit-memory is a 
misnomer—“if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves 
bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment” 
(Bergson 94). But the idea of habitually acting out the past in the present implies 
repetition and movement, traversing to and fro, temporally and spatially. This way 
one can access the unreflective fund of experience, since the body enacts it in the 
present and without being trapped in the field of the past. To some degree, habit is the 
solution to Merleau-Ponty’s reservation about the past. Whilst he is reticent about 
memory as representation and invention, he is more receptive to ideas regarding habit. 
In his longstanding fascination with the phenomenon of the phantom limb, 
Merleau-Ponty finds that “our body comprises as it were two distinct layers, that of 
the habit-body and that of the body at this moment” (POP 95). The habit-body enacts 
all possible actions that the dismembered body at present can no longer perform. It 
dawns on the subject that what was once possible for the body to manipulate has now 
become “what one can manipulate”: “it must have ceased to be a thing manipulatable 
for me and become a thing manipulatable in itself” (95). One realises that “there 
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appears round our personal existence a margin of almost impersonal existence, which 
can be practically taken for granted, and which I rely on to keep me alive” (96). The 
habit-body exposes the unconscious reliance on something outside lived experience 
that has been internalised as formative to existence. In context, the past survives for 
Sasha not as a representation of things past but as “a manner of being and with a 
certain degree of generality” (96). The past is not dated or spread out as a picture; it 
comes into being through a generality, one that is of rooms. Her memory of a certain 
anonymous room infiltrates all experiences of places; it is “always the same room” 
(120). By claiming that all rooms are the same, that places are always the same room, 
Sasha gives prominence to a particular room that she never exactly gives details about. 
Yet this room is the cynosure of all her experiences of places.  
Sasha’s habitus and experiences have an indelible connection with the past 
that first manifests in the enigmatic room which she claims is always constant: 
Serge’s exhibition studio is a room that expands and the dress-house is a room of 
many rooms. Because she remembers the room habitually, it follows that she must be 
thinking frequently about it, whether she does it consciously or subconsciously. Yet, 
in Rhys’s work, remembering the past in the form of a room and what has taken place 
within is almost a habitual response, much like a reflex action. Here the connection 
between the mind’s activity and bodily action is intentional. For Merleau-Ponty, this 
kind of reflex action, which is a combination of the workings of the mind and body, is 
much like “memory, emotion and the phantom limb,” all “equivalents in the context 
of being in the world” (POP 99). The impression of memory, he explains,  
establish and maintain [the past event], prevent it from being abolished, 
and cause it to still count in the organism. They keep empty an area in 
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which the subject’s history fills, they enable the latter to build up the 
phantom…. (99-100)  
As “the stump that keep[s] the amputated limp in the circuit of existence” (99), so 
memory functions like a phantom existence which is especially evident under certain 
circumstances where “it is possible to bring to light constant responses to stimuli 
which are themselves constant” (100). Good Morning, Midnight creates a world of 
these circumstances, incubating the phantom existence of memory so that its recall is 
physiological and not solely psychological. Significantly, as Merleau-Ponty asserts, it 
is because of our being-in-the-world, “which provides all our reflexes with their 
meaning, and which is thus their basis,” that memory and the physical are integrated 
into patterns of behaviours lived out in the world (100).  
 Sasha’s impulse to compare places with the room is a habit that causes her to 
act in certain ways. The room is her phantom limb. To her any room is either a place 
“where you hide from the wolves outside” or it is not a room at all (GMM 33). This 
explains why she either lays motionless in rooms or flees from them. It is not a single 
memory of one unique room that affects her behaviour, but it is “a memory of having 
had that memory… until finally only the essential form remains” (POP 96). New 
rooms may be entirely different and familiar rooms are transformed, but, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, such “renewal touches only the content of our experience and not its 
structure” (96). It is no longer about what the room looks like, but how spatiality has 
structured Sasha’s memory and becomes the way by which her past is acted out in the 
present. This is seen when she recalls the place she once lived with Enno. Whilst she 
is not eager to put a date to the memory (“Was it 1923 or 1924?” “Was it in 1926 or 
1927?”), she is certain that the place is “round the corner, in the Rue Victor-Cousin” 
(11). Her memory of place does not manifest because of external stimulus where she 
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associates one place with another by resemblance. Places come into Sasha’s view 
because of her habit of remembering them. What she has is a spatial consciousness 
that through rooms brings the past into the present.  
 
Spatial Consciousness 
 “‘Quite like old times,’ the room says. ‘Yes? No?’” (9). The opening line bespeaks 
the spatial consciousness that permeates Good Morning, Midnight. It can be thought 
of as a consciousness of place and its effects, or an acute sensitivity to the material 
environment. Place becomes part of consciousness; direction and orientation are 
integrated into actions. In Good Morning, Midnight, spatial consciousness is a result 
of Sasha’s habit of emplacing the past: traumatic memories are recuperated in rooms 
of the present. As the past and present settle in one place, mutually exclusive acts 
such as thinking and perceiving are also knitted together. Nicole Flynn affirms that 
Rhys’s interwar novels deal with “quintessentially modernist themes such as internal 
division, the boundary between internal and external” (“Clockwork Women” 41). 
Judith K. Gardiner adds “those between dark and light, past and present, despair and 
hope, inside and outside, nature and art, life and death, male and female” to the list 
(“Good Morning, Midnight: Good Night, Modernism” 234). Particular to Good 
Morning, Midnight is how spatial consciousness along with its structure of spatiality 
reconciles oppositions, enabling Sasha to think and see at the same time.  
A study of Sasha’s experience of place reveals how spatial consciousness roils 
sediments that regulate experience and interfere with the primacy of perception. More 
importantly, spatial consciousness brings to light another kind of sedimentation, one 
that is not a priori but formulated by the external world to thrust upon the subject. 
Merleau-Ponty beseeches us to reflect on this sedimentation that is from within: “we 
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must recognize a sort of sedimentation of our life: an attitude towards the world, when 
it has received frequent confirmation acquires a favoured status for us” (POP 513). 
To take this further, it is the only sort of sedimentation that we cannot—and perhaps 
do not need to—remove because it is proof of our being in the world. 
The role of spatiality in Sasha’s memory becomes apparent when her thought-
processes, memories of Enno, life in Paris and England, and her dead child surface as 
she walks Paris and goes into rooms. Tragedies and glimpses of her traumatic past are 
episodically framed in places. An examination of place opens up an exploration of 
past experiences. “Quite like the old times”—a seemingly congenial welcome is 
impregnated with hints of Sasha’s past experiences and her strange affinity with 
rooms. To begin with, the spatial arrangement of the first hotel room described in the 
novel gives insight into her past: “There are two beds, a big one for madame and a 
smaller one on the opposite side for monsieur” (9). Too large for a lone woman, the 
spacious room likely reminds her of times with Enno in Paris, later confirmed by her 
last thoughts before turning in: “Was it in 1923 or 1924 that we lived around the 
corner, in the Rue Victor-Cousin…” (11). The pain of the memory is placated as the 
past is structured around a spatial vocabulary: the location of the place and the sterile 
arrangement of the room. The entire experience of the room is tinged with a film of 
the past with which she tries to identify but fails. Merleau-Ponty explains that such 
recall of the past does not function as memory because it is not a “representation in 
the mode of objective consciousness and as a ‘dated’ moment” (POP 96). Rather, this 
past, which remains a “true present,” does not leave Sasha (96). It is acted out in the 
present as she recognises and describes places.  
Spatial consciousness is reified in Part Three where the entire section is 
structured around a list of places that organises the narratives. Each part begins with 
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naming the room in which the narrative takes place: “The room at the Steens’,” “The 
room in the hotel in Amsterdam that night,” “the hotel in the Rue Lamartine,” “The 
house in the Boulevard Magenta.” These are quasi-headings; each is a synopsis, as if 
place is enough to capture the essence of the episode. The solid structure of spatiality 
is juxtaposed with fractured time. The chapter floats in and out of the past; the play on 
time and tenses obfuscates the distinction between experiencing and reflecting. This is 
most evident at the end of the section when Sasha remembers the last room, one near 
the Place de la Madeleine, and concludes that all the rooms mentioned are “always the 
same room” (120). She waits in this room for the money she requested, indicating that 
this moment in the narrative occurs in her memory. The mix of present and present 
continuous tenses brings the past into the present. The twice mentioned phrase in 
continuous tense, “the night is coming” (120), suggests that the money would come 
too as Sasha waits for Enno, but yet at present she is still waiting. The state that she 
was in merges with her present predicament: she was waiting for Enno and now she is 
still waiting, perhaps for another source of allowance. The emphasis on the 
presentness of the narrative—“Now, money, for the night is coming” (120)—blurs 
time. Although the shifts in temporality are jarring, the structure of spatiality holds the 
narrative together, enforcing a relatively coherent and sound recall of memories for 
Sasha to reflect on and re-experience. 
Part Three ends with Sasha contemplating the sameness of rooms: 
Eat. Drink. Walk. March. Back to the hotel. To the Hotel of Arrival, 
the Hotel of Departure, the Hotel of the Future, the Hotel of 
Martinique, and the Universe. … Back to the hotel without a name in 
the street without a name. You press the button and the door opens. 
This is the Hotel Without-a-Name in the Street Without-a-Name, and 
 Foo 198 
the clients have no names, no faces. You go up the stairs. Always the 
same stairs, always the same room. (120) 
The short sentences reduce experience into a paratactic prose. Like an instruction 
manual on how to experience place, the description is dull and mechanical. Nameless 
places and routine activities emphasise Sasha’s isolation. Studying rooms in Good 
Morning, Midnight, Jan Curtis states that “the room is a means of rendering oneself 
insensitive to the inevitability of suffering” (“The Room and the Black Background” 
266). Instead of thinking of apathy as resignation, I argue that Sasha’s insensitivity 
stems from the habitual remembering of the past that after multiple repetitions runs 
dry of emotions. Because she is first conscious of place and not circumstances, Sasha 
is spared from withdrawing into the recesses of her mind where the past devours her 
and inhibits the experience of the present. The structure of spatiality, weaving 
together the aleatory narratives of experience in the chapter, also creates a presentness 
by adding a cyclic quality to the experience of rooms where the past is a lived present 
(akin to Merleau-Ponty’s “true present”). This presentness, enabling reflecting and 
experiencing at the same time, is captured in the following: “The room says: ‘Quite 
like old times. Yes? ... No? ... Yes’” (120). The déjà vu moment recalls the opening 
line, suggesting that the section assumed to be reflecting on the past could be Sasha’s 
present experience. By situating memory in place, the past is precipitated into the 
present, and Sasha can reflect and experience at the same time.  
Spatial consciousness emplaces the past in present place; the narrative of the 
memory becomes a narrative of place. The past is immanent in the present, so spatial 
consciousness does not look backwards. It is concerned with the present and also the 
future. As radical as it sounds, the idea that spatial consciousness operates in part by 
patterning memories onto places suggests that it is preemptive, directing at the near 
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future. If every place Sasha visits potentially evokes the presence of the past, then she 
can take anticipatory measures to counteract trauma. As a matter of fact she is very 
conscious of places because she has full understanding of how uncontrollable her 
emotions can be if she steps into the wrong one. “I must be careful about that. These 
things are very important,” Sasha reminds herself (9). Opening the doors to wrong 
places is equivalent to opening up wounds. It is not a stretch to say that spatial 
consciousness drives Sasha to seek out places that ensure emotional equilibrium. It 
keeps her sane to continue with her itinerary. The lavabo is one such place. Of the 
many places in the novel, the lavabo is particularly interesting because of its historical 
and social resonances. Generally, as a representative of private places in the public 
sphere, it is laden with ideological meanings that threaten to confine Sasha within the 
social system that imprisons her. Yet, as a meeting point of her past and present, 
reflection and experience, place is a spatial manifestation of experience. In it thought 
is a bodily event, lived experience is subjective and somatic.  
Offering shelter from public scrutiny, the lavabos in the basements of cafés 
stow Sasha away. Elizabeth Wilson points out that in the early twentieth century 
restrooms were specifically created to seduce women into departmental stores: they 
could “go unchaperoned or certainly free of men’s protection” (The Sphinx in the City 
60). The lavabo is where Sasha hides away from the streets and men. When she 
cannot stop crying, it is the “familiar” and “empty” lavabo that saves her (GMM 10). 
Domosh and Seager describe early modern London and write about “spaces in the city 
that were designed to reform the ‘inappropriate’ woman” (Putting Women in Place 
74). Although they discuss spaces where prostitutes and fallen women were 
rehabilitated for domestic life in a much earlier period, their argument can be applied 
to the lavabo as a space that makes Sasha well again for public life. The lavabo also 
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bears marks of Bachelard’s cellar, what he calls a “dark entity” (18).71 Regarded as a 
space of “buried madness and walled-in tragedy,” the underground lavabo is a space 
where the misbehaved are tucked away (20). It is in these “closed interior spaces” like 
the lavabo that women “meditate on their past sins and remake themselves into 
rational and self-controlled women” (Domosh and Seager 74). It seems controlling 
the mind is correcting the body, cleaning one’s mind is cleaning up one’s act. Indeed 
the lavabo is where Sasha feels safe and sane—there she stops crying. Yet, any 
control she has is undermined by the function of this deliberately carved-out space for 
women to reflect on their bad thoughts and correct their misbehaviour. Space 
indirectly polices women, and Sasha’s instinctive reaction to hide away in the lavabo 
seems to confirm her obedience.  
The role of restrooms, as Wilson states, is to seduce women into the public 
with promise of a private place for reflection. The seduction is more sinister when the 
reflective experience is designed to reproduce gender norms beneath the guise of 
affording privacy, solidifying existing social stratifications. Whilst Sasha goes into 
lavabos to calm herself, she does not reflect on her behaviour. Instead, she recalls 
lavabos in Paris, London, and Florence. With these images Sasha creates her own 
space comprising of “fifteen women” queuing in the marbled London toilet, “the very 
pretty, fantastically dressed girl who rushed in, hugged and kissed the old dame” in 
Florence, and “the attendant [who] peddled drugs” in the Paris toilette (10). Notably, 
the scenes, albeit from her past, are without the sense of search that accompanies 
memory. Sasha’s habit of recalling places is fed by an acute spatial consciousness that 
reflexively, without thinking, calls forth images of places.  
                                                
71 Bachelard discusses verticality in the house: the attic as the highest room and the cellar (basement) 
the lowest.  
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The lack of thought implied must not be confused with inertia. Habit-memory 
is effected by what Casey calls “active habituating”: “Habituation here takes its most 
concrete form in the body's inhabitation of the world, its active insertion into space 
and time” (“Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty” 285). To inhabit is to be 
passively contained by space and time, and also to actively “know our way around in 
a given circumstance” (285). Sasha may be shunning the public and hiding from the 
world upstairs in an empty and cut-off space in the basement, but the withdrawals 
often lead her to behold a lived space of her own. Her entrance into places like the 
lavabo embeds her in a fully materialised situation of superimposed scenes created by 
her spatial consciousness. This reflexive consciousness of place does not inhibit 
experience in the way that sedimentation and associationism do. It neither searches 
for the past nor represents reality. It acts out the past whilst effacing its time stamp 
and holding onto spatiality. By acting out the scenes, continuing the gestures of 
tenderness between the women, spatial consciousness communicates a feminine 
compassion that stands in contrast to the cold, dark streets of male presence. The 
collected scenes of women in lavabos build camaraderie. In the lavabo Sasha is not 
forced into obedience and her behaviour regulated. Instead she brings to the present a 
group of wayward women who are far from abiding. She resists the introspection and 
self-reflection demanded by the semi-private space and envisions a collective 
experience and feminine existence. 
In Good Morning, Midnight, the lavabo is where Sasha somewhat reflects and 
cleans up her act. It is a specific kind of reflection, one different from a backward-
looking search of the past. The concomitant cleaning up in the lavabo is also not the 
same as regulating behaviour. Rather, the catharsis facilitated by spatiality relieves 
Sasha from the mind-body separation, reconciling thought to bodily experience. 
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Whereas in the closed interior spaces described by Domosh and Seager the 
disobedient body is secondary to the reflective mind (which disciplines the body), in 
the lavabo there is no such hierarchy. The lavabo, although used synonymously to 
mean the restroom in the novel, derives from the Latin lavō (to wash), which refers to 
only the basin for washing hands. Instead of using the French toilette or lavatory, 
Rhys chooses the obscure lavabo.72 The word, not commonly used by the French, is 
historically ecclesiastical, translating as “I will wash,” invoking cleansing rites in 
Catholicism. The washing that takes place in the lavabo can be read as a physical 
cleaning as well as a purification of mind or spirit. A dual catharsis unfolds: Sasha is 
dry, cleansed mentally and physically.  
In the opening scene, when Sasha cries uncontrollably, she goes to the lavabo 
and is “dry” (10). The word, “dry,” is peculiar though explainable—she has after all 
stopped crying. But as she rambles on about how she tried to drown herself, dryness 
becomes associated with the botched suicide: she is dry because she has been pulled 
out of the river. She does not recollect her past experience; there is emphasis that she 
has forgotten it. It is only brought up because of the empty lavabo which effects a 
peace and sterility that dry her—a dryness that encourages her to recapture the feeling 
of sanity and of being saved. Sasha has forgotten the trauma, but she relives the 
rescue: “I realized how lucky I am. Saved rescued, fished-up, half-drowned, out of the 
deep, dark river, dry clothes, hair shampooed and set” (10). The realisation that she is 
no longer crying reinforces her dry body, assuring her that she is no longer drowning 
in the river or in emotions. The mental and bodily dryness are dovetailed by the 
spatiality of the lavabo that stops Sasha from dwelling on the past and re-living the 
                                                
72 Only in Good Morning, Midnight is the lavabo used to mean the restroom. In Voyage in the Dark, 
“lavatory” is used instead. When Sasha says that the lavabo is “luckily empty” and that an old dame is 
“outside near the telephone,” the descriptions suggest a locked toilet cubicle (10). Also, when she asks, 
“What about that monograph on lavabos—toilets—ladies?,” the sub-clause further indicates that the 
two are the same (10). 
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crippling experience of losing control. As she rids herself of emotional excess, she 
disencumbers the baggage of the past and trauma. The cleaning up, or the reflection, 
which takes place in the lavabo is not based on recollection but works towards a 
reconciliation of the mind and body. In the lavabo, Sasha does not retreat into the 
recesses of her past evoked by the reflective mind. Rather, the scenes are acted out 
before her, creating a safe space in which she re-experiences and lives them out.    
Specially set up as a private space where the knowing mind disciplines the 
feeling body, the lavabo like most interior spaces in public (for example, the dressing 
room) is part of a larger social design that looks on thought as the axis of human 
existence. However, as Sasha experiences and radically reflects, it transforms into a 
space that forges togetherness of the mind and body, a state of equivocation where 
thinking is not wholly an exercise of the mind and experience is not an exclusively 
material matter. The subversion of this separation feeds phenomenology as it puts the 
body back into the equation of experience, rendering experience subjective as the 
feeling body lives in the world. Reason, as Alcoff puts it, “was portrayed as universal 
and neutral precisely because it was bodiless” (42). The emphasis on the feeling body 
moves away from rational experience and takes into consideration experiential 
specificities, including “bodily distractions, hormonal cycles, emotional disturbances,” 
which were once unthought of in epistemologies of experience (Alcoff 42). Sasha, 
distracted and burdened by the past, sees the world differently. This is a kind of 
seeing particular to those who occupy a vantage point much lower than the dominant 
point of view. The perceptual experiences from this position articulate a different 
being-in-the-world that diverges from neutral, if not latently masculine, experiences. 
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Feminine Re-Vision 
In Good Morning, Midnight, Sasha’s spatial consciousness animates places and 
envisages the past, offering a version of experience that debunks the neutrality of 
experience and reveals a far from dominant, non-masculinist way of seeing the world. 
Although set in the late 1930s when “new femininities,”73 Scott McCracken observes, 
were “produced at the interstices between private and public spheres,” Sasha prefers 
closed interior spaces (Masculinities, Modernist Fiction and the Urban Public Sphere 
3). Unlike the new woman who ventures outside the home, she retreats to the room 
and shirks away from the alluring freedom of the urban city.  
Between the malicious streets, ambivalent cafés, and claustrophobic rooms, 
Sasha chooses the place that secludes the outside. The cordoned room is the antithesis 
of the open streets. The willing exile seems self-sabotaging, but this physical fixity 
emplaces her, facilitating an examination of how she explores and sees space. Always 
entering places that are alike, Sasha revisits them in hope that the second time round 
she may comport differently and see situations anew. This final section discusses an 
alternative modality of seeing that is particular to women’s experiences. It examines 
how Sasha’s way of seeing veers from normative perception and is dependent on the 
rooms in which she inhabits. By analysing her experiences of rooms of the past and 
present, I will show that spatiality and material resemblances are essential to forming 
a feminine and revisionist kind of seeing that relates women’s situation to the places 
they choose to explore. This kind of seeing affects how women see the world and 
manage their circumstances.   
                                                
73 McCracken observes that new spaces in the urban public sphere at the end of the nineteenth century 
gave new opportunities for exploration to women. Teashops, for instance, “appear as signifiers of a 
new mass culture […] as examples of women’s assertive presence in London’s new public sphere” (3) 
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Normative perception, or “correct perception,” as Merleau-Ponty calls it, 
occurs when “the unity of the object is based on the foreshadowing of an imminent 
order” (POP 20). This “correct perception” ironically “relieve[s] perception of its 
essential function, which is to lay the foundations of, or inaugurate, knowledge” (19). 
Human beings are trained to synthesise images, even if they are discordant with what 
is presented. Synopsis tends to take over seeing; there is a predilection to see things as 
complete entities. Seeing the front view of a cube is seeing all of its six facets. Seeing 
the room from the doorway is already witnessing a panoramic view of the house. Sean 
Dorrance Kelly picks up on this tendency and emphasises the need to differentiate 
between “experiencing something as a mere two-dimensional façade and experiencing 
it as a full three-dimensional entity” (“Seeing Things” 77). This distinction is “rarely 
made” because it is counterintuitive to think of or see objects as two-dimensional: 
“we almost always have experiences as of objects rather than as of mere facades” 
(77). In order to spur, what Kelly calls, a “gestalt shift” that uncovers the perception 
of objects as mere façades rather than holistic three-dimensional entities (78), “a little 
bit of exploration” is required (77).  
Let us examine what exploration means from a phenomenological perspective. 
Say for example, when one visits Disneyland, which is a set of a world of its own, the 
illusion is taken to be real for the duration one stays in the theme park. In Disneyland 
there is no expectation of the real. Quite the contrary, one wants be swept up in the 
unreal such that it is the only reality for that particular day. Theme parks are supposed 
to enable that. As one buys into the illusion, one starts to live it as one would in the 
real world. This entails exploring the world, or, in context, the other sides of the set. 
Gradually, the surrounding “looks as if there are mere façades” (Kelly 78). This is not 
because it has altered in appearance or that one suddenly realises “the hidden aspects 
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of an experienced object” (78). Rather it happens because one is actually experiencing 
the set as a presented reality. Kelly elaborates on this: 
If you explore the set enough in this way, then an amazing thing 
can happen. Now as you walk down the street, it doesn’t look realistic 
at all. Instead of buildings on either side, it looks as if there are mere 
façades. Instead of feeling as if you’re in the Old West, it feels as if 
you’re on an Old West movie set. (78) 
The “amazing thing” is not the illusion of the real which has collapsed or that reality 
has sunk in. But therein is the gestalt shift: “the whole thing looks like a set full of 
façades instead of like an Old West town” (78). Exploration allows one to see things 
as two dimensional, as they appear to the eye. It is a powerful tool, but useful as it is, 
there is something about exploring, physically or mentally, that does not quite apply 
to women’s situations.  
To begin with, to explore and discover in thought or action requires freedom 
and time. The flâneur, peripatetic, and dandy are classic figures of the exploratory 
spirit. The woman is not. The closest female alternatives, the prostitute and 
demimonde, are hardly free. Even today, exploration remains very much a male 
prerogative. The city attracts the male explorer but often ensnares women. Domosh 
and Seager describe women’s movement in the modern city: 
Much of their fear is focused on urban public spaces, such as streets, 
parks, and subways…. They avoided walking in certain places, at 
particular times, and often will not go out alone. Geographer Gill 
Valentine has argued that this behavioral response to our fear of crime 
constitutes a ‘spatial expression of patriarchy’ (1992: 27), since it 
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reflects and reinforces the traditional notion that women belong at 
home, not on the streets. (99-100) 
Women simply cannot afford the luxury of time to explore the city, awaiting an 
epiphany. It is too risky. So women are a different kind of explorers; their exploration 
is different from the masculine experience; it is time-sparing and more directed. 
Some explorer archetypes of the early twentieth century include Baudelaire’s 
rag-picker poet who rummages the city for inspiration and Benjamin’s flâneur who 
needs to hear and see the crowd. They are in search of stories, sights, and sounds. 
Sasha, in comparison, is a different kind of explorer. She does not draw from the city 
but throws herself to its dangerous mobs and unsafe streets. Her exploratory spirit 
manifests in the unrestrained flowing out of herself—by this I mean her past, feelings, 
thoughts—in certain rooms. Her vision of rooms always ignites a spatial flow that 
undermines the order of correct perception. This is evident when she crosses the 
inner/outer divide less consciously and almost effortlessly. Take for instance the 
introductory passage where she gives a prosaic description of the room: 
There are two beds, a big one for the madame and a smaller one on the 
opposite side for the monsieur. The wash-basin is shut off by a curtain. 
It is a large room, the smell of cheap hotels faint, almost imperceptible. 
The street outside is narrow, cobbled-stoned, going sharply uphill and 
ending in a flight of steps. What they call an impasse. (9) 
The account of the room paints a scene of Sasha entering the room and sees both parts 
of the room and street. Analysing this scene, GoGwilt argues that the separation 
between interior and exterior is bridged by the impasse “that undoes the separation of 
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interior and exterior (“The Interior” 69).74 Notwithstanding this observation, Sasha’s 
lack of discernment for boundaries hinges on a less overt detail.  
Note how the description segues from interior to exterior, as if there is no 
textual division, as if there are no windows. Before we dismiss this detail as inane, we 
might pause for a moment and recall Sasha’s preference for light rooms. She insists 
on the room with two windows, repeating, “‘I mean a light room. A light one. Not a 
dark one’” (33). The window brings light from the outside into the room, allowing the 
exterior to impinge on the interior. It functions like a screen, giving glimpses to the 
outside world, or filtering out the external. If the house is a bodily system, then 
windows “from which people look out” are “metaphors for eyes and vision” (Parsons, 
Streetwalking the Metropolis 25). Sasha reiterates this parallel when she describes 
walking about the city at night: houses as towering “cubes of darkness, with two 
lighted eyes at the top to sneer” (28). Frustrated with “hostile people” (37), she sees 
the lighted windows as fiery eyes, “[f]rowning and leering and sneering” at her (28). 
They warn and stare at the wandering woman, keeping her out of their territory. Sasha, 
however, does not share the sense of boundary. The fact that windows do not obstruct 
or hamper the view when she enters the room is telling of a vision that is open and 
continuous from interior to exterior.  
Another memory of windows is found in the episode where Sasha realises her 
love for Enno when she sees him looking up at her, or rather “looking up at [their] 
window” (108). In this instance, the division between the street and room is stark: 
Enno is on the outside and she stands behind the curtain. Her vision in this example 
adheres to the inner/outer divide. This separation, however, is less prevalent in the 
                                                
74 GoGwilt explores the monolingualism of “impasse,” both French and English. He refers to the 
“physical, architectural sense of the word” and also argues that the word “delineates the experience 
Rhys’s protagonists are bound to repeat in finding themselves trapped in the double bind of private and 
public metropolitan social space” (67). 
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present as seen in the opening section. As Sasha’s life falls apart, the distinction 
between interior and exterior crumbles as well. The window no longer separates, as it 
did before placing Enno on the outside and Sasha in the hotel room, but is the portal 
that brings the exterior in. Her later perception of the interior and exterior is more 
fluid after her trauma; her perception of rooms has expanded. The new room without 
the spatial divide is a re-vision just as Sasha’s view is revised. She embraces the hazy 
division and does not desire perceptual unity: all she wants is “this room, which is 
part of the street outside” (109). The mixing of the interior and exterior does not 
muddle experience. Rather the roiling of sediments causes the perceiver to be aware 
of residues and deposits from previous experiences. As Sasha explores places, moving 
in and out of the past and present, she never confuses façades with objects, though she 
does not care for the distinction.  
Sasha’s ability to not muddle façades with objects goes back to the dual acts 
of half-seeing and half-thinking the past and present. This is encapsulated in the 
motion of the gramophone record playing in her mind: “The gramophone is going 
strong in my head: ‘Here this happened, here that happened.’” (15). The use of 
present continuous tense (“going”) perpetuates action; the record is going strong at 
the moment of Sasha’s narration. But progress is combatted by the past tense that 
frames the incantation. Additionally, “here” fixes on a certain place and holds back 
the continuing action of the playing record, also slowing down Sasha’s walking. Each 
time she identifies a “here,” the specific locale is both of the past and present; she is 
thinking about the place in the past and seeing the place in the present simultaneously. 
There is therefore no relation between the past and present because they are not 
separate. The two are seamlessly one.  
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Pizzichini stresses that “Sasha makes no connections between past and present, 
between old lovers and new: they are all the same” (217). Truly, to Sasha, the past 
and present co-exist in places and are part of the larger framework that is the lived 
streets of London. In a letter to the American novelist, Evelyn Scott, Rhys wrote: “I 
mean that the past exists—side by side with the present, not behind it; that what 
was—is” (qtd. in Pizzichini 208). The way in which Rhys positions the past and 
present suggests a structure to temporality, as if the past and present have a spatial 
dimension. As Sasha walks into places, inhabiting “here,” past scenes are reeled 
before her. This is Sasha exploring places. She is not so much exploring the world 
that is already there as much as she is re-seeing the world that she once inhabited and 
is experiencing again. 
As Sasha reacquaints with places and revisits rooms, she is reconfiguring her 
past. The prefix (re-) is vital to building the language of a new kind of seeing. More 
than seeing anew, it is re-vision. To experience in Good Morning, Midnight is more 
correctly to re-see and re-think the past. These revisionary activities are examples of 
what Sandra Gilbert describes as means to “review, reimagine, rethink, rewrite, revise, 
and reinterpret the events and documents that constitute [history]” (“What Do 
Feminist Critics Want” 32).75 Gilbert believes that the only way to claim “the private 
lives of women and sometimes their public lives” is to “redo our history” (32). In 
much the same vein, Sasha’s revisiting rooms and retelling her past are revisionary 
imperatives that try to claim back her voice and power from dominants like Enno and 
Mr. Blank. To re-vision the personal past is also a step towards revising a collective 
women’s history and reevaluating the patrimonial and hegemonic worldview. Sasha 
                                                
75 Gilbert notes the importance of re- for feminist discourses: “words beginning with the prefix re- have 
lately become prominent in the language of feminist humanist, all of whom feel that, if feminism and 
humanism are not mutually contradictory terms, we must return to the history of what is called Western 
culture and reinterpret its central text” (“What Do Feminist Critics Want” 32). 
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may be habitually recalling her past in places rather than actively taking on the task of 
re-vision, but the acting out of past events and scenes is coeval with processes of re-
thinking and re-seeing. Like feminist critics, Rhys expresses a revisionary imperative, 
though her ambition is not to reform the Western male tradition but to reenact and re-
see the past that is dissociated and silenced. 
Gilbert saw the urgency to revise the construction of women’s history because 
of the problems historically experienced by them. Likewise the need for another kind 
of seeing, a re-vision, arises from the inadequacy of the phenomenological vision that 
leaves out women’s situation. Merleau-Ponty defines seeing: 
To see is to enter a universe of beings which display themselves… they 
remain abodes open to my gaze, and, being potentially lodged in them, 
I already perceive from various angles the central object of my present 
vision. Thus every object is the mirror of all others. (POP 79). 
He reasons that every object is a mirror of other objects, a reasoning rooted in the 
principle that one inhabits the object as it is in a lived world. So seeing an object is 
more than just seeing one side of it. It is to see its other sides by assuming other 
positions of surrounding objects, thus seeing them as well. This object transcendence 
is the basis of the spatial perspective central to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. It 
proves perception is lived experience where to see an object is to see it as embedded 
in a visual field of other objects that together form the world. That we are always 
seeing something from somewhere—we may even be seeing it from everywhere 
because of interrelationships between bodies—is Merleau-Ponty’s idea of being-in-
the-world, a world that is always already there.76  
                                                
76 This is different from the Godlike perspective that does not take into consideration intentionality. It 
assumes an omnipresence, a view from above looking down on everywhere, whereas object 
transcendence begins from the things of a lived world. 
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What is missing from his vision, I think, is an interrogation of the objects. 
How are the objects presented, and what motivates the mirroring? There is neutrality 
and even naturalness that underpins Merleau-Ponty’s universe of beings. It suggests 
that the surrounding objects mirror one another without mediation. For the privileged 
who walks into a universe of objects that confirms his vision and presence, being 
lodged in them is a welcomed predicament. He yields passively because he is assured 
of his lived experience. For the waifs and strays, the experience is vastly different. 
Objects reflected in every angle multiply their abjectness. To be surrounded by them 
is to be imprisoned in a house of mirrors. It is, as Sasha complains, “to lodge me in a 
small, dark room, to clothe me shabbily, to harass me with worry and monotony and 
unsatisfied longings” (25).  
For a phenomenology of place, the object in question is place. In Good 
Morning, Midnight, the object is the room that is both past and present. That every 
room in the novel is a mirror of all others, of rooms past, present, and future comes as 
no shock. More pressing are the motive and decision driving the perception of rooms. 
The “why” and “how” help frame a kind of seeing that is uniquely Sasha’s, given the 
situation she lives in and circumstances she faces. It is a seeing that expands spatiality, 
resulting in a mise en abyme where the expansion reproduces rooms of the past. Far 
from enslaving her, the outflowing of spatial images comforts her: “Now the room 
expands and the iron band round my heart loosens” (83). There is something non-
combative and pacifist about the transgressive power of Sasha’s perception of space. 
She expresses rather poetically that it is “a strange feeling—when you know quite 
certainly in yourself that something is for always” (108-109). Somehow there is peace 
in knowing that rooms are always alike and death is imminent. Sasha knows the truth 
of rooms, which would “undermine the whole social system” (33), and is liberated 
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from “the insouciance, all the gaiety” (109). Her revisiting of places is restorative, not 
destructive. The rooms do not mirror her past in ways that make her a victim, but they 
make space for a re-vision of her experiences. This also explains her constant desire 
to find more rooms although they are never different to her. The place-seeking 
impetus, intensified by a restive spirit, is imperative to revisionist, feminine seeing. 
The feminine needs context. It is broadly used to describe perception and 
experiences that are exclusive to women. Within the Western theoretical canon, the 
feminine is semantically confusing and polysemic. Ongoing debates between 
materialists and idealists, essentialists and constructionists, French and Anglo-
American feminists, leave the term imprecise. Is the feminine a performance? Is it a 
process, as conceived by proponents of écriture feminine? Or, is it an otherness, even 
absence? The questions tunnel their way to aporia. To answer this from a 
phenomenological perspective, we turn to Husserl’s notion of essence, which is closer 
to the word, eido—a pure form of essence that underwrites impure, intellectual, and 
empirical descriptions. Diana Fuss explains that essence, “in this early twentieth-
century phenomenological view, is not something that lies behind a given thing, but 
rather essence is that which is most self-evident and self-given about things” 
(Essentially Speaking 15). The phenomenological essence is not, in the Aristotelian 
sense, “irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person and thing” 
(2). Rather, it is the givenness of a person, thing, or event; the view as it appears to 
the perceiver. Phenomenologically, essence is the contrary of sediment. If the 
feminine is the essence of female existence, then this is true only to the extent that it 
demystifies preexisting masculinist forms and images of women. Here it takes on a 
corrective and restorative significance that re-routes the normative course of 
experience. A feminine kind of seeing can be described as a re-seeing that rebuilds the 
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originary connection with the world and re-examines the seer’s relation to the world 
as it appears to her.  
A feminine kind of seeing emerges from a feminine situation. Situating the 
feminine in the intersection of feminism and phenomenology, Young emphasises that 
if there are “‘feminine’ styles of body comportment and movement,” then there is a 
need to specify “a differentiation of the modalities of the lived body” (138). The 
dialogue on femininity must not begin with biological differences but with women’s 
situation “within a given socio-historical set of circumstances” (139). The individual’s 
situation always precedes the shared experiences of women and a unity “specific to a 
particular social formation during a particular historical epoch” (139). Stuck in rooms, 
Sasha may not have a style of movement, but there is a style of perception that is 
neither masculine nor neutral. Her perception of the world affects the way she sees.  
John Berger in his prominent work Ways of Seeing presents a narrative about 
seeing that resembles Merleau-Ponty’s, except his is more experiential. He writes, 
We never look at just one thing; we are always looking at the relation 
between things and ourselves. Our vision is continually active, 
continually moving, continually holding things in a circle around itself, 
constituting what is present to us as we are…. Soon after we can see, 
we are aware that we can also be seen. The eye of the other combines 
with our own eye to make it fully credible that we are part of the 
visible world. (9) 
Berger makes clear that the objects in question are human beings. He adds that seeing 
is “affected by what we know or what we believe” (8). There is recognition of the 
subjective lived perceptual experience and of women’s vision. Berger notes the 
difference between men and women’s social presence and how that affects 
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perception. A man’s presence “may be fabricated” because he walks with privilege 
(46): If he does not meet the expectation of the power he embodies, he pretends and 
“the pretence is always towards a power which he exercises on others” (8). This is 
contrary to the woman whose 
presence expresses her own attitude to herself, and defines what can 
and cannot be done to her. Her presence is manifest in her gestures, 
voice, opinions, expressions, clothes, chosen surroundings, tastes—
indeed there is nothing she can do which does not contribute to her 
presence…. To be born a woman has been to be born, within an 
allocated and confined space, into the keeping of men. The social 
presence of women has developed as a result of their ingenuity in 
living under such tutelage within such a limited space. (46)  
In addition to underscoring the differences in social power, Berger’s emphasis on 
women’s “chosen surroundings” and the “allocated and confined space” delineates 
the direct relation between women’s situation and the places they choose to 
experience (46). To the extent that the relation between spaces forges women’s 
experience, material resemblances also form the basis of a feminine seeing. 
The connection between allocated situation and chosen surrounding gives 
insight into how and why Sasha sees as she does. She sees rooms everywhere because 
of the physical and metaphorical room that is the genesis of her trauma and tragedies. 
All experiences trace back to that particular room. To her, four walls and a tight space 
make any place a plausible room. I venture to say that the room is the fulcrum of 
feminine seeing in Good Morning, Midnight. Take for example the dress-house scene: 
Sasha describes working in a large room with “mannequins and sales women all 
mixed up” (21); as she tries to find the kise she passes by “showrooms, the fitting-
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rooms, the mannequin’s room,” the “workrooms and offices and dozens of small 
rooms” (22). The room expands into a labyrinth of other rooms, stairs, passages—“all 
different, all exactly alike” (23). The mise en abyme creates a multiplicity of rooms; 
each room is a re-vision of the first room.  
In addition, these rooms that are appear and passed by in a bid to find the 
room in Sasha’s mind are not random and insignificant. They are what Elizabeth 
Bronfen terms “neutral territory”; they are “rooms which cannot be assigned to any 
people or ideas” and so “may have a revitalising influence” (Dorothy Richardson’s 
Art of Memory 20).77 Though neutral, they are not liminal in that they do not quite 
straddle the boundaries of dichotomous entities like the interior and exterior, private 
and public. Bronfen explains that such spaces are neutral because they stand in 
contrast to “semantically coded” spaces (20). Indeed, although these spaces, 
“mannequin rooms,” “workrooms,” are related to her employment and implicit of her 
social standing, they are no longer imposing (even though Sasha’s search for the kise 
is in the first place a work order from her superior). Their brief mentions as Sasha 
literally passes by them in a hurry speak to the fact that she is no more concerned by 
them as she would have been, as exemplified in other episodes where she dwells and 
harps on rooms. These rooms become “neutral” as they give way to and “revitalise” 
Sasha’s memory of rooms that matter to her, such as the lavabos.  
Notably, in the scene every passage “ends in a lavatory,” each invoking scenes 
of crying and hiding away (23). In the midst of anxiety and disorder, Sasha finds 
herself in a rather bathetic situation, surrounded by lavatories: “The number of 
                                                
77 Although Bronfen’s analysis is on Richardson’s use of space, the idea of empty space can help to 
illuminate Rhys’s writing of non-descript rooms. In the chapter “Locations of Passage and Habitation,” 
Bronfen writes about how “empty” and “free” spaces such as the moving trains and cafés in 
Richardson’s works “revitalise[s]” Miriam’s experience of her own room. She discusses, for example, 
how the exterior space of London (“an open, free, exciting and mysterious space…”; “protective and 
separated from the rest of the world”) serves as “external approximation to her own room,” which also 
straddles between “openness” and “protection” (20).  
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lavatories in this place, c’est inoui” (23). The kise episode, Carole Angier notes, is 
“funnily horrible, horribly funny” (Jean Rhys: Life and Work 378). Scurrying around 
passages to find a room she does not know only to end up in different lavatories, the 
scene captures the foundering of Sasha’s sangfroid. The events that have happened to 
her have accreted to point where “the horrors are pathetic, laughable” (Angier 378). 
At this point in her life, Sasha is in her late thirties, alone in Paris, and abandoned by 
Enno and her family. She has been “living for some time on bread and coffee,” trying 
to survive as she drifts from room to room, job to job (GMM 21). The unraveling 
rooms unreservedly call onto the scene the rooms in Brussels, the Steens’, the 
Boulevard Magenta, the Rue Lamartine…. Material resemblances bring about an 
expanding spatiality. This behemoth of rooms now becomes a structure of her past, 
mirroring her memories and emotions. In this moment, her anxiety of being 
humiliated by Mr. Blank intensifies and merges with the humiliation she felt when 
Enno had left her pregnant and poor, encompassing the degradation and oppression 
endured by “all the fools and all the defeated” (25).   
The mise en abyme continues. As Sasha stays confined in the dress-house 
room, she is also trapped in society’s room where “all the doors are shut” (GMM 23). 
The idea of “rooms within rooms” is delineated by Penny Sparke, who in her sharp 
analysis of retail spaces in the early twentieth century, discusses how the organisation 
and use of rooms were relocated from the private to the public, resulting in a 
“layering of inside spaces” where department stores were panoptic structures that 
overlooked “‘inside’ experiences” (The Modern Interior 57). Furniture and familiar 
room settings in shop displays simulated domestic life and created experiences that 
were supposedly “shut off from the outside world and contained within safe, 
unthreatening… spaces” (57). Likewise in Good Morning, Midnight, the innocuous 
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appearance of something is an elaborate ruse. The dress-house painted in delicate 
white and luxurious gold reflects the domestic and commercial, respectively. The 
Louis Quinze chairs and painted screens further erect a highly idealised domestic 
front. Sasha, however, does not fall for the illusion. She knows the chairs are 
“imitation” and the dolls are “malicious” (16). Society’s attempt to pass off the public 
for the private does not escape Sasha. She may be complicit in the deception, for she 
would greet customers and then escort them “to the floor above, where the real 
activities of the shop were carried on,” but she is not ignorant about the consumerist 
society and simulacrum of rooms (16).  
In spite of her acuity, Sasha is still trapped, arguably by her perception of 
rooms that lends itself to the mise en abyme. This is where feminine seeing 
demonstrates its revisionist ability, reorganising the rooms and reinterpreting the 
dominant. Sasha may be lost in the dress-house but she manages to find a room: “I 
rush away from them into a fitting-room. It is hardly ever used…. I shut the door and 
lock it” (24). Instead of being locked out of social rooms, Sasha finds one of her own 
and locks it. By inserting her own room alongside the other locked rooms, she admits 
herself into the world that precludes her. She carves a private space in the large room 
of Society and revises the oppressive scenario, changing the relation between the 
ruling power of society and “all the fools and all the defeated” (25). Trapped in the 
metaphorical room of society, they who are vulnerable and cannot escape their lot 
stay together in the tiny fitting-room. Sasha does not seek justice but cries for them. 
The lack of resistance seems to serve hegemony and frankly there is little striving on 
Sasha’s part for social transformation. Zemgulys expresses her frustration at reading 
Rhys’s narrative, but adds that it “points to different kinds of transformative 
sentiments other than ‘revolutionary’” (37).   
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It is true that Rhys’s women possess a passive-aggressiveness that is easily 
misunderstood for conformity. But this is precisely what makes Rhys a writer of the 
feminine experience. She plays to the liabilities of women like herself, women who 
are inefficient emotionally, physically, and socially, depicting an abject vulnerability 
that makes her characters act the way they do. The Rhysian women know and accept 
their weaknesses. Their instinct is for flight rather than fight. When asked about the 
political stance in her writings, Rhys replied, “I just wanted to say about life, not 
about propaganda” (Cantwell 25). It is never her ambition for her heroines to 
transcend or to challenge social order. Finding a room for herself, even if it agrees 
with social stratification, is Sasha’s way of surviving the system that wants to do 
away with her lot. By locking herself in and going along with the way of society, 
creating a room of her past where she can reinterpret her circumstances, she lives 
another day, perhaps to find another room. As Cantwell quite rightly appraises, Rhys 
“has written about all the people who know how to survive but not to fight” (27). 
“I’m not sure whether men need women, but I’m perfectly sure women need 
men,” said Rhys (Cantwell 25). Her blunt view does not meld well with feminist 
currents. Even Diana Athill, editor and friend, was frustrated and “had no patience for 
[Rhys’s] need to be admired as a woman” (Pizzichini 301). Still, the underlying 
feminine content in Rhys’s writings of women in real destitution and depression has 
an oblique force so indirect and tamed that it is unrecognisable to feminist scholars.  
A foretaste of Rhysian brand passive-aggressiveness appears when Sasha 
musters up the courage to find Mr. Blank, confronting Society in its own room. She 
makes it a point to enter without knocking, gesturing defiance, and delivers a diatribe 
against society: 
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Well, let’s argue this out, Mr Blank. You, who represent Society, have 
the right to pay me four hundred francs a month. That’s my market 
value, for I am an inefficient member of Society, slow in the uptake, 
uncertain, slightly damaged in the fray, there’s no denying it. So you 
have the right to pay me four hundred francs a month, to lodge me in a 
small, dark room, to cloth me shabbily, to harass me with worry and 
monotony and unsatisfied longings till you get me to the point when I 
blush at a look, cry at a word…. Some must cry so that the others may 
be able to laugh more heartily. (25-26) 
In Sasha’s interior monologue, the small and dark room is contrasted with Mr Blank’s 
large white and gold room. She interprets the social gap with the language of rooms, 
one that she is most familiar with. Social hierarchy is enacted in the setup of different 
rooms; the worry and monotony society inflicts translate to the uniformity of rooms 
and anxiety to find the right room and provision. Society has no room for inefficient 
members like Sasha. Her complaint against Mr. Blank becomes a rebuking of society 
as she relates the physical entrapment to capitalist oppression. By all accounts her 
speech is harsh and her arguments compelling. But, of course, she does not say this 
aloud. Still Sasha is relieved and liberated; she walks out into the streets where the air 
is “sweet” and “the dry leaves are blowing along” (26). Her sense of feeling free is 
not dependent on victory over her oppressors. She makes a point to herself about the 
workings of society and leaves it unheard. Just as she “will never tell the truth about 
the business of rooms,” she will not divulge her analysis of society because “it would 
bust the roof off everything,” giving away herself and all other destitute women (33). 
 It is difficult to comprehend Sasha’s actions from a rigorously feminist 
perspective. Phenomenologically speaking, the act of describing the scene is an 
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experience for herself; it need not represent women. As Alcoff explains it, experience 
cannot be reduced to discourse: “lived experience includes such things as choices, 
intentions, and a range of inarticulate affects that exceeds discourse” (52). She adds 
that there can be a discourse of women’s experience only if it is supplemented with 
“phenomenological accounts of the embodied effects on subjectivity” (55). Sasha’s 
way of seeing is a result of her vulnerability, self-derision, and passive-aggressiveness. 
Her embodied experience is formed from impressions and memory of places. They 
make her vision unique and feminine. Sasha is the exemplary lived body that, as 
Young describes, “has culture and meaning inscribed in its habits, in its specific forms 
of perception and comportment” (Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays 14). Her 
narrative is a description of a lived experience expressed through the perception of 
spatiality. Pièce by pièce, she habitually recalls the past and re-interprets events, 
revising the way she sees the lived world.     
What is presented in Good Morning, Midnight is the subjective perceptual 
experience of one lone and destitute woman. Rhys lets us in on a particularised way 
of seeing that does not adhere to normative perception and a lived experience 
embracing the past and destitution which are excluded from phenomenological 
traditions. This kind of seeing is characterised by material resemblances, invigorated 
by the relation between the milieu which has shaped her and places she experiences, 
between the past and present. Good Morning, Midnight confronts us with a perception 
haunted by residuals of past experiences. The effects of such perception on women’s 
inhabitation, actions, and thoughts are further explored in Bowen’s short stories, 
which thrive on ghostly repercussions and haunted houses.  
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5. On Shaky Ground: Elizabeth Bowen’s Ghost Fiction 
Haunted rooms in Good Morning, Midnight are a precursor to the haunted houses in 
Elizabeth Bowen’s ghost fiction. Whereas Rhys’s rooms are haunted by the past, 
Bowen’s houses are frightening, possessed by spectrality. Especially in “The Demon 
Lover” (1941), “Pink May” (1942), and “Hand in Glove” (1952), the fantastic is 
palpable and built into brick and mortar.78 Spellbinding place, for Bowen, is not an 
alternative world antithetical to reality, but inspires an alternative way of looking at 
the world. In the preface to A Day in the Dark and Other Stories (1965), she states, “I 
do not make use of the supernatural as a get-out; it is inseparable (whether or not it 
comes to the surface) from my sense of life” (9). Founded on the co-existence of 
unreality and reality, Bowen’s houses are threshold spaces, possessed by phantasms 
of the past, the dead, and forgotten, inhabited by wandering tenants. By housing the 
fantastic in living space, Bowen dramatises the ambivalence of women’s everyday 
experiences and returns some opacity to the intelligible and visible world.  
Place is uncanny but still recognisable in Bowen’s fiction. As Jacqueline Rose 
notes, the short stories “push our sense of perceptual reality towards a type of vertigo 
or precipice” (“Bizarre Objects” 78). Dislocation and uncanny effects occur, Merleau-
Ponty explains, “because one’s own body has ceased to be a knowing body, and has 
ceased to draw together all objects in its one grip” (POP 329). In a similar manner, 
Bowen’s characters are stripped of knowledge and become completely dependent on 
place. Their “thinking,” to quote Merleau-Ponty, “starts from nowhere,” for one is 
“united” with space (330). The affect of place is emphasised in “Notes on Writing a 
Novel” in which Bowen states: “The locale of the happening always colours the 
                                                
78 “The Demon Lover” first appeared in The Listener; “Pink May” in English Story; and “Hand in 
Glove,” written at the request of Cynthia Asquith, in Second Ghost Book. Parenthetical reference for 
the stories will be referred as “HG,” “PM,” and “TDL.”   
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happening, and often, to a degree, shapes it” (39). Bowen’s narratives show the extent 
to which people are influenced by and their perception shaped by the environment in 
which they find themselves.  
The texts in this thesis help us visualise and understand the workings of place 
in the phenomenological structure of perception. As discussed in previous chapters, 
place is intentional and responsible for orientating and positioning women. In 
Nightwood, nocturnal space bends perception; in Good Morning, Midnight, the room 
lets the past into present experience. In “The Demon Lover,” “Pink May,” and “Hand 
in Glove,” it is the haunted house that bedevils characters by gnawing at the past and 
what has been repressed. The stories comprise a fantasy world where ideas of place 
and women’s perception of places do not confirm preexisting formulas of experience. 
The haunted house, or “crazy house,” as Bowen calls it, refigures “reason” (Collected 
Impressions 44).    
Haunted space negotiates between rational explanation and imagination. The 
supernatural cannot be “grasped in a single perception by all the senses, as ordinary 
experience does” (Delaplace, “What the Invisible Looks Like” 64). It illuminates the 
things which “usually escape our senses” (65). Bowen’s haunted space, in this regard, 
resists correct perception; the ghostly experience cannot be explained rationally. The 
haunted house stands against the Cartesian “treasure house of the mind” (Meditations 
on First Philosophy 46).79 “Human reason,” Kant writes, “is by nature architectonic, 
viz., it considers all cognitions as belonging to a possible system” (Critique of Pure 
Reason 502). A system of precepts and rules, the treasure house (of mind) fits diverse 
experiences into its singular structure of understanding. Merleau-Ponty concurs with 
Kant that experience cannot be mathematically reasoned. This is reasoning that 
                                                
79 Some translations use ‘storehouse’, from the Greek thesauro.  
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“begin[s] from self-constructed and well-defined definitions” and not “from concepts, 
which are already given but are also given in a confused manner” (54). Perception 
cannot be mathematical; perception akin to thought is nothing but “fraud” (17). 
“Perception,” Merleau-Ponty states, “is not an act of understanding” (54). The real 
does not need to be understood; it must only be described. To conceive the world with 
human reason is, in Kant’s words, a silly attempt to “build nothing in philosophy 
except houses of cards” (637).   
Built on shaky ground, quasi-real, and part-fantasy, haunted space is like a 
house of cards without the rational façade. It is unstable and ambivalent. Experience 
of haunted space, like the experience of the night and past, is a dramatisation of being 
in the world. Whilst Nightwood presents perception at a slant and Good Morning, 
Midnight perception as habit, all of which are possibilities of experience that are less 
deliberated in phenomenology, Bowen’s short stories reveal perception as belief. In 
the selected stories, place reflects and shapes its inhabitants’ beliefs. The perversion 
of the domestic home, from a place of safety to terror, shakes the female characters’ 
beliefs and equilibrium, which are in actuality evolved versions of social norms that 
reinforce the status quo. The haunted house subverts the home, which is “the ‘most’ 
feminine of spaces,” and so disparages the “deep-seated and seemingly ‘natural’ 
association” between women and the home (Domosh and Seager 2).     
A phenomenology of place for women shows how women’s embeddedness in 
the world, often a socio-cultural world that for many women is the only kind of world, 
manifests in the way they approach and orientate themselves in place. In Bowen’s 
stories, being situated is to be subjected to social norms and beliefs which influence 
how women view themselves and the world. They are confined to physical and 
figurative spaces. The bedroom upstairs, for instance, imprisons the women in “Pink 
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May” and “The Demon Lover.” Haunted space, however, breaks the ultimate 
archetype of feminine space—the home—by superimposing upon domestic space a 
parallel space sustained by doubts of the faith that upholds the feminine and domestic 
ideal. The faith I speak of is an ingrained belief in certain ideologies that reinforces 
the power of the dominant and enables the continued marginalisation of the 
disadvantaged. Ideology of such force has the strength of belief. A classic example is 
the belief that the city at night is dangerous for the lone woman. Still today many 
women “avoid walking in certain places, at particular times, and often will not go out 
alone” (Domosh and Seager 100). Fear and oppression are spectres of patriarchy 
looming over the weaker gender.  
Bowen’s stories engage the fear of place in a very different manner. Whilst 
gender stratified space is regulative, haunted space is restorative in its effort to shock 
and rouse inhabitants from inertia. It disrupts regulated perception, consequently 
tearing apart the synthesised world. The women in Bowen’s stories, conditioned to 
perceive the regulated world as ideal, do not deal well with the disequilibrium. Their 
reactions to the hauntings testify to the intensity of social and gender-codified 
conditioning to which women have been subjected. Most women, consciously or not, 
have been well disciplined, thoroughly accustomed to the hegemonic structure of 
perception.  
Consider young Kathleen who, wanting to refuse her lover, could only say: 
“But that was—suppose you—I mean, suppose” (“TDL” 83); Mrs. Drover whose 
mouth “hung open… before she could issue her first scream” (87); and the women in 
“Pink May” and “Hand in Glove” whose desire to be wanted left one “ruined” (“PM” 
160), the other “choke[d]” (“HG” 216). They suffer for overstepping their boundaries. 
Phyllis Lassner, in Elizabeth Bowen: A Study of the Short Fiction, affirms that women 
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are “[held] responsible” for “men’s failed dreams” and “betrayed expectations” (57). 
One breaks her promise to her ex-lover; another cheats on her husband; the third is 
too manly. Transgression has consequences: the women are haunted by the ghosts of 
their persecutor, and worse still, an internalised patrimonial sense of duty and honour. 
At first glance, the haunted house seems to be imprisoning. But, as I will explain 
shortly, its deviance is needed to reflect the perversity of the male-centric world, a 
regimented environment which women themselves are guilty of preserving.   
As the haunted house is perverse, so is the lived world. Disciplined by “the 
law of the father,” Donna Haraway muses, “Who wouldn’t grow up warped?” 
(“Situated Knowledges” 54). Living in a “garrison town” which “plumed itself upon 
its romantic record,” Ethel Trevor in “Hand in Glove” sees marriage as a prize to be 
fought for (207). Her perception of the world is formed by what she believes the 
world to be. Warped beliefs lead to warped seeing. To expose “false vision” and 
relearn how to see, Haraway states that emphasis must be placed on “limited location 
and situated knowledge”: limited location refers to circumscribed mental and physical 
space in which women find themselves, and this specific vantage allows them to be 
“answerable for what [they] learn how to see” and provides knowledge (59).80 
Limited location relates to situatedness, which recognises that “I am thrown into a 
nature” that is “outside of me” and also “discernible at the centre of subjectivity” 
(POP 403).  
Situatedness involves an understanding of what it means to be in a world that 
is lived. We have before us a world that precedes our existence, but we also shape the 
world according to our existence. To be situated entails balancing between faith in an 
                                                
80 Haraway advocates a “feminist objectivity” which counteracts all “Western cultural narratives about 
objectivity” (59). As feminists, she continues, we must learn “how to attach the objective to our 
theoretical and political scanners in order to name where we are and are not, in dimensions of mental 
and physical space we hardly know how to name” (59).  
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already inhabited world and the belief in the power to inhabit the world. David 
Simpson, in Situatedness, Or, Why We Keep Saying Where We’re Coming From, 
explains the task of situatedness: 
It is meant to preserve rather than resolve the tension we experience 
between being in control and out of control, between seeing ourselves 
as agents of change and as passive receivers of what is already in 
place. (20) 
His explanation echoes phenomenology’s idea of being in and of the world. Though 
trenchant, both Merleau-Ponty and Simpson assume in their use of “I” and “We” that 
women are in “in control and out of control” in the same way as men are (20). Yet 
this is rarely the case in the patriarchal world which presents itself as neutral and its 
system as normal. We must look again at what it means for women to be situated. 
Haraway suggests that to be situated is to be “subjugated” (60). If she is right, then 
situatedness is not the body in the world from which women know themselves as 
subjects to the world, for they believe themselves subordinate to the subjects of the 
world. Experience is doubly sedimented for the subjugated. Unless they explicitly see 
their situation as subjugation, they can never break out of the illusion erected by 
dominant beliefs.  
Place is the spatial embodiment of beliefs where myths and ideals of gender 
are practiced, and also where new beliefs may be formed and tried. All places are 
intentional, but the house as home has an added intentionality in terms of how it is 
designed to orientate women. This chapter interrogates the notion of belief within 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and examines how experiences of certain places 
reveal the pernicious effects of beliefs, particularly a faith that goes without 
questioning. I show how perceptual beliefs are related to internalised social and 
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political beliefs that domesticate and disempower women. Phenomenologically, belief 
has an experiential dimension, i.e., the belief in something is a lived experience of the 
thing in question. Merleau-Ponty’s idea of perceptual faith helps elucidate the unity 
of vision. Perceptual faith gives insight into questions of how we see the world with 
sedimented beliefs and how our experience is ordered in a manner common to 
humankind. Whilst this muted faith brings people together, ascertaining a world of 
selves, the practice of faith reaps differently for men and women, the aged and young, 
the bourgeoisie and proletariat. The different situatedness of men and women means 
that how each views the world from their positions would have influence on their 
practice of faith and the effects of faith on their action and behaviour. To presume that 
man in the world is the same as woman in the world homogenises situatedness. 
Women’s situatedness is often one of spatial delimitation. The domestic home 
is an example of delimited space. It constrains its mistress to her duties which are 
built into various rooms of the house like the kitchen. As the epitome of feminine 
space, the home—I am thinking of the domestic ideal carried over from the Victorian 
age—tries to keep women from straying outside the dominant socio-cultural ideology. 
Set in stone, it reifies biases and beliefs that subjugate those trapped within its walls. 
Bowen’s haunted homes, in comparison, are less reassuring of beliefs. As I will argue 
later, the haunted house is a mythical space which is less knowable, but visible and 
veridical. It exists because the believer perceives it to exist. The women think and act 
in a certain way in mythical space because of handed down beliefs. Whilst the 
domestic home is an enforcer of beliefs, its wayward other as conceived in Bowen’s 
stories scares its inhabitants out of them. The home is unhinged; the women feel 
displaced; space is no more monolithic. On the brink of demise, the women or those 
around them experience how wavering beliefs break strongholds. The haunted house, 
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nearly pushing its inhabitants over the ledge, is an intimidating place, full of power 
and potential for change.  
In “The Demon Lover,” “Hand in Glove,” and “Pink May,” place has as much 
potential to liberate as it has to imprison. If place fortifies beliefs, it can also shake 
them. Evoking feelings of homeliness and homelessness, the haunted house is 
articulated as a space of ambivalence. This double space motivates the return home 
only to turn the returner away at its door. At work is the debunking of beliefs and 
making of myths. Double space is of the “hazily known and of the unknown” (Tuan, 
Space and Place 86).81 Ambivalence surrounding the haunted house foils the 
normative order of perception and razes the ideal feminine space to the ground. 
Women are deracinated from conventions; their faith in the home and what it 
symbolises falters. In haunted space the female characters experience a moment of re-
cognition in which they encounter and cogitate again something they once knew and 
believed in. Only this time, the place they call home is not protective but aggressive. 
The ghostly house precipitates an existential crisis that shakes epistemological beliefs. 
Bowen’s spatial stories tell us how our relation to the world is never exclusive to what 
we think is obvious such as common beliefs and imitated practices; in fact, any real 
connection to the world is dependent on how much remains unperceived and fuzzy. 
Only after we accept the world is ambivalent can we stop reducing it to formulas and 
synopses and begin experiencing things in their mystery and givenness.  
 
                                                
81 Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan elaborates on the chiasmic nature of mythical space: it is “a fuzzy area” 
surrounding “pragmatic space” (86). In such space it is “the fuzzy ambience of the known which gives 
man confidence in the known” (87).  
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The Haunted House is a Bad Home    
At the centre of the three stories is the haunted house. Often linked to the Gothic, it is 
associated with “curse narratives,” which Robert Mighall explains “bind the lives of 
the present generation to the misguided customs of the past” (A Geography of 
Victorian Gothic Fiction 80). Usually a castle or country manor, it commands an 
“imposing” presence, echoing also the strong patrimonial ties between fathers and 
heirs (Williams, Art of Darkness 39). Elsewhere, the haunted house appears in a 
myriad of genres from invasion narrative to mystery. Each domicile is imposing in its 
respective way. The old family manor in detective stories like Wilkie Collins’s The 
Moonstone (1868) and Arthur Conan Doyle’s “The Adventures of the Speckled 
Band” (1892) is surrounded by an aura of otherness that thickens the mystery. In the 
twentieth century, the haunted house hosted more than ghosts and spirits. Notably, in 
the fantasy tales of H. P. Lovecraft, the house bridges science and the supernatural, 
functioning as a portal to alien worlds and mythic cosmos. Clearly the haunted house 
is a very important narrative trope. Amongst the many kinds of haunted house, I am 
interested in the one that illuminates the relation between women’s experience and 
place. This haunted house shares the setting of the domestic home and haunts its 
homemaker.   
 The domestic haunted house emerged with the cult of domesticity which 
proliferated in the 1800s. Also coined the cult of True Womanhood, Barbara Welter 
explains how conflation of the feminine ideal and domestic space made women “the 
hostage in the home”: 
The attributes of True Womanhood, by which a woman judged herself 
and was judged by her husband, her neighbors and society could be 
divided into four cardinal virtues-piety, purity, submissiveness and 
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domesticity. Put them all together and they spelled mother, daughter, 
sister, wife-woman. (“The Cult of True Womanhood” 151-152) 
To be a true woman was to stay at home. Women were expected to “dispense comfort 
and cheer” (163), “keep busy at morally uplifting tasks” (164), and pick up “forms of 
artsy-craftsy activity” like needlework and flower arrangement (165). These tasks 
ensured the moral and aesthetic upkeep of the home. As the home came to represent 
virtue and taste, economic progress and growing affluence led to an increase in the 
number of bourgeois houses. This socio-architectural phenomenon found its way into 
literature and affected the narrative of place in haunted house fiction.  
Significantly, the bourgeois domestic home was the idée fixe in women’s 
ghost fiction. Though not as imposing as the castle or abbey, the pretty house in West 
London in Rhoda Broughton’s “The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the 
Truth” (1868) and the cosy cottage in Edith Nesbit’s Man-Size in Marble (1893) 
portray a different haunted house which despite its ghostly presence is familiar. This 
haunted house is close to home, neither aristocratic nor secluded. The move of the 
haunted house from noble estates to middle-class homes has implications for our 
discussion here. For one thing, it is not bound with patrimony but femininity. Given 
that the middle-class home is a “highly feminized phenomenon” where women 
“‘worked for love’,” its haunted counterpart can be read as a means of challenging the 
gendered foundations of the domestic home (Sparke, As Long as It’s Pink 19; 
Domosh and Seager 5). Instead of putting women in place, the haunted house shakes 
them from deep-seated domestic ideology, which Sharon Marcus explains is “the 
celebration within the middle class of separate spheres of home and work, divided 
along gendered lines that assigned a domestic realm to women and a public realm to 
men” (Apartment Stories 89-90). Indeed, in Bowen’s “Pink May,” “The Demon 
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Lover,” and “Hand in Glove,” the haunted house fails to meet the conditions of the 
domestic ideal and is a feminine nightmare.  
The house locks its inhabitant away from the outside world and traps her in 
the spatial manifestation of her beliefs. As Hermoine Lee explains, “Places are used 
repeatedly to expose a deficiency in the people who inhabit them” (Elizabeth Bowen: 
An Estimation 132). She is right to the extent that “people” include the ones who once 
inhabited places and laid the foundation stones of culturally and socially divided 
spaces. The place in question is the haunted house; but more specifically, it is the 
haunted domestic home. To rephrase Lee’s words, the house is used to expose the 
problems of those who believe in and are influenced by the domestic ideology that 
dresses up the feminine and private sphere as ideal. “Certain locales,” Lee writes, “are 
always bad for the soul” (133). That is to say the home is bad for the homemaker.  
An enduring motif of refuge and imprisonment, the home exposes the 
conflicting relation between women and place. Given its “close association with 
family and stability,” Rebecca Janicker affirms that the home is “especially good at 
provoking tension and anxiety in most people—both about the relationship of 
individual to family and of family to larger social and historical hole” (The Literary 
Haunted House 19). Approaching Bowen’s choice of the haunted house through 
Janicker’s insight, the stories capitalise on the female protagonists’ intimate 
relationship with the home: by undermining the stability of the house, Bowen disrupts 
the indelible link between women and home.  
Unlike Woolf who wrote on the rights of women, Bowen is not known for her 
feminist politics. Ellmann claims in “Elizabeth Bowen: The Missing Corner” that 
“Bowen was no feminist,” citing Bowen in 1961: “I am not, and shall never be, a 
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feminist” (65).82 Still, Bowen’s fascination with place, her “spellbound beholding” of 
scenes, puts emphasis on the environment over the personal. This is paramount to the 
understanding of women’s experience, for Bowen’s stories bring places to the 
foreground, enabling a first-hand examination of women’s participation in the world.  
To Bowen, place is more than an “element”; it is an “actor” (Preface to The 
Last September 123). It is “lived,” in that it reflects the values and beliefs of past 
occupants and also the present inhabitants who then act according to those beliefs. In 
this regard, one’s experience in and of place is not an inconsequential encounter with 
objective space, but an engagement with a habitus shaped by the past and prevailing 
beliefs. Every bit of one’s encounter in and with place reveals the indoctrinated 
beliefs that one is acting out which also accounts for actions and reactions. The 
haunted house fiction puts the home under scrutiny, interrogating the forces that shape 
feminine experience and examining how domesticity and femininity are entangled in 
the mess that is the ideal home.   
For a feminist phenomenology of place, Bowen’s haunted house perverts the 
domestic and frustrates the experience of the feminised home, ultimately exposing the 
ideology that keeps women in their roles, subservient to the set of values and morals 
mandated by the dominant culture. The codes of conduct and attitudes are in 
accordance with the domestic ideology internalised and reproduced by women 
themselves. Marcus gives insight into the “moral attributes” and “actions proper to 
wives and husbands”: 
Domestic ideology dictated that women were to be self-sacrificing and 
virtuous, men enterprising, protective of their families, and susceptible 
to women’s softening influences. Women were to guarantee the 
                                                
82 Quoted in Heather Bryant Jordan’s How Will the Heart Endure: Elizabeth Bowen and the Landscape 
of War. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1992. p. xvi.   
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neatness, order, and comfort of the home by managing household 
finances and supervising servants; men were to earn the money with 
which women created the domestic comfort that would restore their 
husbands at the end of each working day. (90)   
The similarities between the qualities of the home and its maker are striking. Women 
form the paragon of morality and virtue; the home is a safe haven, undefiled by the 
mechanistic and mercenary world. Their “softening influences” and ability to create 
“domestic comfort” are reflected in the home which is “comfortable” and, according 
to Sparke, does not “threaten or create dis-ease of any kind” (As Long As It’s Pink 
26). The home is an extension of women. It is a material projection and spatial 
embodiment of feminine qualities and beliefs. The home is happy and good because 
its maker is the Good Wife.  
 The house is a structure of domesticity and its female inhabitant embodies 
domestic values and expectations. Together, they present the home as the ideal 
feminine and domestic space. A good home is feminine and domestic. In Bowen’s 
ghost fiction, the supernatural tears apart the good home and turns it into the bad: the 
haunted house. By subverting the good home, Bowen’s haunted-house narratives 
challenge ideas of domesticity and femininity. They elucidate the importance of place 
in experience and how some ghostly additions to its appearance can alter the relation 
between women and place and expose the indoctrinated beliefs they have interiorised 
as their own.  
 On the note of the haunted house as a bad home, Stephen King discusses in a 
similar vein the idea of the “Bad House” that “seems to literally tear itself away” 
(Danse Macabre 152). It is the “prosaic fallout of the place” where the haunted house 
fiction begins (152). Instead of focusing on the psychological aspect of haunting or 
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emotional disequilibrium of characters, King describes the house to show the 
condition of those trapped inside. The state of the house reflects the state of its maker. 
Accordingly, for a feminist phenomenological reading of place, the narrative of the 
decrepit houses undergoing changing hands are material manifestations of the inner 
unrest and conflict of their female inhabitants. The house is not external to the 
individual’s circumstance but is a way of enacting her unaddressed desires and 
silence. As Lee writes, “‘Bowen’s terrain’… is a spiritual as well as a geographical 
locality” (130). Bowen’s haunted house is the antithesis of the domestic home which 
is supposed to be a cosy and private sphere, cleaned and managed by women, and 
representative of the nucleus family. In creating haunted, bad homes, Bowen tears 
apart the façade of the ideal home, exposing the problems of its domestic ideology. 
In “The Demon Lover,” for instance, Bowen refigures the concept of the home 
as shelter and reveals the underside of an overprotective environment. The house is 
too secured, to the point of being claustrophobic. In “Hand in Glove,” claustrophobia 
is intensified in the attic, whilst in “Pink May” the most unsettling spaces are the 
bedroom and bathroom. It is no coincidence the haunting is acute and terrifying in the 
most private and feminine of rooms. The former bedroom of Kathleen is where she 
keeps herself safe; but it is also a place where the supernatural and fear creep in. The 
bedroom traditionally “considered part of the women’s sphere… for privacy and for 
more intimate meetings” morphs into a site of struggle and tension (Sparke, As Long 
As It’s Pink 24). It may be a temporary hideout, but it stirs anxiety. Likewise, in “Pink 
May,” the bathroom where one cleanses and comes undone (like Sasha crying in the 
lavatory) becomes the place of terror. It unnerves the unnamed protagonist: “it made 
me heave the other way round in [her] bath, in order to keep one eye on the door” 
(154). Also, in “Hand in Glove,” the attic or as Bachelard describes “the garret in 
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which we [are] alone” fails as a shelter (15). Unlike Clarissa Dalloway who could 
unwind in the attic room, Ethel is wound up and chokes in her attic. The haunted 
home compels the women to confront their domestic beliefs and what it means to 
have a lived experience of the world.  
Domestic ideology affects experience. It functions as a kind of “prepersonal 
tradition,” assigning meaning to places like the home, “in accordance with an earlier 
agreement reached between x and the world” (POP 296). The “earlier agreement” in 
context of our discussion would be the gendered division of labour that has feminised 
the private and interior. As Domosh and Seager states, the home “resonates as a 
marker of women’s so-called inner character” (8). The home suffused with feminine 
qualities “endows every subsequent perception, of space with its meaning,” and is a 
structure which reveals “a communication with the world more ancient than thought” 
(POP 296). Women’s perception of the home is tainted by tradition, their direct 
experiences hampered by preexisting ideals of experience. The home is not neutral. It 
is, as Merleau-Ponty writes of space, “presupposed”: it cannot be “observed” since it 
is “already constituted” (296). Geometrically, the presupposed domestic space is 
perspectival: it consists of the actual space before her eyes and an invisible dimension 
that is automatically visualised. The preconception of space works similar to the extra 
dimension in tri-dimensional Euclidean space, adding depth to the flat visual field. 
Presupposed space is not flat but has depth, enabling the rotation of objects and a 
multi-perspectival view.  
Depth has a phenomenological significance. The proclivity for a holistic grasp 
of things presupposes depth and causes one to abandon her unique “point of view” so 
as to assume a God-like perspective of the world (POP 298). “For God,” Merleau-
Ponty writes, “breadth is immediately equivalent to depth” (298). But we are not God; 
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we are not above all and omnipresent. Our view of the world is exceedingly limited. 
In order to get to the “human experience of the world” and not “what God might think 
about it,” we must make depth visible (298). Depth needs to be described as it is 
lived. Rather than accepting depth as naturally invisible and that we are “simply badly 
placed to see it,” we take up positions in the world, describing one point of view at a 
time (297). As we actively live space and take up different positions within, we see 
that the extra dimension is not derived from the object seen, but “belongs to the 
perspective” (298). This is revelatory for the subject who has always perceived the 
world intelligibly. One realises that experience is not direct, between subject and 
object, but is mediated.  
We are all guilty of depth perception. We think a square side suggests a cube; 
a door must lead to a room. Behind our seamless perception is an intentional arc. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the intentional arc projects “our human setting, our 
physical, ideological situation and moral situation” (POP 157). It directs our actions 
and shapes perception. The intentional arc, Donald Landes defines, is “an embodied 
and meaningful orientation toward the world” (The Merleau-Ponty Dictionary 114). It 
seems the arc dovetails present individual experience and existing patterns of 
experience. The intentional arc reminds us that we are bodies situated in the world, 
meaning the world and others are part of lived experience. Both Merleau-Ponty and 
Landes regard milieu as constitutive of existence: people help us understand our lived 
experience and ourselves as subjects in and of the social world. If so, Kathleen 
Drover’s “setting,” determined by her duties as a sister, wife, mother, and fiancée, 
frames her situation and bestows her experience with significance. Yet, women’s 
orientation towards the world, though saturated with meaning, puts them in positions 
where their selves are often suppressed in support of those in power. The trouble is 
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women’s situation (for example, being confined to domestic space) does not so much 
enable a meaningful individual experience of the world as it disenables them from 
other possible ways of experiencing the lived world.  
Domestic space requires maintenance and upkeeping. The woman is part of its 
setup; she is the homemaker. On this, Wendelin Küpers explains that in organised 
space, “practitioners” are “being carried forward by lines or cycles of intentionality” 
(Phenomenology of the Embodied Organization 130). There implies some degree of 
complicity on the part of those who participate in the practice. Some feminist critics 
have singled women out for their passivity: de Beauvoir notes how mothers impart 
domestic values to daughters; Sparke alleges that women are “sustainers of the status 
quo” (As Long As It’s Pink 26). They are correct to say that women often take part in 
marginalising their own kind, but, salient as the claims are, they assume it is possible 
for all women to simply walk away from the home and everything that they have 
believed to be right and true. Such claims can be presumptuous and quite uncaring. It 
is more useful for our discussion to think of bodies phenomenologically, to think of 
them as intentional, not autonomous. This shifts focus from the body-in-itself to the 
body-in-the-world, which is interested in what motivates the body to act out intention. 
Also, as Küpers explicates, intentional bodies are not only “situated in, but also 
oriented operationally towards the world” (131). The adverb, “operationally,” relates 
to Küpers’s study of embodied organisation, but also signals a larger and more 
general structure at work, one that presets experience and orientates the body.  
We have established that women’s situation is a projection of greater socio-
cultural and ideological situations. To understand what makes women experience 
place the way they do, we must first acknowledge that setting and situation are not 
neutral. The locale in which the scene is set and where she is situated shapes her 
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experience. As aforementioned, this space is tri-dimensional and has an invisible 
depth formed by the intentional arc. Arced and expanded beyond what is seen, place 
mediates spatial experience. It is intentional space, which according to Küpers is 
“where things invite or are marked in relation to practices, capacities and powers” 
(130). It is a milieu reflecting the extent to which it is influenced and demarcated by 
prevailing social standards, where things and events occurring within reinforce the 
dominant system. The benumbed body is just one part of active and intentional space.  
The home is always intentional. But the haunted home in “The Demon Lover” 
is intentional in an additional way. Kathleen Drover’s experience is more than a 
projection of moral and social situations. It is synthesised by a double vision in which 
images of the house from memory converge with those that unfold in the present. The 
old house confronts Kathleen with “traces of her former habit of life” (“TDL” 80). 
She sees the past mingling with the present. The objects in the room automatically 
acquire a depth formed from the convergence of past and present impressions: “each 
object wore a film of another kind” (80). Walking into the room and “looking about 
her,” Kathleen observes many things including the white marble mantelpiece and the 
escritoire (80). As eye-catching as they are, her visual attention is on 
the yellow smoke-stain up the white marble mantelpiece, the ring left 
by a vase on the top of the escritoire; the bruise in the wallpaper where, 
on the door being thrown open widely, the china handle had always hit 
the wall. The piano, having gone away to be stored, had left what 
looked like claw-marks on its part of the parquet. (80)  
Here the placement of details differs from the natural order in which the things would 
have appeared. Emphasis is on the stains and bruises, the fallen state of the objects, 
which points to the passing of time, rather than the objects themselves. It is as if 
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Kathleen’s perception is gradually invaded by a consciousness of the past: the clauses 
become longer, more descriptive, including parentheses. The backstory of each object 
in the room becomes more elaborate with the increasing presence of the past. They 
become fuller in appearance and deeper in meaning. The past sneaks up and takes 
over, giving prominence to invisibles like the removed piano and vase and the stories 
behind the ring and claw-marks. There is an inversion at work: the invisible is 
envisioned and the visible diminishes. Moreover, the liberal use of past tense, which 
contrasts with the single mention of the present continuous tense (“Now the prosaic 
woman, looking about her”), also shuts the house within the past (80). Kathleen is the 
living present encroaching on a shut-up time capsule. 
 The return of the past recurs in Bowen’s fiction. In a complimentary reading 
of “The Demon Lover,” Thomas Davis regards the house, its old furniture, and the 
missing fiancé’s letter as “relics” (39), symbolising “the afterlife of the past in the 
present” (“Elizabeth Bowen’s War Gothic” 34). In a similar vein, Neil Corcoran 
concludes that “the re-surfacing of contingent memory” plagues Kathleen (Elizabeth 
Bowen: The Enforced Return 164). Because “The Demon Lover” is an inter-war 
story, it is tempting to associate recurrence with historical past, which “incorporates 
the fear of civilizational decline and extinction” (Davis 35). Words like “afterlife” and 
“re-surfacing” imply continuum: the past discontinues the present so as to continue 
from where it left off. Davis suggests that the “past returns to make sense of the 
present” (35), echoing Ellmann’s general observation of Bowen’s fiction: “Her stories 
rarely unfold chronologically, but tend to psychoanalyze themselves, tracing present 
crises to past causes” (“Shadowing Elizabeth Bowen” 149). The impulse is always to 
trace back, to re-discover the past in the pretext of figuring the present. In doing so, 
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one is caught up in retrospection and reflection, and forgets that the past does not 
override the present, even if it influences it.  
Consider this from a phenomenological perspective. According to Merleau-
Ponty, whether willful or oblivious, one undertakes the past in the same way we take 
up decisions that support our motivations. The memory of the past, which is much 
like the expectation of death, is “a situation in which [one’s] presence is required” 
(POP 302). By giving away bits of the history of the stains, Kathleen inserts herself 
back into the home in which she no longer lives. She sees things with a tint of past 
impressions because “they already contain [the past] in their significance” (302). In 
this sense, the past is not superimposed on the present but first mediated through the 
body, summoned quite arbitrarily as Kathleen walks and looks around the room. With 
this I want to suggest a different reading to that of Davis and Ellmann’s which reads 
the present in correspondence to the past. My reading of the chiasmic perception in 
“The Demon Lover” focuses on the phenomenological implications of intertwining 
temporalities with an emphasis on how absence and presence add to the intentionality 
of place which puts women in place and obscures their vision.  
To draw from Merleau-Ponty’s vocabulary, the past is an invisible and the 
present a visible. Using such terms brings perception into the analysis and by default 
implicates the seeing body. The body is a lived one; it is not an objective vessel or a 
passive receiver. Bowen’s female characters are illustrations of the phenomenal body, 
defined as “an irresolvable consciousness which is wholly present in every one of its 
manifestations” (POP 138). It is an embodiment of significances, of lingering affect. 
The amputee, for instance, continues to feel the limb which does not exists. She is 
acutely aware of absence, but at the same time “continues to allow for it” (94). This 
does not mean that the act of allowing is a conscious one. It merely tells us that one 
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does not actively stop the invisible from appearing. On this Merleau-Ponty firmly 
states that allowance is not a case of “I think that….”83 The appearance of invisibles is 
not a “deliberate decision” (94). Kathleen’s perception and re-envisioning of the past 
does not occur “at the level of positing consciousness” (94). Instead consciousness is 
deflected from the thinking body and emplaced in the room.  
In “The Demon Lover,” corporeality extends to the environment. The house 
and its furniture take on the consciousness of the owner. As she walks into her old 
Kensington abode, Kathleen is enclosed in another spatiality within the abandoned 
house, one which enacts the scene of smoke rising, the door swinging and hitting 
against the wall. The use of active verbs endows inanimate objects with life: “the door 
being thrown open widely, the china handle had always hit the wall” (80). Place is 
active and takes over the narrative. On behalf of Kathleen, it gradually pieces together 
the scene of former life in the house. Its presence is juxtaposed against the subject’s 
absence. This speaks to the extent to which Kathleen has allowed for the past to 
manifest itself. However, by doing so, she also recalls the invisibles and ideas that 
come with it, including habits and beliefs. This instinctive attraction to meaningful 
objects is part of what Merleau-Ponty terms “the power of habit” which “prompts us 
to revise our notion of ‘understand’” (POP 167). Habit improves understanding by 
“incorporate[ing]” the pre-existing sense of space into one’s “bodily space” (167). For 
Kathleen, her need to see to the plight of the house—“She had been anxious to see 
how the house was” (81)—is met by the habit of associating objects with narratives. 
Her perception is indicative of the embodied experience of the past and of domestic 
space, a perception curved by the intentional arc.  
                                                
83 Merleau-Ponty uses the example of the amputee’s “awareness of the amputated arm or of the 
disabled arm as absent” (94). 
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The home is built on tradition, shaped by handed-down moral values and 
beliefs. This means it is active, a cog in the patriarchal machine, regulating gender 
relations. The woman, who thinks herself independent, is in actuality passively 
receiving from place. This kind of experience is secondary as it is already present and 
precedes existence. But, Merleau-Ponty reminds us that experience is not “a by-
product of being,” in which case it cannot “[give] us access to being” (301). The 
distinction between experience as a product of being and as means to being is hard to 
make. But if we turn to the narratives of women’s experiences of haunted houses, the 
trauma and anxiety that result from the disparity between what they conceive the 
house to be and what they actually perceive in place could shed light on the extent to 
which intentional space influences experience. In the first place, disorientation and 
angst occur because the house is not the home that they have in mind. The haunted 
house fails as a home. Failure is its resistance to the propagation of dominant beliefs 
and domestic ideology.   
The parallel between the unhomely home and the haunted house is seen in 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wall-Paper” (1890). The house, which is 
also an ancestral home, supposedly conducive for “perfect rest” as decided by 
physicians in the narrator’s life, is “queer” and “haunted,” eventually driving her 
descent into madness (4). It is a “failed home,” Kate F. Ellis describes, “the place 
from which some (usually ‘fallen’ men) are locked out, and others (usually ‘innocent’ 
women) are locked in” (The Contested Castle ix). Failed homes like the haunted 
domestic space expose the failures of the home by twisting the domestic ideology 
engendering interior space. Like Gilman, Bowen uses the home to flag the dangers of 
believing domestic space is safe and nurturing. Rather than furthering the myth of 
feminine home, domestic space is demonised. And since the home puts women in 
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place—the homemaker as the feminine ideal—its ghostly counterpart displaces them 
from their inherited place and life at home.  
My focus on setting in Bowen’s stories departs from psychoanalytic readings 
on the unconscious. Critics like Sinéad Mooney maintain that “psychology meets the 
apparently inexplicable agency of the supernatural” in the ghost fiction (“Bowen and 
the Modern Ghost” 79). Corcoran similarly charts the return of carnal impulses as 
“human psychology is being opened up to its formative psycho-sexual patternings or 
stresses” (155). Whilst psychoanalytic perspectives give insight into the repressed, 
they fail to appreciate experience in its own context, preferring psychological origins 
to the material. Architecture is regarded as spiritual, symbolic of the inexplicable. 
Yet, for Bowen, as Lee affirms, place is “a spiritual as well as a geographical locality” 
(130). Instead of place being a psychological extension of the human mind, places in 
Bowen’s stories have a mystifying presence of their own that “arose out of an 
intensified, all but spellbound beholding… of the scene in question” (Preface to 
Stories by Elizabeth Bowen 129). Bowen’s terrain is a blend of material and mythical 
space that arrests the beholder. Its essence is captured in the haunted domestic home, 
especially since it is a tangible and familiar environment that in spite of ordinariness 
spellbinds its inhabitant.   
Familiar yet estranged feelings toward the house are often explained by the 
phenomenon of the uncanny. In his seminal essay, “The Uncanny” (1919), Sigmund 
Freud points out that “an unheimliches house” is generally translated to “a haunted 
house” (241). Das Unheimliche (the unhomely) toys with the idea of unhomeliness, 
where the unhomely house, or the uncanny, is “nothing new or alien, but something 
which is old-established in the mind and which becomes alienated from it only 
through the process of repression” (241). This idea of the home that is unhomely, the 
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familiar that is unfamiliar can be related back to how space can at times seem like a 
phantom limb to the inhabitant who has long occupied the space. The appearance of 
the haunted house is not altogether “alien” to its inhabitant because it still belongs to 
her, albeit now envisioned at a distance separated by spectrality. By relating the 
uncanny to the phantom limb, we can move away from discussions of the haunted 
house that often fall back into “the perennial obsession of the Gothic genre” and the 
return of the repressed (Janicker, The Literary Haunted House 26). Instead we can 
think of the house as a bodily extension of the subject’s consciousness and material 
fabric of her socially shaped mind. 
Although Bowen dabbled in the psychology of terror, her obsession was with 
material and mythical places. She once asked rhetorically, “Am I not a writer for 
whom places loom large?” (Pictures and Conversations 34). “Loom” is expressive of 
the haunting and mythical quality of place found in her fictional houses. This quality 
also distinguishes Bowen’s haunted house from the uncanny, which as Anthony 
Vidler describes, does not necessarily involve “the magical, the hallucinatory, and the 
supernatural” (The Architectural Uncanny 22). Part-fantasy, sinister in its want to 
situate women in wretched states, Bowen’s haunted house does not just evoke “a 
sense of lurking unease” or “an uncomfortable sense of haunting” (23). It is capable 
of either emplacing or displacing its inhabitants, depending on the nature of beliefs 
built into place. In any case, it brings awareness.  
Places in Bowen’s stories are used to “expose a deficiency in the people who 
inhabit them (Lee 132). The women are shaken into re-cognition: Kathleen is stuck in 
the taxi; Ethel is strangled in the attic. Yet this does not mean that place is a means to 
an end, functional in the mechanistic sense, just as the phantom limb does not inform 
the amputee that there is a lack. Rather, it draws attention to the function and 
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existence of the parts of the body. Bowen’s use of places, if explained through the 
phenomenology of the phantom limb, is a way to understand the lack of 
correspondence between the idea of the body and being a lived body in the world, 
between life and living in a material world. It is one thing to know there is a limb, and 
another to comprehend what this means: its muscular abilities and complex reflexes, 
for example. To begin to comprehend is not to think in the mind, but to live it. As 
Merleau-Ponty writes, “I cannot understand the function of the living body except by 
enacting it myself” (POP 87). In the short stories, Bowen is “enacting” the women’s 
existence and allowing them to be haunted by their phantom limbs which take the 
form of places so as to force one to rethink the body and its relation to place, or the 
lived world.  
The haunted house, or rather haunted space in general, is discussed in 
phenomenology. According to Merleau-Ponty, space becomes haunted when  
[The body] applies itself to space like a hand to an instrument, and 
when we wish to move about we do not move the body as we move an 
object. We transport it without instruments as if by magic, since it is 
ours and because through it we have direct access to space. (“An 
Unpublished Text” 5)  
His idea of haunted space may not cohere with popular definitions of the term but it 
still conveys that sense of being possessed by and losing control to some inexplicable 
higher power like magic. It is a “virtual space,” he writes, which is not removed from 
one’s “corporeal situation” (7). Haunted space is treated as a kind of mythical space 
that is magical and material at the same time. Mythical space is discussed more 
extensively later in the chapter, but at this point it is useful to introduce it as a space 
that “retain[s] the general setting” of the observable world and then “settle[s] in a 
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different theatre” (POP 331). Merleau-Ponty seems to imply that this space, before 
settling in the theatre in question (for example, the setting of haunted house fiction), is 
already performative in that it is endowed with symbolic significance.  
Take the attic in “Hand in Glove” for example. It is alluded to but never 
directly appears until the final scene, which is in keeping with the attic being a place 
of storage, associated with the stale and unused. The general spatiality is exported to 
the haunted attic of Jasmine Lodge and filled with a similar but symbolic significance 
according to how space is seen and experienced by Ethel Trevor. The luggage in the 
attic “yawned” and “gaped”—verbs that on one hand connote lethargy and reinforce 
the storage space where objects freeze in time, and on the other hand demonstrate the 
watchfulness of the “fixed eyes,” as if the objects are waiting to pounce on the 
intruder (“HG” 215). The first set of significance has to do with the general setting; 
the second is affected by Ethel’s comportment. With fear she sees the open trunks 
yawning and gaping, “glanc[ing] this way, that way, backward over her shoulder,” as 
if expecting the trunks to shut their lids on her (215).  
The object of Ethel’s anxiety and the anxiety itself, to use the language of 
phenomenology, “both express the same essential structure of [her] being,” that is 
“being situated in relation to an environment” whose “structure alone gives 
significance to the directions up and down in the physical world” (POP 331-332). The 
structure, or the haunted spatiality, holds together Ethel’s experience in the attic, her 
fear and anxiety, and her perception of the macabre trunks that only become more real 
to the extent that she does not leave the attic. As long as she stays in the “theatre,” the 
show will go on. The spatial manifestation of her bodily attitude perseveres and the 
haunted house remains, until the end where Ethel’s fierce pursuit of the glove causes 
her demise and brings the haunting to a close.  
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Here we see how the haunting of the attic is internalised and then projected 
back onto place, causing a dramatic enactment of the menacing glove. This episode is 
also important for it cautions against the lack of discernment of place and calls for a 
reflection of what it means to be in a lived world. If we return for the last time to the 
the phantom limb, the pursuit of the glove, which Ethel has so convinced herself to be 
essential and must belong to her, can be read as her attempt to recuperate what has 
been removed from her. Yet, as mentioned, the bodily object here which is like the 
phantom limb is not meant to be ‘attached’ back to its owner. Ethel’s desire to seize 
the glove, thinking that the haunted glove can be transformed back into its ‘normal’ 
form, is symbolic of her want to exit the “theatre” by putting an end to the haunting. 
The imposition of a separate reality unto haunted space is an attempt to break out of 
the existing spatiality. And the consequence is dire for Ethel who fails to recognise 
the nature and power of place and how to inhabit mythical and material spaces. 
Though the story ends on a less ghostly note, it comes at the expense of one who has 
not yielded to the existential nature of space.  
Space is not only essential; it is existential. For as long as those haunted live in 
the world of the haunting, haunted experience counts as perception. It exists because 
one believes one sees it, even if does not appear in objective space, according to the 
laws of perception. There is little need for a clear distinction between the real and 
unreal, cause and consequence. Haunting is not a “representation but a genuine 
presence” (POP 338). What one sees is what one gets. Reality is only as real as it 
appears, as real as it is lived. The focus is on the experience in its context. The 
haunted house is as real as it is lived, its haunting as spooky as felt, ghosts as human 
as seen. 
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The Power of Beliefs  
The house in each story is spooky and mythical. It comprises the general setting, 
which is the home, enacted in theatrical settings, which can include dreamscapes and 
mythological places like Mount Olympus. Linked to stories about divine beings and 
beasts, myth is often dismissed as fallacious, even though it never claims to be the 
truth. Susan Sellers, in Myth and Fairy Tales in Contemporary Women’s Fiction, 
notes that myth can be conceived as “a mode of perception rather than an attempt at 
elucidation” (4). She draws from Susanne Langer and also Colin Falck’s mythic 
consciousness in which “the mythic mode of consciousness is a vision of reality,” 
thus also a mode of being, “of men’s place in reality” (Falck, Myth, Truth and 
Literature 116). Polish anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski resolves the tension 
between myth as being and as a tale of being in his elegant definition of myth as “a 
story told” and “a reality lived” (Myth in Primitive Psychology 21). Its fiction is 
bound to reality; the story lives on. There is an element of performance surrounding 
myth and so mythical space. But this performance is not associated with artificiality. 
Rather, as Malinowski tells us, it has to do with magic. Magic is made up of three 
parts: “the formula, the rite, and the condition of the performer” (112). As technical as 
it sounds, the “knowledge of magic” prepares the performer for the practice of magic 
(112). One does not question myth because, as with magic, it “never was created or 
invented”: “All magic simply was from the beginning” (113). It is self-sufficient and 
sustainable in its origin and continuation. Myth is magical like that.  
Although Merleau-Ponty describes the magic of space—how it is presupposed 
and omnipresent—his mythical space is overlaid by a nagging unreality. His approach 
to mythical-like space, which draws from physiology (he relates the rising and falling 
moments in dreams to the up and down motions of the chest during respiration), 
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undermines the sufficiency of mythical space. The mythical seems to require a more 
down-to-earth counterpart, its space always tracing back to some physiological root. 
Bowenian place, however, in its haunting, is mysterious and material at the same 
time. To its inhabitants, mythical space is existential.  
Looking at the ways in which the women relate to the home, first emplaced 
and then displaced, I want to address the spatiality and power of beliefs. Beliefs can 
either fortify or demolish existing space. The issue is not the belief per se. Neither is it 
about evaluating or righting the wrong. More salient is how beliefs are truths taken to 
be Truth, acted upon in the name of Truth. On the bright side, although beliefs are 
firm and relentless, they have the potential to ignite change. As Charles S. Pierce 
describes beliefs in his 1878 essay, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” “belief is a rule 
for action” (129). A meeting place for monistic principals of the dominant and the 
material application of rules, belief “appeases” doubt and “relaxes” thought (129). 
Older forms of thought rest and new thoughts may germinate. It follows that if the 
house is a site of built-in ideology, then it is also where natural thought suspends, 
beliefs debunked, myths invented. The ambivalence of haunted space mythologises 
the normative, eventually exposing the socio-political structure of perception and the 
power of mis/beliefs. 
If we shift the inquiry from that of what is real or unreal, Truth or myth, and 
instead focus on how mythical space can be sensible, embodying ideas and 
appearances, then the issue at hand is not a matter of binary differences but of 
perceptual attitudes. Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan asserts that mythical space cannot “be 
readily verified, or proven false, by the evidence of the senses” (Space and Place 85). 
Places like El Dorado, Sodom and Gomorrah have “to exist because they [are] key 
elements in complex systems of belief” (86). The existence of mythical space stands 
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for “a whole way of looking at the world” that acknowledges “areas of the hazily 
known and of the unknown” (86). There is a symbiotic relation between the known 
and unknown. Tuan explains that although “errors abound in the unperceived field,” it 
is not erroneous but “is every man's irreducible mythical space, the fuzzy ambience of 
the known” (87). Mythical space in this regard commingles the known and unknown, 
and can also be understood as objective space in which one knows one exists and the 
subjective sources that comprise one’s existence. Put simply, mythical space is as 
objective as one knows of it and as subjective as one personalises it. In Bowen’s 
haunted house stories, the home is as terrifying as the characters believe it to be. The 
key to perceiving haunted place is her beliefs.  
By now it should be clear that perception of space is a result of preconceived 
ideas, but what exactly are these ideas and how do they affect women in particular? 
Beliefs influence identity, thoughts, and experience, creating “a whole way of looking 
at the world” (Tuan 86). They are received and actively practiced. Whilst it is 
commonsense that faith requires action—the believer must practice her faith—the 
focus on place here looks at how beliefs become operative through place. Casey 
explains that abstract and neutral spaces are localised and made meaningful because 
of “the manipulation of natural or artificial materials” (Getting Back Into Place 114). 
Places are built to serve “particular predelineated purposes,” for example residential 
and sports buildings (114). Casey accounts for the social aspects of place but not the 
processes of socio-cultural conditioning in which human beings are socialised into 
accepting and practicing the law of the land. There is a gender bias and political side 
to these social purposes that need to be spelled out. 
Sensitive to the more nuanced ways in which social norms and tradition are 
ingrained in us, Ahmed suggests thinking of beliefs as “inheritance… what we receive 
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from others, as our ‘point of arrival’ into the familial and social order” (125). They 
link us to those who came before and with those who share the same lineage; they fit 
us into social groups and distance us from non-believers. Ahmed digs deeper into the 
implications of inheritance: 
Indeed, the word inheritance includes two meanings: to receive and to 
possess. In a way, we convert what we receive into possessions, a 
conversion that often ‘hides’ the conditions of having received, as if 
the possession is too simply ‘already there.’ (126) 
We act as if beliefs are “already there” in the world we inhabit—something taken for 
granted. They orientate us and reproduce the orientations of our predecessors. Beliefs 
are more powerful than we believe them to be. They are anchorages, situating human 
beings in the world that is orientated around the beliefs we share.   
For those who come into the world less privileged and with a lower position in 
the social ladder, the inheritance is a burden, a hegemonic ideology that reproduces 
normative perception and attitude, strengthening the dominant and discriminating 
against the dispossessed. Such prized inheritance—in the form of social norms and 
normative beliefs—has a different hold on women who are not the decreed inheritors. 
Women are “receivers,” in Ahmed’s terms, whose “reception is not about choice” 
(125).84 In the home women inherit social beliefs which they then naturalise as 
personal beliefs. Staying at home in the evening and doing housework are diluted 
forms of domestic ideology and femininity worked into the private space. We witness 
in Bowen’s stories how female characters believe certain ideas about themselves 
before entering the houses. There in the home they practice their beliefs, every action 
and thought presupposing space. The home is more than a background that facilitates 
                                                
84 Ahmed’s discussion on inheritance and reception centres on the passing down of histories, of 
“normative whiteness,” and of “compulsory heterosexuality” (127).  
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the process of inheriting. It is, Ahmed writes, “‘inherited’ as a dwelling” (126). To 
dwell in place is to inherit the beliefs that come with it.  
Belief has a spatial element: it is manifested and enforced in place. An 
excursus on place from Bowen’s personal writings throws light on the power of 
belief. In July 1935, Bowen was in search for a new house in London, which later 
came to be No. 2 Clarence Terrace. The experience of walking into people’s houses 
was, in her own words, “alarming” (The Mulberry Tree 210). In a letter to Woolf, 
dated 31st July 1935, Bowen wrote: 
It is impossible to believe that the people discovered in rooms sitting 
stiffly about as dolls in dolls-house attitudes are not to be sold with the 
house, and to remember that it is not necessary to ask oneself whether 
one likes them. I had no idea so many houses could be macabre and 
horrifying. (211) 
The houses are “macabre” because of their doll-like inhabitants. The anecdote reveals 
much about Bowen’s view of place and its inhabitants. Her perception is shaped by 
the belief that houses and people are intimately related. The idea of place is knitted 
with people: a narrative of place tells of the personal stories of those who inhabit it.  
An analysis of place gives insight into what shapes perception. Merleau-Ponty 
offers his take on what forms “initial perception”:  
Every perception presupposes, on the perceiving subject’s part, a 
certain past, and the abstract function of perception, as a coming 
together of objects, implies some more occult act by which we 
elaborate our environment. (POP 328) 
Perception begins with presupposition and the thing perceived is shaped by some 
inexplicable “occult act.” There is a “background” to every place (328). One can say 
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there is a backstory to every perception. There is an intimate and interactive relation 
between human beings and the world. Robert Tally Jr. describes it like this: “We are 
situated in a world that is not of our making, but our very essence (that is, existence 
itself) requires us to shape our world” (Spatiality 66). Notwithstanding the fact that 
one automatically inherits a place in a world that precedes one’s existence, one has 
the freedom to shape. 
Presupposition comes from the idea that perception is based on le préjugé du 
monde, that is, “widely held prejudice” (POP 5). The term more accurately translates 
to “the unquestioned belief in the world,” which is the “cause and content” of 
experience (Landes 223). Experience makes sense because “perception has long 
provided us with objects” which “we transpose… into consciousness” (POP 5). We 
think we see something only because we “know perfectly well” it exists in the world, 
at least we think we do (5). However, with ghosts, we are not so sure. Supernatural 
encounters as regarded as rare, one of a kind, experiences. Such experience, Merleau-
Ponty writes, is “taken in its private context as if it did not belong to the same 
universe as others” (POP 7). It is anomalous and treated as less of an experience. As 
with seeing in the dark and through the past, seeing ghosts is one of many “unclear 
sights” that seer tends to say, “It is so only for us” (7). This is the problem Merleau-
Ponty has with scientific analyses and casual explanations: these hypotheses “save the 
prejudice in favour of an objective world” (7). Unclear experiences are dismissed 
because of existing unquestionable perceptual beliefs. It follows that the more unclear 
experience is deemed to be, the deeper beliefs are set in stone.  
Experience of haunted space is especially fuzzy because it cannot be roped 
into preexisting formulas of perception. Unlike dreams and memory, it cannot be 
causally or psychologically rationalised. There is no waking life or present moment 
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that awaits the haunted. Perception is uncertain; the foundation on which it is built 
becomes shaky. In “What the Invisible Looks Like,” Grégory Delaplace highlights the 
problem of seeing ghosts from a phenomenological perspective:  
Ghosts, as sensations that challenge abruptly the implicit certainty that 
‘the world is what we see’, give us in a flash the uncanny suspicion 
that what we perceive might actually not be the entire world. Ghosts 
give us an uncertain glimpse of a dimension that usually remains 
invisible to us but that might nevertheless be part of the world. (65) 
Spectrality “casts doubts on human perception” (55); it challenges the “single regime 
of perception” (65). This regime is a belief system that functions similarly to the 
immanent order common in people known as perceptual faith. 
Perceptual faith, described in Merleau-Ponty’s manuscript dated 1959, is “a 
faith common to the natural man and the philosopher—the moment he opens his eyes; 
they refer to a deep-seated set of mute ‘opinions’ implicated in our lives” (TVTI 3).85 
It is “naïve evidence of the world,” enigmatic but “common” to all (3). That being 
said, it is common because it is presupposed rather than unanimously agreed upon. It 
is “perfectly familiar” but impossible to explain (3). The only important matter here is 
“the very fact that this vision is mine” (5). Attention is on the “singular” relation 
between the world and I, a relation that “makes me sometimes remain in appearances, 
and it is also what sometimes brings me to the things themselves” (8). Whilst this idea 
is in line with the examination of lived experience in his earlier Phenomenology of 
Perception, it does not directly tackle the falsity of vision and misguiding beliefs.  
Perceptual faith deflects from the task of differentiating true and false vision, 
                                                
85 Written more than a decade after Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished work 
published posthumously in English under the working title, The Visible and the Invisible (1968), is a 
compilation of ideas in progress and working notes, a work of which “only the first part was written” 
(Lefort, Foreword to TVTI xx). 
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seeing and believing, moving away from epistemological concerns. The problem of 
“synthesis” in Phenomenology of Perception is supplanted by “metamorphosis” (TVTI 
8). Twenty-four years after the publication of his groundbreaking work, Merleau-
Ponty’s discussion of perception moves from a set of stylised acts (for example, 
recalling previous images and associating one with the other) to one that involves an 
abrupt change and growth, a metamorphosis “by which the appearances are 
instantaneously stripped of a value they owed merely to the absence of a true 
perception” (8). Perception is not made of parts substituting parts but is wholly 
transmuted. Part of this shift is motivated by perceptual faith which Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone points out is “a way of avoiding epistemology” (The Primacy of Movement 
300). She elaborates that “faith is epistemologically vacuous” and proves the world 
cannot be reduced analytically (300). More precisely, it cannot even be challenged.  
We often think it is easy to justify or debunk beliefs since they can be tested in 
our everyday lives. Donald Davidson refutes this assumption on the grounds that we 
cannot stand outside beliefs. “No such confrontation makes sense,” he explains, “for 
of course we can’t get outside our skins to find out what is causing the internal 
happening of which we are aware” (Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective 144). 
External “intermediaries,” such as “sensations and observations,” are subjective and 
situational, only accentuating the “epistemological problem” of beliefs (144). The 
futility of justifying beliefs with “intermediaries” is illustrated in “Pink May.” Not 
convinced of the ghostly presence, the secondary character constantly interrupts the 
protagonist with questions that challenge her belief.   
‘But look, did you ever see it?’ 
‘Well, not exactly. No, I can’t say I saw it.’ 
‘You mean, you simply heard it?’ 
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‘Well, not exactly that…’ 
‘You saw things move?’ 
‘Well, I never turned round in time. I… (160) 
Against the interrogative tone of her companion, the protagonist sounds tentative. The 
apprehension felt in her hesitant answers is brought out by the ellipses and repeated 
use of “Well.” Her companion seeks answers, evidence that would ease scepticism. 
The onlooker is a non-believer: s/he does not want to be convinced, but wants to hear 
justifications for the believer’s faith. This is apparent in the manner and chronology in 
which the questions are asked. The first few questions are as follow: 
‘You were frightened?’ 
… 
‘What month?’ 
… 
‘You never met them?’ (151) 
The questions reveal one’s quest for empirical evidence. The secondary character is a 
sceptic, a voice of reason and sanity. But, scepticism has seldom made sense to 
believers. It is pointless to justify beliefs, including perceptual faith, with “something 
outside [its] totality” (Davidson 146). The interrogating character in “Pink May” 
approaches the protagonist’s story from a place of unbelief. The increasingly strained 
conversation finally leaves the protagonist helpless and frustrated, exclaiming, “If you 
don’t understand—I’m sorry I ever told you the story!” (160). Her companion has 
failed to see—“can’t you see there must be something?” (160).  
 Unbelief in the mind and heart manifests in bodily actions, translating into an 
inability to see. The attempt to justify and check beliefs, as seen in “Pink May,” is 
vain and only exposes the tendency to refute a belief so as to reassure one’s own 
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beliefs. It is an example of the need for “further reassurance,” Donaldson explains, so 
that one may “add to his stock of beliefs” (146). One is sucked into an endless strife 
for assurance, comparisons, and other egoistical endeavours that serve the solipsistic 
self. Merleau-Ponty too makes clear that beliefs cannot be justified or checked against 
a thought or practice system of the world. Evidence and reason cannot be used on 
perceptual faith because at the heart of beliefs is “a germ of non-truth in the truth” 
(TVTI 28). What this implies, I infer, is that beliefs are characterised by truthfulness, 
though not necessarily truth. They are truthful in their endeavours to achieve some 
hold on the Truth. Whereas Truth is a single modality of experience, akin to tunnel 
vision, truthfulness allows one to tell it as it is, as true as experience is lived. Contrary 
to popular belief, faith is not blind and its workings are not invisible. As Richard 
Rorty puts it, we run into difficulties when explaining faith because “we [have] not 
succeeded in finding a translation at all” (Consequences of Pragmatism 6). The only 
way to attempt to prove or disprove beliefs is to “run over such possible stories” of 
the believer and “tell the whole story” (7).86 The crux of belief is its truthfulness. And, 
if truthful it cannot be blind to doubt. To be truthful is therefore to see. 
 
Believing is Practically Seeing  
We have seen how faith has a perceptual component and is embodied and lived out. 
This section continues to examine how believing becomes seeing in Bowen’s stories 
and how belief manifests somatically and also spatially in the appearance of the 
haunted house. I will show how believing is a kind of seeing by drawing from 
phenomenology as well as pragmatism: phenomenology approaches beliefs as they 
                                                
86 Rorty demonstrates the un/translatable nature of stories with the example of a foreigner who 
appropriates the language and beliefs of the local. The whole story of the foreigner must be told to 
“decide on the soundness of [local beliefs] against the possibility of [his false beliefs]” (7). 
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are embodied; and pragmatism values believable realities. Haunted experiences, re-
envisioned through the lenses of phenomenology and pragmatism, are experiences of 
embodied and spatialised beliefs. 
Beliefs are part of existence; they are embodied and acted out in the lived 
world. They are veridical only if one is in the thick of experience. Sandra Rosenthal 
and Patrick Bourgeois remind us that perceptual faith is “lived faith”: it “consists in 
living in the belief… that the world in which we live is really the real world” 
(Pragmatism and Phenomenology 174). To live in faith is to live by it, to believe 
before any “validity or verification” (174). It entails practice and performance through 
which one preserves faith and anticipates its fulfillment. This may well be true, but 
this brand of pragmatism neglects the issue of doubt, which as stated before is part of 
belief. The neglect, Sheets-Johnstone explains, is probably due to the difficulty of 
reconciling the acts of “confirming experientially” with “taking on faith” (299). 
Adding doubt would make perception’s task doubly tough.  
Despite the difficulty, Merleau-Ponty insists on the importance of questioning. 
Questioning differs from the justification and checks that Davidson deems useless. It 
does not occur outside the totality of beliefs. Perceptual faith, writes Merleau-Ponty, 
is a “continuous interrogation” (TVTI 103). It is always “questioning itself about 
itself” (103). Herein is the paradox of perceptual faith: it is true in its truthfulness, but 
truthfulness itself means truth is not absolute and that doubt must exist alongside for it 
to be veridical. The doubting character of faith is not the same as scepticism. It is 
better described as inquisitiveness about our everyday experience. In an interview 
with The Believer, Rorty speaks briefly on inquiry: “Inquiry is a matter of problem-
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solving in the here-and-now rather than a search for the Eternal.”87 To doubt, or 
inquire, is a way of making sense of experience. It does not mean to determine the 
truth of the matter; it is more of a means to “ask” if something is “useful for solving 
the problems of the day” (Rorty). This approach to belief turns away from the past 
and preconceptions, instead focusing on its practice and impact on the believer. This 
puts emphasis back on the body and helps direct the discussion towards the women’s 
experiences of the haunted house and the impact of haunting on their perceptions. As 
Rorty says, “the hell with what the source is, let’s look at the consequences.” 
  The pragmatic focus on consequences of beliefs sheds light on the spatial 
manifestations of beliefs as depicted in the women’s experiences of the haunted 
houses in Bowen’s stories. If the appearance of place is a spatial projection of the 
women’s beliefs, then haunted house fiction can be read as narratives of questioning 
faith. Doubt appears viscerally in the form of a haunting, overlaying the house as the 
home held by social beliefs and domestic ideology. It is the belief in the house as a 
home that ironically enables the women to see their uncanny houses as haunting and 
macabre. The more they dwell in haunted space, the more discomfort and anxiety 
brew as a result of the discrepancies between the house as a home (idea) and the 
house as haunted (appearance). The haunted house with strange things and spectral 
happenings forces one to change perspective and see through the façade of beliefs.  
Rose describes in “Bizarre Objects” how Bowen’s employment of strange 
objects upsets one’s equilibrium. Bizarre objects like the leather gloves, the 
mysterious letter, and the pink trees are objects that question “our relationship to the 
perceivable world, our confidence that there is a world which, simply by looking at it, 
                                                
87 The interview took place in Rorty’s Palo Alto home and was conducted by Gideon Lewis-Kraus. It 
was published online in the June 2003 issue of The Believer.  
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is there to be seen” (78). Significantly, Rose points out, these bizarre objects may not 
be analysed as figments of the imagination or evidence of a psychotic break. They are 
products of “another way of seeing things” (83). In this regard, objects, happenings, 
places are not imbued with significance that steers perception, but with a creative 
power that opens a new way of looking at the world. One’s “perceptual instability” as 
a result of strange things and haunted spaces is therefore “partly redemptive, 
disintegrative of all knowing” (78). Rose’s point is illustrated in “Pink May” when the 
protagonist falls into an existential crisis at the end of the story, almost hysterical, 
crying out, “Let to oneself, one doesn’t just ruin one’s life!” (160). Even if we follow 
the doubting secondary character and question the hallucinatory origins of the 
protagonist’s story, the extent of her final breakdown is testimony of how haunted 
space causes the disintegration of the knowledge of the self. It cannot be described in 
a manner that satisfies the sceptic’s need for confirmation and representation.  
From the outset, the sceptic presses for answers to get a clearer portrait of the 
ghost. The unnamed protagonist fails to communicate effectively and represent that 
which cannot be described. The haunted place stops the perceiver from reproducing 
visions of things according to ready-made ideas of them. To Rorty, this would qualify 
as an act against representationalism. His main critique of representation is how it has 
been packaged as a priori truth that upholds “traditional distinctions”: 
A life spent representing objects accurately would be spent recording 
the results of calculations, reasoning through sorites (vagueness), 
calling off the observable properties of things, construing cases 
according to unambiguous criteria, getting things right. (Consequences 
of Pragmatism 164-165) 
In “Pink May,” we see the protagonist somewhat resisting a life of representation. She 
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answers questions which aim at achieving a holistic representation of her experience 
with descriptions of what she felt and saw. She simply cannot convey the haunting as 
accurately as the sceptic demands of her. Like the pragmatist, the protagonist realises 
that there is “no method for knowing when one has reached the truth, or when one is 
closer to it than before” (166). But unlike the pragmatist who sees this as a revelatory 
moment, she is on the verge of a mental breakdown.  
For the woman whose history has always been represented for her, fashioned 
by those in power, to lose the compass which she has hitherto used to navigate her life 
is absolutely terrifying and ghastly. Rorty assures us that getting rid of the compulsion 
to represent would allow us to “gain a renewed sense of community” where “what 
matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together against the dark” (166). 
This presumes that everyone is unmoored in the same way, leveling out our 
confusion. Yet we are not equally in the dark. Unfortunately, for the misfits and 
pariahs, the loyalty that Rorty speaks of can be a euphemism for obedience. See the 
demon lover who expects Kathleen to wait for him, writing to her, “I shall rely upon 
you to keep your promise” (82).  
It is evident in the short stories that there is no existential comfort, only fear 
and the horror of discovering one’s placelessness, displacement from the haunted 
house and herself. She suffers for being truthful and is visually and emotionally 
disorientated. Bowen’s haunted settings are spatial manifestations of intertwining 
belief and doubt, shaking the ground on which faith is built. Writing on ghostly 
presence in Bowen’s writing, Derek Hand suggests that the haunted house forces 
characters to “confront their own stark condition and predicament in the present 
moment” (“Ghost from our Future” 66). The “relationship of the person to place” is 
encapsulated in Bowen’s “spectral occupations” which “centre[s] round characters 
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under pressure in terms of their link to particular places: particular homes and houses” 
(65). Hauntings are projections of uneasiness and feelings of being out of place. And 
the haunted house disrupts the illusion of homeliness and illuminates the fate of 
displacement and homelessness. Bowen’s haunted houses, in widening the gap 
between belief and experience, challenge the naturalised and normative regime of 
experience adopted by their female inhabitants. Destabilising the belief system, which 
regulates perception, haunted space reveals their perceptions to be an understanding 
of the world from a subordinate position which sediments beliefs about identity. The 
women position themselves according to rooted beliefs, believing before seeing.  
Conditioned to look up from down below, they are predisposed to behave in a 
certain way. For example, in the garden, confronted by her fiancé, young Kathleen 
does not move and hesitates to speak. Her inability to respond corresponds to her 
blurred vision brought upon by the darkness and the shadowy garden territorialised by 
the lover—a symbolic blindness from fear and anxiety. In a different place, however, 
where she recognises the oppression, she acts differently. In her Kensington house, 
realising that she is threatened and subjugated, controlled by the demon lover, 
Kathleen thinks of an escape plan. For the first time, “[the] idea of flight” occurs to 
her (“TDL” 86). The “hollowness of the house,” which “cancelled years on years of 
voices, habits and steps,” has a part in emptying Kathleen of rationality and diluting 
belief (85). She who is usually self-controlled loosens up and begins to see the 
actuality of the relationship with her fiancé: “He was set on me, that was what it 
was—not love. Not love, not meaning a person well” (86). She sees now that she was 
his possession, an object the demon lover has returned to retrieve.  
Though Kathleen does not divulge the reason for her promise, she admits to 
the “complete suspension of her existence during that August week” (86). She was 
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benumbed and beside herself. The state of non-being extended into the months after 
her fiancé went missing and for a long whilst she was “dislocate[ed] from everything” 
(84). Even when she married William Drover, her “movements as Mrs. Drover were 
circumscribed” (84). It seems her existence is ever suspended, her identity defined 
and hence limited by forces outside herself. Young Kathleen committed her life to an 
“unnatural promise” because a man was set on her; she “put herself out” to suitors 
because she “share[d] her family’s anxiousness” (84). In a world where patrimonial 
beliefs are imposed, she does not exist for herself. Lassner adds that she is “driven by 
a male fantasy of her total devotion,” around which she builds her life (65). The 
internalised social gaze dictates her identity, but what is particularly interesting about 
the portrayal of Kathleen is how she has been socialised into accepting patrimonial 
beliefs to a point where the demands of society become the demands on the self. In 
Kathleen we see the tension between existential angst and societal pressure. Beliefs of 
society are naturalised by the individual as those of the self.    
Believing that she must fulfill her duties as a fiancée, sister, daughter, wife, 
and mother, Kathleen’s personal experience is shaped by the social. Even when the 
enforcers of social conventions are absent, she is still haunted by the spectre of the 
dominant culture. What was and is social is naturalised into the personal and 
manifested in the physical. Though she has married another, she is not happy but 
plagued by illness. This is symptomatic of unaddressed angst and restlessness from 
being suspended in existence and having to wait until the promise is fulfilled, 
marriage is at hand, and the demon lover returns. It is also a state reflecting the 
coexistence of societal beliefs and existential anxiety, where outer and inner pressures 
coalesce and are difficult to tell apart. Caught between the personal and societal, 
Kathleen is in hesitation. It is as if waiting is intrinsic to her existence; she is expected 
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to wait. The letter from the demon lover writes, “I shall rely upon you to keep your 
promise” (82). As Lassner articulates it, the “fiancé had nothing to worry about, no 
need to doubt her bondage to him” (65). This is her loyalty, one starkly different from 
the empowering loyalty Rorty describes. Her loyalty to him and his demands of her 
reveal the power relation between Kathleen and her fiancé: he dominates her and she 
submits to his power. The subservience speaks to the seamless amalgamation of the 
social and personal. Kathleen has been conditioned to await and accept dominance.  
The conjunction between social and personal, societal pressure and existential 
angst, is overt in the detail of the signature, K., which matches Kathleen’s initial. The 
ambivalence of the dead fiancé’s name, furthered by his shaded face, obscures his 
identity. To Lassner, this is evidence of intermingling consciousnesses to a point 
where “Kathleen is haunted by becoming his reflection” (66-67). Also noticing the 
detail of the signature, Corcoran agrees that it symbolises the “disruption of legitimate 
privacies” (159). Kathleen’s identity is tied to those around her. Hers is “a life lived 
under control, in check, unspontaneously, subserviently; and lived for others, not 
herself, a driven life” (160). Both Lassner and Corcoran identify the succession of 
consciousness as the primary consequence of oppression. Kathleen has completely 
internalised the gaze of the oppressor: “his consciousness overtakes hers” (Lassner 
66). She sees herself as the self that the others see.  
Kathleen, also Sasha in Good Morning, Midnight, is strangely obliged to the 
one in power. The subjugated have a pathological dependence on the dominant, even 
if they are subdued. Women, de Beauvoir writes, are often “weighed” by “a tradition 
of timidity and of submissiveness” (140). The tradition presents itself when young 
Kathleen dares not voice out her thoughts when with her fiancé, when she is unwilling 
to leave the house because she is “a woman whose utter dependability was the 
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keystone of her family life” (85). Corcoran contends that Kathleen’s “persistence” 
reveals the relationship between “possession and self-possession,” “commodity and 
identity” (164). I think the distinctions suggested by Corcoran are two sides of the 
same coin. Holding on to commodity or identity makes it obvious that Kathleen is 
strapped to the domestic tradition which ultimately creates again and promotes the 
need for possession and self-possession. Kathleen’s immobility and silence are acts of 
a fateful, albeit unconscious, resignation. She has given up “without attempting to 
take any action,” acting according to the limited vision and ingrained beliefs she has 
of herself (De Beauvoir 160).  
A similar account of how perception influences beliefs is detailed in “Hand in 
Glove,” where the Trevor sisters imbibe social attitudes and believe before they see. 
Embodying traits of military history and romance, they are described as “tall and 
handsome” with “good bust and shoulders” (208). Though strong as soldiers and 
attractive as lovers, the blend of features makes them “handsome girl[s]” which is the 
“vocation” for women as “many of the best marriages had been made by such” (208). 
They internalise the tradition in a very different way from Kathleen Drover but are 
nevertheless dominated by the system. The sisters are, as Lassner notes, part of “a 
marriage market,” “obsessively driven by the dictum to marry at all costs” (69). They 
are trained to focus on the goal—that being, “Whom, and still more when did they 
mean to marry?” (“HG” 208). Their vision for themselves as wives is a vision 
inherited, parochial and regimented. Ethel’s obsession to marry and desperation to 
attract Lord Fred result in a tunnel vision which doggedly targets the pair of gloves 
that would eventually take her life. “Hand in Glove” dramatises the detrimental 
consequences women face from believing in the reigning ideology and its values.   
 For Ethel, the epiphany comes too late, at the expense of her life. In “Pink 
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May” and “The Demon Lover,” the women are paralysed and descend into darkness. 
The house has no “reassuring power” (“TDL” 84). The women are disenchanted; 
preset ideas of the domestic home fall away. Haunted space challenges perceptual 
faith, the foremost belief in a unifying something that standardises appearance. It 
refuses to cohere with existing conceptions of the domestic abode and stands in the 
way of retrospection. Much like dream spaces, haunted space is found in the 
instantaneity of experience. It is shaped by “feeling that towards which our desire 
goes out, what our heart dreads, on what our lives depend,” situating the perceiver in 
the present place and moment (POP 333). In this sense we cannot pit the experience 
of the dream against that of the bedroom in which the dreamer sleeps in terms of how 
real each experience is. The experiences cannot be measured against a yardstick of 
reality. The crisscrossing of inner and outer spaces, haunted and homely spaces in 
Bowen’s stories advocates for the co-existence of spaces and truths, not separation. 
The point is not whether the house is haunted as experienced by the protagonist or if it 
is a figment of imagination as implied by the other character. “Pink May” is an 
example of co-existence: the haunted house experienced by the unnamed protagonist 
is as possible as the one supposed by the sceptical inquisitor.  
Because belief is about truthfulness and not truth, it is not absolute and can 
exist alongside doubt. It follows that space perceived with the lenses of belief in 
Bowen’s haunted houses, as with Rhys’s rooms and Barnes’s world at night, is one of 
ambivalence. We cannot quite put our finger on it. Whilst memory and darkness 
obscure vision in Good Morning, Midnight and Nightwood, it is belief that muddles 
the narrative of place in Bowen’s ghost stories. The house is haunted because it is 
believed to be so. It is not quite ghosts that scare the women out of their wits but the 
prospect of ghostliness. In “Pink May” spectrality is hinted at or left out. Either way 
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the presence of the absence is enlarged by way of negatives including silence and 
omission as demonstrated in the following excerpt: 
‘The queer thing is, though, I remember whistling but I can’t 
remember when I happened to stop. But I must have stopped, because 
it was then I heard.’ 
‘Heard?’ 
She lit up again, with a slight frown. ‘What was it I heard first, that 
first time? I suppose, the silence. So I must have stopped whistling, 
mustn’t I? … (153) 
Contrary to expectation as voiced by the inquisitor’s curiosity (“‘Heard?’”), it is what 
is unheard that startles the protagonist. What is heard is only alluded to: when the 
whistling stops, it is heard. The silence and non-events—the reiteration that “there’s 
nothing queer about that”—are chilling and suspenseful (154).  
The lack of action and evidence of the supernatural is disappointing to the 
reasoning listener who lets out a doubting “Oh?” and “Heard?” (154). The question 
marks, capturing rising inflection, are cues for clarification, along with a list of 
directives such as “Because of the…” and “I’d been going to say…” in which ellipses 
encourage explication (152). Many times the inquiring character tries to predict the 
unfolding and steer the account in order to normalise the extraordinary. William 
James would reason that the rhetoric is fueled by “practical consequences” in which 
we ask “what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and 
combines with the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being omitted” 
(Pragmatism 80). The secondary character needing coherence and reason asks 
questions as a psychologist would: “‘What makes you think that?’” (158). S/he does 
not “look on [answers] as closing [one’s] quest” but aims to “bring out of each word 
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its practical cash-value” (James 53).88 The protagonist, however, is uncooperative. 
She constantly digresses. Her narrative is littered with dashes: some interject with 
parenthetical information and reflections whilst others break the flow of sentences. 
Content aside, her speech is jerky and rambling.   
 The juxtaposition of the main character’s experience of ghostliness against the 
secondary character’s expectation of a ghost story is not to validate one and void the 
other, but to show how beliefs can spin different perceptual accounts. Thinking like a 
phenomenologist, our concern with belief is how it orientates the body and drives it to 
perceive the environing world in a certain way. A belief powerful enough contributes 
to the natural attitude—what Kelly calls the “attitude of belief” (“Merleau-Ponty on 
the Body” 387). But recognising belief is not the same as addressing the engineering 
of belief: how is it socially conditioned, gendered, and appropriated for the believer? 
Phenomenology and pragmatism are interested in belief only if “a belief is what it is 
only by virtue of its position in a web” (Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 98). 
Merleau-Ponty would probably say together with Rorty, “Do not ask where the new 
beliefs and desires come from” (93).   
Pragmatism stays away from absolutism. Rorty describes the pragmatist: 
He wants us to give up the notion that God, or evolution, or some other 
underwriter of our present world-picture, has programmed us as 
machines for accurate verbal picturing, and that philosophy brings self-
knowledge by letting us read our own program. (Consequences of 
Pragmatism 165) 
We are discouraged from a life ordered by the dominant structure of perception that 
takes the guise of “an unclouded mental eye” (165). Rorty’s persuasion is reminiscent 
                                                
88 James’s cash-value refers to the practical fulfillment of sensations that words and ideas promise.  
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of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the omniscient eye, the God-like perspective we think we 
have of the world. Both the phenomenologist and pragmatist want us to turn away 
from—and here I quote James— 
abstract and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a prior 
reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes 
and origins… towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, 
towards action and towards power. (51) 
James invites us to turn from a priori arguments and towards what is present and is to 
come. There is a nagging historical lack. In comparison, Merleau-Ponty’s work has 
more historical leanings in his affirmation of a world that is already there. Both views 
attempt to reconnect human beings and the world by beginning with facticity, a brute 
facticity that is given and always already there. The pragmatist sees no need to dwell 
on the truth of the matter. The phenomenologist focuses by veering from the matter, 
by way of “re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world” (POP viii). 
The two varying approaches have the same implication for belief: that is, seeing and 
believing are practically one and the same.   
“To believe is to see”; the pragmatist professes the possibilities of faith. 
“Seeing is believing”; the phenomenologist rejoins with perceptual faith in mind. The 
first speaks of the relation between belief and desire, the second of motive and 
decision. Pragmatism has shown us how believing can be conceived as seeing, how 
beliefs constitute perceptual experience. However, where pragmatism intersects with 
phenomenology is also a gap, a non-address of the engendering of beliefs. The two 
schools of thought, one anti-essentialist and the other non-dualist, do not consider 
how beliefs may be engineered to the disadvantage of women and tend to ignore the 
experiential specificities of women’s circumstances. It is also this jarring absence of 
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discourse on the feminine experience that makes it clear, I think, that pragmatism with 
its levelling impulse and phenomenology with its androcentric body are ill-equipped 
to address women’s situation for her experience is always indiscriminately located 
within the theories. There is a pressing need to particularise the phenomenological 
framework to address women’s experience, which in context has to do with how 
women naturalise beliefs and practice them.   
 
Committing to A View of the World 
To attend to experiential particularities related to women’s being in the world, we 
must acknowledge that feminine experience has not been adequately addressed in 
philosophic and pragmatic discourses and that the woman is commonly regarded as 
“the negative, the underside, the reverse of the only visible” (Irigaray 26). She has a 
lower vantage point and receives beliefs differently. Whilst it is against the principles 
of French post-structuralist and some Anglo-American feminisms to ascribe women’s 
experience to essentialism in the sense of biological determinism, I think it is careless 
to render the female an equal to the male caught up in “webs of desires and beliefs” 
where according to Rorty we are equally free to “simply drop an old belief or desire” 
or “create a whole host of new beliefs and desires” (Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 
93). Rorty is right in his views as a pragmatist, as Merleau-Ponty is astute in his 
observations about the general lived body. But their vantage point is high up and they 
speak from an unsilenced male privilege.  
Phenomenology and pragmatism have shown us the power of belief but the 
radially complex web architectures of Rorty and Merleau-Ponty’s experiential 
theories do not draw out vertical levels of perception. There are orders and hierarchies 
governing the world and along with them are varying vantage points and perceptual 
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levels, depending on where one sits on the socio-political ladder. The truth is that 
many women experience the world from the bottom. This is not to lump experiences 
together and claim all are equally subjugated, but women’s experience, or feminine 
experience in the looser sense, needs a more thorough examination of nature and 
essence. What I bring attention to in this final section of the chapter is how women 
see with a limited point of view and how places appear to them because of the beliefs 
they have inherited. The view from the bottom is not that bad; Haraway believes that 
“vision is better from below the brilliant space platforms of the powerful” (59). The 
point of view, I will argue, is spatially expansive, characterising feminine experience. 
This section reinforces what has been discussed on feminine seeing and examines 
how women’s situations shape an alternative mode of perception.    
To recap, feminine seeing sets into motion a mise en abyme effect where 
presence films over surrounding space, opening up one spatial detail after another.89 
In Good Morning, Midnight, Sasha’s angst saturates the room and her tendency 
towards the past brings in other rooms she once lived in. In Bowen’s stories there is a 
similar opening up of spaces even though the heroines’ are more privileged than 
Rhys’s wandering women. In “The Demon Lover,” Kathleen Drover enters the house 
with apprehension. The feelings affect her perception. Her perceptual experience is 
suffused with a sense of angst that is spatially projected in the “unwilling lock,” 
increases in proportion in the “warped” door, and culminates in the pervasive “dead 
air” (80). Ghostliness increases in magnitude as one spatial element connects to the 
other. Kathleen Drover quite literally meets her doom in the opening paragraph of the 
story. The mise en abyme is more obvious in “Pink May,” particularly how it unveils 
underlying social and gender issues.  
                                                
89 A woman’s presence is “her own attitude to herself” (Berger 46). 
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When asked if she is frightened, the female character in “Pink May” instead 
describes the view from the bedroom:  
And the room at times I’m talking about used to be full of daylight—
sunset. It had two French windows, and they were on a level with the 
tops of may trees out in the square. Then may was in flower that 
month, and it was pink. In that sticky sunshine you have in the 
evenings the may looked sort of theatrical. It used to be part of my 
feeling of going out. (151) 
The attempt to get the protagonist to take inventory of her feelings and frame her 
account of the haunted house within what it means to be frightened (“You were 
frightened?”) backfires as she digresses. Still, there is something amiss and vaguely 
dreadful in her reply. The idiomatic phrase “used to” is repeated twice, signalling the 
lack of something which is no longer present. The emptiness inside the house sharply 
contrasts with the picturesque view outside. The open windows, the cheerful coupling 
of pink and yellow, sunshine, and flowers set up a hopeful and bright atmosphere that 
accentuates the interior lack. Though she does not speak specifically about her fear, 
the spatial details reveal her mood and angst. Her account of the room gives a sense of 
her feelings. As Berger reminds us, “there is nothing she can do which does not 
contribute to her presence” (46). 
What we have is a mapping of space that begins from a parochial point and 
branches out into other spaces, a point that begins from who she perceives herself to 
be. To feminists eager to get away from foundationalist thought, this is prevarication. 
Working within phallocentric tradition is not enough. Radical feminism, which began 
with the 1960s second-wave feminism, would in theory prefer Gilman’s Herland to 
Lysistrata, favouring revolutionary changes over reforms. In the same way, queer is 
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framed in terms of homosociality as being rather than homosexuality as identity. Such 
feminism, I think, is unsustainable. As Waugh points out, it ends up “fatally 
undermining itself as an emancipatory politics” (“Modernism, Postmodernism, 
Feminism” 190). Separatist approaches lead nowhere. For emancipatory goals we 
must focus on our situatedness in a world of self and other selves. In and of the world, 
we are part of it, of other selves, and they are parts of us.   
Though it sounds foolish to think we can converse with tradition and its 
keeper, to see the light in oppressive darkness, without remaining marginalised, I 
think the encounter between feminism and phenomenology can mediate the relations 
between the oppressed and the oppressor. Feminist phenomenology can qualify the 
essence of feminine experience without approaching women’s situations as 
compromise and negation of autonomous existence. To rephrase Haraway, a limited 
point of view is still a unique vantage point. Stein for one was a phenomenologist 
who wrote as a Jewish woman in academia; she did not shy away from her vantage 
point. Her phenomenology is women-centric and is conscious of limitation. Also 
known by her religious name, St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, Stein saw human 
being as a “finite” image of God (Essays on Women 73). She avows that woman must 
“seek to know within the form and limits ordained by God” (73). To seek within the 
form is to seek within what has been prescribed. Women have to turn to our limited 
position in the world to understand ourselves even if “life itself has made our 
existence problematic” (45). Through our situations we learn to become. Our maturity 
is not synonymous with autonomy or transcendence. Essence is not metaphysical but 
“a being in the state of becoming” (46). For Stein, it is not Truth but “forms” that 
“participate in existence” (Haney, “Edith Stein: Woman and Essence” 221). These 
forms show in our body and bearing, in our lived experiences. Our sufferings and 
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subjugation are a part of finite existence. They are manifestations of essence, of what 
it means to be a woman, of the difficulty of being woman. Stein’s writings elucidate 
how circumstances are part of the embodied experience. Limitations, in the form of 
disadvantages and challenges, shape how we see the world. 
Emplaced in a fixed location like the haunted house in Bowen’s short stories, 
women see the world from a limited perspective that makes room for stories, myths, 
dreams, and the like. Finitude extends to the place in which they are situated. As 
Haraway tells us, gender is “extreme localization” (63). This means to be gendered is 
also to be part of practiced space. Space is existential in this sense because it affords 
“a particular terrain of possibilities in which [one’s] agential actions and decisions can 
take hold” (Telaro, “Perception, Normativity, and Selfhood in Merleau-Ponty” 351). 
It emplaces women and makes space where essence is existent. Tuan likens existential 
space to finite worlds like isolated villages that are held together by sufficiency, or at 
least possibilities of sufficiency. Inhabitants may own very specific knowledge of life 
unique to their worlds, but their experiences do not come in handy outside the finitude 
of space, for “knowledge of terrain becomes hazy and inaccurate” when they leave 
their homes (Tuan 87). Along similar lines, Merleau-Ponty draws parallels between 
existential space and the “world of myth” inhabited by “primitive people” (POP 332). 
This world has its own habitus and structure of perception, sustained by myths which 
are sufficient for its people. “Primitive people,” Merleau-Ponty claims, “do not 
overstep this existential space” (332). Both the geographer and philosopher, despite 
different approaches to space, seem to suggest that finitude affirms existence, even if 
the people of finite worlds live by beliefs that keep them within a particular order. 
Finitude, according to Stein, has to do with limit. Casey explains that to say a 
place is limited means “there is nothing beyond the place of an actual occasion—
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except another place for another occasion” (Getting Back Into Place 15). Meaning is 
produced and enclosed within. This way finite place guarantees a fixed location and a 
limited point of view. According to Haraway, women can find objectivity in “limited 
location” because precision “allows [them] to become answerable for what [they] 
learn how to see” (59). There is hope of gaining some form of re-cognition since 
“partial perspective promises objective vision” (59). The point is, I am placed, 
therefore I am. “I” is dependent on how deeply rooted one is to beliefs in and of place. 
This rootedness, Merleau-Ponty explicates, is the reason for our “significant” lives: 
“this certain significance of nature and history which I am, does not limit my access 
to the world, but on the contrary is my means of entering into communication with it” 
(POP 529). Significance, however parochial, gives freedom which “does not conjure 
away our finitude” (528). Merleau-Ponty tells it plainly, “It is by being unrestrictedly 
and unreservedly what I am at present that I have a chance at moving forward” (529).   
Maria Telaro, too, agrees that we draw strength to live from “a particular level 
of commitment to, or implantation in, a concrete existential situation” (451). The odd 
pairing of commitment with implantation suggests that existential space is not a space 
of delimitation but of spatial commitment. Being in place, situated and committed, 
offers a different kind of freedom. This is freedom that coexists with limitation. As 
Merleau-Ponty warns, if we try to escape commitments, “to bypass [our] natural and 
social situation by refusing to take it up,” we risk being free at all (POP 529). The 
choices and actions we make as a result of commitments do not “restrict our liberty, 
since choice and action alone cut us loose from our anchorage” (530). To be is to be 
committed; to be committed is to be to be free. For Stein, it is Catholic faith that 
preserves her world. For Merleau-Ponty, the promise of Being rubs out possibilities of 
becoming. When asked by de Beauvoir how he reconciled God with existentialism, he 
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simply riposted, “It is better to sacrifice becoming than being.”90   
In Bowen’s stories, the houses, finite and haunted, mirror the women’s limited 
perspectives and fateful situations. Their demises are tragic; the lack of some form of 
transcendence is frustrating. Still, I think, by taking emphasis away from the traumatic 
endings and focusing on the ordinary lived experience, a feminist phenomenology can 
bring out a potentially positive reading of the texts. Its perspective accentuates lived 
experiences and situations, the evanescent spatio-temporal moments of being in the 
world. To quote Bowen: “Nothing can happen nowhere” (“Notes on Writing a Novel” 
39). Put differently, as long as there is place, there is potential for transformation, a 
change in mind, and possibility of action. There are no big moments of liberation, 
epiphanies, or gasping revelations in Bowen’s ghost stories. If there are, they come 
too late. The women have given up the ghost. Still what we do find in these stories is 
an unyielding commitment to presenting the world as it has been given to the women, 
as they perceive it from their limited vantage points. We cannot judge their decisions, 
but we are haunted by their perseverance and commitment. Kathleen Drover may be 
trapped in a taxi driving to nowhere but her unheard scream reverberates. Ethel 
Trevor is dead but her struggle is etched on her sister’s heart. The haunting carries on 
long after the haunted is gone.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
90 As recorded by de Beauvoir in her July 1927 diary entry from Diary of a Philosophy Student: 
Volume I, 1926-1927 (44). 
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Conclusion 
Phenomenology, feminism, and literature expound on lived experience. They are 
concerned with direct experience, exploring how and why we see the world in certain 
ways. Each account of their subject’s experience—be it the amputee, the subjugated 
woman, Clarissa Dalloway, or Sasha Jenson—reveals something more about the 
world we share regardless of our differences. Sometimes abstract and vast, other 
times oppressive and insufferable, the worlds which phenomenology, feminism, and 
literature explore are nonetheless the same small world. We belong to what Merleau-
Ponty calls a “circuit” in which one “connects” to the other (TVTI 269). Connection is 
paramount to existence: “the other is a relief as I am, not absolute vertical existence” 
(269). The term, “relief,” is intentional: it is a reminder that before connecting with 
other selves, we must first connect with the material world. This also means taking 
into account that certain reliefs are gentler and others steeper, just as some existences 
come with higher vantage points and others lower. Such is the landscape of humanity.  
 In the fin de siècle world, the irregularities in this landscape of humanity, that 
gap between men and women’s experiences, between subject and object, positive and 
negative, dominant and other became increasingly difficult to turn a blind eye to. The 
consciousness of difference, of individuality can be attributed to the spatial changes 
that were brought about with the turn of the nineteenth century into the twentieth. The 
texts chosen for this thesis were written in a time of spatial crisis, in which new and 
improved machines of transport like the aeroplane and electric motor car destabilised 
absolute space and “argued for its heterogeneity” (Kern 132), “located within the 
movements between and across multiple sorts of space” (Thacker 8). Clarissa 
contemplates the vicissitudes of life whilst ambling through the busy streets and quiet 
parks of London; Sasha slips into the past as she traipses around Paris; Kathleen 
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relives the memory of the demon lover when she enters the haunted house. The 
women crisscross ambivalent spaces and blur boundaries. This mobility, spurred by a 
restive and wandering spirit, is an outward symptom of the irregular landscape, of the 
fracturing sense of identity and reality as traditional paradigms of self and society are 
shaken in light of new epistemologies. The select narratives of being situated in 
certain cities and rooms reveal how the changing spatiality of the early twentieth 
century shaped the imaginations of writers.  
Modernity set in motion “a chaos of imperfection, discord” which, according 
to Wyndham Lewis, freed “art and imagination” from “the lump of compressed life” 
(“Manifesto II” 33; 32). The early twentieth century was truly “a time of excitement 
and new freedoms” (Scott 6). Especially for women who stayed home, modernity 
along with its spatial flux opened the door to a life beyond the common sitting-room. 
It promised movement, literally and symbolically. There is a sure connection between 
mutable space and the hubbub of modern life, one reflected in many literary works of 
the time, wherein geography is a pivotal fixture. In Woolf’s earlier work, “The Mark 
on the Wall,” the protagonist mulls over the frenetic pace of life: “Why, if one wants 
to compare life to anything, one must liken it to being blown through the Tube at fifty 
miles an hour—landing at the other end without a single hairpin in one’s hair!” (84). 
Bowen’s characters are also “in transit consciously”: they move “from room to room 
or floor to floor of the same house, or one to another portion of its surroundings” 
(Pictures and Conversations 41). In their fiction the line between interior and exterior 
wears thin: the mind segues from thought to thought as the body moves from space to 
space.  
As noted in Gerald Bullett’s review of Mrs Dalloway, such modernist work 
has a “continuous effect,” connecting “external drama” and “the life of the mind”: 
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The sensation of seeing and feeling the very stream of life, the 
undeviating tide of time, flowing luminously by, with all the material 
phenomena, streets and stars, bicycles and human bodies, floating like 
straws upon its surface. (164) 
The experience of places and people cannot be separated from the expansive mind. So 
instead of vain attempts to access the dark recesses of inner life, the trope of spatiality 
enabled a physical mapping of consciousness in which the workings of the mind are 
corporealised and manifested in one’s traverses. Given the evanescent and mercurial 
nature of thoughts, the only viable way to “catch” life as it is vague and escaping is, 
as Woolf instructs, to “trace the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in 
appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness” (“Modern 
Fiction” 159; 161). This pattern, as I have argued in this thesis, has a spatial aspect. It 
can be found in women’s experiences of places: why they behave the way they do in 
certain spaces; where they feel comfortable or uneasy in; what they do to remain still 
or leave their positions. Significantly, how places are inhabited and experienced gives 
insight into women’s relation to the world and describes an inclusive but nonetheless 
particularised modality of experience sympathetic to delimited perspectives, restricted 
mobility, and constrained space. 
Situated below, far from the positive and neutral, women are no strangers to 
disadvantage. It is this unique position, this view from the bottom that sparks curiosity 
for someplace larger than the sitting-room, higher than the attic. In the fin de siècle 
world the spaces to which women were confined were no longer well founded. Riding 
the wave of chaos, perhaps foreseeing an opportunity for change, the women writers 
let their female protagonist wander the streets and linger in dingy rooms so they may 
find a place of their own. As Ahmed argues, “Nothing is brought forth without 
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coming to reside somewhere, where the somewhere (say, the house, the room, or the 
skin) shapes the surface of ‘what’ it ‘is’ that is brought forth” (40). Whether it is the 
hotel or the home, public or domestic space, the narratives of places are stories of 
inhabitation, of how women come and go, inherit and dwell, in the world.  
The literary feminist phenomenology developed in this thesis is a framework 
for examining the narratives of women’s experiences in and of the lived world, with 
emphasis on the material, working world. It calls for a politics that involves place, 
recognising that preconceived ideas and perceptions of places affect inhabitation and 
one’s involvement in the world. One’s relationship to place—how she perceives her 
environment, her movements and position in certain situations, for example—reveals 
much about her relationship to the dominant ideology and political institutions that 
propagate familiar narratives of experience. A literary feminist phenomenology of 
place is a means to illuminate and understand women’s relationship to the lived world 
and its history and politics so as to give meaning and expression to her experience on 
her own terms. Phenomenology, with its ideas on the thinking and emoting body, 
positionality, and orientation, provides the tools to describe direct experience, whilst 
feminism committed to “deconstructing both the subject and the ‘master narratives’ of 
history” provides the lens through which the negative and neglected experiential 
specificities may be examined and given an autonomous existence different from that 
of the hegemonic ideal (Feminine Fictions 16). Women’s writing, with its revisionary 
imperative, revises the implicitly male philosophy by confronting phenomenology’s 
experiential generalities and shifting the area of focus to queer and invisible modes of 
inhabitation. Approaching narratives of women’s experiences with the framework of a 
revised phenomenology, we gather snapshots of what feminine experience might look 
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like: that is, women in the midst of a spatial moment, exploring a certain room, caught 
in action and in position. 
Although this thesis sets out to discover what constitutes feminine experience 
and posits that there are distinct ways in which women engage with the world, it must 
be emphasised again that feminine experience is not a blanket term for all women and 
only women. Femininity, as Toril Moi defines in Kristevan terms, is a “position” 
(126). It is “relational”: “men can also be constructed as marginal to the symbolic 
order” (126). What I hope to have shown in this thesis is how feminine experience, 
through phenomenological analyses of women’s inhabitations and interactions with 
place, is intricately bound with spatial consciousness which encompasses a sensitivity 
to the power of place, a mastery of its practices, and a proclivity to connect places. At 
the core of feminine experience is our relation to the world in the most material sense 
of the word. It is true—and I quote Woolf here—“that our relation is to the world of 
reality” (A Room of One’s Own 132). Not only that, this relation is a solitary one. We 
embark on a journey to find a room of our own in a world of many rooms. Escaping 
the sitting-room is both exciting and intimidating. The ground outside can be rosy, 
also shaky. The point I want to make is that feminine experience is an exploratory 
kind. It is personal and sometimes lonely, enlightening but also confusing. It is not 
exclusive to one gender, particular only because it is an individual endeavour. Its 
singleness means it cannot be essentialist, whilst its mess celebrates randomness and 
difference. 
In September of 1925, when life got the better of her, Woolf noted to herself: 
“Arrange whatever pieces come your way” (A Writer’s Diary 80). Widely quoted, this 
has become a mantra to live by. I prefer to read it with a spatial consciousness, that 
one should arrange whatever pièces, or whatever rooms, come your way. So when a 
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literary feminist phenomenologist asks “Where are you coming from?” it is not a 
question of perspective per se. What we really want to know is where you have been 
and where are you heading. As Rhys would agree, let the room speak. 
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